7 1 0 2 / 5 e u s s I e Journal Special Issue: Pipeline Safety in Germany www.pipeline-journal.net ISSN 2196-4300
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Pipeline Safety in Germany A Success Story Pipelines are the lifeline of our society and our economy, thus they deserve our attention in order to work safely and reliably. Pipelines transport gas, oil, water and other products over long distances, mostly over thousands of kilometers, from production facilities to the user. On their way, pipelines traverse mountains, cross lakes and pass densely populated areas. Damages to pipelines threaten lives, can cause high costs and inflict harm to the environment. At the same time, more and more pipelines are crossing developing and emerging coun- tries that do not have up to date technical standards, and this poses high risk. International exchange of experience is there- fore indispensable to transfer knowledge on how to apply the most reliable and safe tech- nology. This is important for all steps along the value-chain of pipelines: planning, construction and operation. Especial- ly in the case of gas and oil pipelines, PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 3 EDITORIAL Prof. Dr. Gerald Linke CEO DVGW Dr. Klaus Ritter President EITEP mistakes can lead to catastrophic incidents with far-reaching consequences. Taking into account the fact that the pipeline network (high pressure) length totals about 4 million km, and is being extended by 25,000 km every year, we are obliged to exercise prudence and attention to safety. The Pipeline Technology Conference (ptc) and its publication the Pipeline Technology Journal (ptj) are instruments for fostering an ex- change of experience and best practice. During this, Europe’s leading pipeline conference, latest techno- logical developments are presented by scientists, operators, service providers and administrators. Since the first ptc, more than 12 years ago, safety has been a core topic. Safety was also discussed prominently during the last ptc in May 2017. DVGW – the German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water – has been asked to report in a special session about its technical set of rules, their implementation in the field and their positive impact on pipeline practice. The German gas supply system excels in its high level of technical safety, not least due to the constant advancement of technical stand- ards in the course of the DVGW’s work on the Set of Rules. The focus of this edition of the ptj is the sta- tistical evaluation of damage incident and accident data, the holistic safety methodology of the DVGW and the further development of the Set of Rules, taking into consideration current case law and scientific investigations as well as enhancements of the Set of Rules review process. The decrease in the number of incidents in the German gas supply network in the past 30 years by 90% is a remarkable result of Germany’s safety process and leads - even though the pipeline network has in- creased considerably in length and has aged over the same period - to the current frequency of nearly 0.01 incidents per 1,000 km per year. Nevertheless, improvements have to be made in areas where incidents occur more frequently in order to systematically reduce incidents caused by technical or human error. The technical papers of the DVGW safety session are provided in this special edition of ptj. Due to the international interest in the aforementioned technical session, we have decided to augment this edition with additional papers with related topics. The Pipeline Technology Conference will continue to discuss latest safety-related technological develop- ments. The Pipeline Technology Journal will keep you informed. Dr. Klaus Ritter President EITEP Euro Institute for Information and Technology Transfer in Environmental Protection Prof. Dr. Gerald Linke CEO DVGW German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water
4 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL THIS ISSUE’S COMPLETE CONTENT NOVEMBER 2017 / ISSUE 5 TECHNICAL ARTICLES RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY Ensuring the Technical Safety of Gas Infrastructures in Germany Alfred Klees / Anika Groos DVGW Integrated Safety Concept of DVGW in Terms of Statistical Verification of Incidents Frank Dietzsch DVGW Implementing the Integral DVGW Safety Concept at Open Grid Europe Dr. Michael Steiner Open Grid Europe Enhanced Safety through expert assessments Christian Engel TÜV NORD Systems A shift of paradigm for construction inquiries Jens Focke BIL Pipeline Security: Public Awareness and Mitigation of Third Party Accidents Prof. Dr. Jürgen Schmidt / Natalie Schmidt / Johannes Biernath CSE Application of Proactive Risk Management in Pipeline Integrity Ricardo Almandoz / Debora Veitia ROSEN Germany INDUSTRY AND PRACTICE DENSOLEN used for Field-Joint Coating on High Pressure Natural Gas Lines in Bavaria, Germany Denso Group Germany REPORTS CONFERENCES / SEMINARS / EXHIBITIONS www.linkedin.com/groups/4740567 ptc 2017 Report www.twitter.com/pipelinejournal ptj Job & Carrer Market www.facebook.com/ Pipeline.Technology.Conference www.pipeline-journal.net Company Directory Event Calender 08 16 22 28 32 38 44 56 58 62 64 66
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Alfred Klees / Anika Groos DVGW – German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water ENSURING THE TECHNICAL SAFETY OF GAS INFRASTRUCTURES IN GERMANY
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 9 RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY ABSTRACT An extensive gas infrastructure system criss- crossing Germany ensures the high reliability of supply of heat and electricity to the civilian population, of process heat/heat energy and natural gas as a raw material for organic chemistry to the industry, of highly efficient primary energies to power plants, and of alternative environmentally friendly fuels (CNG/LNG) to the transport industry. The German gas supply system excels in its high level of techni- cal safety, which is not least due to the constant advancement of technical standards in the course of the DVGW’s work on the Set of Rules. The focus of this article is on the statisti- cal evaluation of damage incident and accident data, the holistic safety concept of the DVGW, and on the further de- velopment of the Set of Rules, taking into consideration current case law and scientific investigations as well as an adjustment of the DVGW codifi- cation processes. It additionally discusses aspects that will affect the gas infrastructure in the context of the energy turnaround. This paper is the first of a series of technical articles that deal with the safety-related challenges facing the gas infrastructure. The German gas grid currently consists of 550,000 km worth of closely intermeshed pipelines. Gas transmission lines cover nearly all of Germany (Figure 1). The structure shown in the figure has been built and expanded over the last two to three decades using cutting-edge technologies and materials. Figure 1: Germany’s comprehensive gas infrastructure, this figure showing pressure classes > 4 bar Source: GeoBasic-DE/BGK 2012/DBI
10 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY Figure 2: Its central geopolitical location makes Germany a gas import and export hub Source: ENTSOG ENERGY SUPPLY FOR GERMANY AS AN INDUSTRIAL LOCATION Various energy carriers cover Germany’s annual primary energy demand of cur- rently about 3,644TWh (Figure 3), with 21 per cent of the primary energy coming from natural gas. Today 13 per cent of the energy demand is already covered by renewable energies; the intention is to substitute the remaining 87 per cent of fossil energies in the long run. National energy policy is aimed at con- siderably reducing the primary energy demand across all sectors by 2040 by way of potential energy savings and/or efficiency increases. Direct electricity generation from sun and wind does not produce waste heat, of which power plants such as e.g. coal- fired powered plants produce an amount greater than the generated electrical power. Assuming energy savings of ap- proximately 3 per cent per year will still keep the use of primary energy at about 50 per cent. Even assuming that energy demand could be reduced by as much as 3 per cent annually until 2040 as compared to the current trend, almost 50 per cent of today’s energy consumption, i.e. almost 2,000TWh, will still need to be provided in a sustainable way . Its geographical location makes Germany a hub for both gas imports and exports; as such, Germany plays a critical role in the European gas infrastructure network (Figure 2). The German gas grid has a twofold task: first, to link import and export points and second, to link the main production and consumption points. This makes it one of the most complex technical structures in Europe. Gas consumption is subject to strong fluctuations; it depends e.g. on the season, time of day, and economic cycles. Short-term supply and demand imbalances can be directly buffered in the transmission network. Germany’s geology provides for sufficient subsurface storage capacities so that even major fluctuations in consumption can be accommodated without difficulty . Currently, the predominant renewable energy sources are wind power and PV. It is foreseeable that this trend will continue in the future as biomass, hydropower and geothermal are limited resources. National energy policy intends to increase the demand for “electrical power” in e.g. households and the industry, raising the impres- sion that the world (of energy) is moving towards a fully integrated world of electricity, or all-electric-world, where energy is generated, transmitted, and consumed in the form of electricity. Alternative gas technologies however can increasingly be found on the agenda of discussions on energy policy. “The German gas grid has a twofold task: first, to link import and export points and second, to link the main production and consumption points. This makes it one of the most complex technical structures in Europe.” Alfred Klees
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 11 RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY Other 15.6TWh 0,40% Renewables 463.3TWh 13% Black coal 477.2TWh 13% 3643,9 TWH Lignite 434.7TWh 12% Mineral oils 1242.2TWh 34% Only about 2,454TWh worth of final energy out of 3,644 TWh worth of primary energy will eventually reach the consumer on ac- count of conversion and transmission loss- es. The heat energy sector (space heating, hot water, and process heating) accounts for almost half of that (1,214TWH), while the electricity and transport sectors require con- siderably less energy (515TWh and 725TWh, respectively). Potential process heat energy savings are comparatively low. Moreover, electrically powered heat pumps can be used only up to a point because of the high temperatures required for their operation. Heat energy demand management however offers a huge energy-saving potential . The more stringent requirements of the Ger- man Heat Insulation Ordinance have already helped to sustainably reduce the demand for heat energy (Figure 4). Nuclear energy 278.1TWh 7% Natural gas 781.1TWh 21% Exploiting additional savings potentials offered by efficient appliance or insulation technologies could further reduce the current demand for primary energy. Highly efficient gas technologies, however, would make the most signifi- cant contribution towards drastically reducing emissions. Simply shifting from obsolete heating systems to gas condensing boilers could save 20 million tons of CO2. Figure 3: Primary energy consumption in Germany in 2015: 13 per cent of the energy is already ob- tained from renewable sources. Germany intends to substitute the remaining 87 per cent of energy from fossil sources in the long run Source: AGEB 2016 This would go hand in hand with potential financial gains generated through energy savings. A further reduction of emissions can be achieved using CHP and “gas-plus tech- nologies” such as gas-powered heat pumps . ) a 2 m ( / h W k n i d n a m e d y g r e n e g n i t a e H 1st Heat Insulation Ordinance (WSchVO) 1978: 140 kWh/m²a max. Only approx. 12% of buildings achieve the optimum energy efficiency level. 1st WSchVO 1978-1984 2nd WSchVO 1984-1995 3rd WSchVO 1995-2007 EnEV (Energy Saving Ordinance) 2002-2006 Total (1.6%) Of which Kfw*-60 (0.8%) Of which Kfw*-40 (0.3%) Of which passive buildings (0.006%) *Reconstruction Loan Corporation Figure 4: Heat energy demand of buildings. The energy turnaround in the heat market happens to the existing infrastructure Quelle: Prof. Maas, Bestandsersatz als Variante der energetischen Sanierung, 2009; destatis Mikrozensus 2006, IWU, Bremer Energie Institut, 2012; Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, 2012 Folie: 1
12 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY “By advancing the comprehensive safety concept that was developed in the early 1990’s, the DVGW has set a milestone in the evaluation and reduction of damage and incidents in the gas supply sector by 90 Percent within the last 30 years...” HOW SAFE IS GERMANY’S GAS IN- FRASTRUCTURE? In the light of continuing national and pan-European gas market regulations, current structural changes in the busi- ness environment and the fundamental reorganisation of the energy supply systems in Germany and Europe, it is the primary aim of the national economic and business policy to maintain a high standard of technical safety of the gas supply systems. By advancing the comprehensive safety concept that was developed in the early 1990s, the DVGW has set a milestone in the evaluation and reduction of damage and accidents in the gas supply sector. The statistical/stochastic analysis of incidence data collected from the damage and accident statistics of the DVGW has served as a basis for the elaboration of the cause-oriented Incidents/1,000km of pipeline length 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,1 0,0 m k 0 0 0 1 , / s t n e d c n i I 1980 1990 2000 Year 0,05 0,04 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,01 r y · m k 0 0 0 1 r e p y c n e u q e r f e r u r y · m k 0 0 0 1 r e p y c n e u q e r f e r u THE HOLISTIC DVWG SAFETY CONCEPT As the DVGW’s holistic safety concept is focused on suitable measures that can be implemented in all cor- responding technical areas (Figure 7), it is not confined to the work on the Set of Rules. The qualification and certification of products, individuals, service providers and management systems as well as of companies conse- quently play an important role. The following quality requirements, among others, have been defined to reflect the high standards of the Set of Rules: - Gas supply and gas application technologies are governed by stringent legal regulations such as the German Energy Industry Law (EnWG), the German High Pressure Gas Pipeline Ordinance (GasHDrLtgV), the German Low Pressure Connection Ordinance (NDAV), and the German Model Building Regulations (MBO), in which observation of and compliance with the DVGW Set of Rules are anchored as generally recognised codes of practice and/or state-of-the-art technology. DVGW DVGW 0,05 itel der Präsentation, Arial 38pt hole hole rupture rupture unknown unknown Optionaler Untertitel, Arial 28pt a F l i l i a F 0 0,01 2010 2020 external interference corrosion constr/material hot tapping ground unknown gender, Arial 24pt 0 external interference corrosion constr/material hot tapping ground unknown Figure 5: History of gas pipeline incidents in Germany. Since 1980 the incident rate has dropped by 90% catalogue of measures. It has helped develop and intro- duce tangible technology and process improvements as well as additional training and information measures for each cause-relevant target group, ensuring a sustainable high level of safety in the German gas supply industry. Figure 5 documents the resulting considerable reduction of the specific incident rate in the German gas grid . The measures derived from the incident analyses have been gradually integrated into the state-of-the-art technol- ogies codified in the DVGW Set of Rules; they guarantee a comparatively high standard of safety, with the focus here on gas pipelines. External mechanical interferenc- es account for the lion’s share of incidents, followed by corrosion damage. Defective material and incorrect work, e.g. tapping, assembly and construction defects, rank third. • The products used in gas engineering, service-pro- viding com-panies, and the specialists/experts who are responsible for the technical acceptance tests are examined and certified on the basis of the DVGW Set of Rules. • Only companies/individuals who have proved their expert qualifications are allowed to carry out con- struction, modification or maintenance work on gas pipelines and gas facilities. • In addition, and for the purpose of monitoring the compliance with the technical safety requirements stipulated by law and the Technical Rules, the DVGW provides the industry with guidance on practice-ori- ented Technical Safety Management (DVGW TSM).
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 13 RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY line that were partially built and operated according to obsolete standards. This is why for two decades the DVGW Set of Rules has backed two methods to ensure safety: Protecting the lines against third party interference and equipping them with sophisticated technical safety features. The preference of safety dis- tances over technical safety solutions is not congruent with the historic experience of the DVGW Set of Rules be- cause frequently identical or even higher technical safety can be achieved by employ- ing technological solutions other than distances. Figure 6: Decline of incidents in customer facilities since 1981 Source: BDEW, DVGW (Incidents in customer facilities per 1m natural-gas heated residential units) OBSERVATION OF CASE LAW AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH In this context, the following primary safety measures have proved especially successful: Ongoing technological progress keeps the Set of Rules of the DVGW constantly evolving, always with the aim of reflecting state-of-the-art technology. These evaluations also take into account case law developments. Pipeline design with a high safety factor (1.6); • Installation of shut-off valves; • 100 per cent check of construction site weld seams; • • Hydrostatic tightness and strength tests of the pipe- line sections; For example, the expedited ruling of the Higher Adminis- trative Court (OVG) of Lower Saxony in Lüneburg on 29 June 2011 led to an immediate construction freeze on some sections of the Northern European Natural Gas Pipeline. The OVG simultaneously assessed the safety of gas pipe- lines - disregarding the usual risk assessment procedures employed for technical facilities - and defined more strin- gent safety measures in respect of such lines, employing a previously unknown safety technology - the distance from residential buildings. In “DVGW energie | wasser-praxis” 1/2012 the DVGW took a stance by making the following core statements: • • Supply lines shall be carefully guided up to residen- tial and industrial areas. Protecting the lines is the most effective protection of the public at large. • No further safety distances are generally required for lines running through a protection strip. • Not only distances but also any other technical mea- • sures have to be taken into consideration. The analysis of the Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing (BAM)  only looks at certain aspects and relates to worldwide incidents on pipe- • Marking of the pipeline route with signposts; • • Passive and active corrosion protection; Checking of the protective sleeve by so-called inten- sive measurements; Short inspection intervals for surveillance on foot and by air; Inspection by modern pigging technologies; Tightness tests to determine the smallest of leakages. • • • The following additional safety measures, among others, are also applied: • Higher depth of cover; • • Hydrostatic stress tests. Setting up of pipeline route warning tapes; Even comparable Sets of Rules such as, for instance, the German Technical Rules on Long-distance Pipelines (TRFL) do not contain any information on distances from built-up areas, as evidenced by an enquiry from the state “... The statistical / stochastic analysis of incidence data collected from the damage and accidents statis- tics of the DVGW has served as a basis for the elabora- tion of cause-oriented catalogue of measures.” Alfred Klees
14 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY parliament of Baden-Württemberg (Landtag) to the Fed- eral Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU): (Landtag von Baden-Württemberg [Regional Parliament of the Federal State of Baden Württemberg]), Drs. 14/6687, p. 28): “In knowledge of the BAM research report the new TRFL will also not specify any minimum distances to be kept to built-up areas with residential buildings. The BMU communicated that the revised Technical Rules for Pipelines (TRFL) intentionally do without the definition of safety distances. It has to be decided on a case-by-case basis which specific action to take. Within the meaning of this definition, case-by-case refers to special situations as mentioned and described in TRFL no. 5.2.5. Since the indi- vidual measures listed under TFRL 5.2.5 are not exhaus- tive (“e.g.”), an increase of the distance could be counted among these measures. This means that in a specific case it shall be tested whether one or more of the listed mea- sures will/has to compensate for the concrete, higher po- tential risk. However, the proximity to residential buildings alone does not constitute such a special situation.” This goes to show that all in all, the TRFL defines ‘state- of-the-art’ differently from the expedited OVG ruling. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the pipeline incidents eval- uated by the BAM research report 285 partially date far back in the past. It is, therefore, extremely significant that most of the incidents that were evaluated are associated with lines built according to a now-obsolete state-of- the-art. Many other incidents occurred in non-European countries where other sets of rules apply. Furthermore, the report focuses exclusively on damage impacts, completely ignoring the root causes of the inci- dents or the probability of damage occurrence. The deter- mination of the severity of damage such as the blast radii mentioned in the research report or the calculation of risk arising from the operation of gas pipelines therefore are of very limited validity . On 14 November 2011, the Administrative Court (VGH) of Mannheim  issued a formal decision in respect of the BAM research report, in which it refutes the contention that the research report would demand specific minimum distances. The decision moreover holds that the state-of- the-art can also be ensured without defining unambigu- ous minimum distances. Furthermore, the VGH Mannheim generally recommended not departing from the standards stipulated in the Set of Rules, unless in case of substanti- ated scientific and technological advances. Although the DVGW’s opinion - which was published in 2011 - on the expedited ruling of the OVG Lüneburg made clear that applying the DVGW Set of Rules en- sured consonance with the state-of-the-art, the DVGW additionally evaluated the safety-related integrity of gas pipelines on a scientific level . TECHNICAL REGULATION BASED ON SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH The DVGW “Safety of Gas Pipelines” project group took part in the scientific investigations and summarised the findings for the concrete work on technical regulations by the DVGW expert panels. The following guidelines are now observed in the context of preparing technical regulations: • • • • • The deterministic safety concept of the technical regulations will be maintained, however with the option of adding probabilistic statements. The Set of Rules shall protect man and nature; safety measures applied in the field today shall be integrated into the Set of Rules. The documents of the Set of Rules shall reflect the state-of-the-art and consider all sources of knowledge. Incidents and findings from damage statistics (DVGW damage and accident statistics (G410), Eu- ropean Gas pipeline Incident data Group (EGIG), etc.) shall be taken into account especially when drafting regulations. The worst-case damage scenario, e.g. total rupture, shall be taken into account. • Mandatory technical safety measures shall be spec- ified; their efficiency, availability and accuracy shall be evaluated and harmonised at regular intervals with new sources of knowledge. Risk potentials shall be taken into account regard- ing the type, number, and efficiency of the protec- tive measures. • At the same time, the DVGW has developed a method- ological approach with the intention being to logically represent the implementation of the above-mentioned guidelines; this procedure specifies binding goals, to be confirmed by the members, for each project group com- missioned with elaborating a document that forms part of the Set of Rules. The guidelines have also been incorporated into the cur- rent version of the Rules of Procedure GW 100 of Febru- ary 2016 and thus constitute a binding guidance for the work of the DVGW committees with its main focus on taking into account new knowledge sources.
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 15 RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY What is more, a large number of new papers published in 2015 and 2016 have been prepared applying the above-mentioned enhanced safety-relevant guidelines. The revised Sets of Rules are based on the scientific findings from various analyses, among other things, and, therefore, constitute key elements in continuing the scheduled publication series on ensuring technically safe gas supply to and in Germany. References . Konersmann, R.; Kühl, C.; Ludwig, J.: Forschungsbericht 285 „Zu den Risiken des Transports flüssiger und gasförmiger Energieträger in Pipelines“; Editor: Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing (BAM), Berlin 2009. . Landtag von Baden-Württemberg (Regional Parliament of the Federal State of Baden Württemberg), Drs. 14/6687, p. 28. . Dietzsch, F., Klees, A. (2011): Weiterentwicklung des Kennzahlensystems und des sicherheitsrelevanten Berichtswesens für die Gasversorgung. In: DVGW energie | wasser-praxis, October 2011. . Working Group on Energy Balances (AGEB): Evaluation table on the energy balance in Germany from 1990 to 2015, as of July 2016. . Handbuch der Gasversorgungstechnik, K. Homann, T. Hüwener, B. Klocke, U. Wernekinck, DIV Deutscher Industrieverlag GmbH, 2017, Munich. . Klees, A., Schwigon, A.: Sicherheit von Gasfernleitungen – das Technische Regelwerk im Licht der aktuellen Rechtsprechung, in: DVGW energie | wasser-praxis, Volume 1/2012. . ASUE e. V.: Technikinfo CO2-Vermeidung, as of January 2016. Authors Alfred Klees DVGW – German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water Head of Department Gas Technologies and Energy Systems Klees@dvgw.de Anika Groos DVGW – German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water Specialist Infrastructure Groos@dvgw.de CONCRETISATION OF SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS AS STATE-OF-THE-ART The DVGW Set of Rules feeds on the wealth of practical experience from companies as well as incident statistics analyses and other relevant sources of knowledge. Tar- geted scientific research completes the evaluation materi- al for the codification of state-of-the-art technology. Meanwhile, a large number of DVGW Sets of Rules has been adjusted (see information box) against the back- ground of diverse scientific research as well as technolog- ical progress and the knowledge derived from it. Some of the fundamental changes are illustrated by way of exam- ple of DVGW Standards G 463 and G 495, as follows: Crucial safety-relevant amendments in DVGW Standard G 463 “High Pressure Gas Steel Pipelines for a Design Pressure greater than 16 bar - Construction”, July 2016: • • • Specification in the scope of application that there is no upper limit on nominal diameters and design pressures; Increase of the pipeline depth of cover to at least 1.0 metres; Cathodic corrosion protection shall always include gas transmission lines; Gas transmission pipelines shall be piggable; • • Harmonised rate of use of 0.625; • Stricter requirements for the marking of gas trans- mission pipelines in built-up areas. Crucial safety-relevant amendments in the DVGW Stan- dard G 495 “Gas Plants and Systems - Operation and Maintenance”, November 2016: • • • • • Consideration of the latest health and safety regula- tions in respect of the operation and testing of gas plants; Integration of requirements on the monitoring of heat transfer cycles in respect of corrosion; Further development of the requirements for the condition-based maintenance (CBM) of gas plants and extension of CBM to domestic pressure regula- tors based on the findings of the relevant research projects; Increased consideration of design features such as redundant safety features of devices and rails to increase their intrinsic safety and reduce the likeli- hood of failure; Inclusion of the requirements on the operation of mobile gas measurement and pressure reduction stations.
INTEGRATED SAFETY CONCEPT OF DVGW IN TERMS OF STATISTICAL VERIFICATION OF INCIDENTS Frank Dietzsch > DVGW – German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 17 RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY ABSTRACT The guarantee of a high safety standard of the gas infrastructure must be the highest goal of economic and operational action within the framework of proceeding national and European regulation and the organisational changes interrelated in the companies . “Precise technical and process improvements as well as further trainings and awareness campaigns led to a high safety level within the German gas infrastructure.” Frank Dietzsch At the beginning of the 1990th DVGW, the German Asso- ciation for Gas and Water, developed an integrated safety concept and thereby set a milestone for the evaluation and reduction of incidents and accidents in the German gas infrastructure. The basis for the development of the cause-oriented tool box was the statistical analysis of data coming from the incidents and accident statistics of DVGW. By means of this precise technical and process improve- ments as well as further trainings and awareness cam- paigns could be developed and introduced which have led to a high safety level within the German gas infrastructure. In 2011 the damage and accident statistics were made state-of-the-art according to Section 49 of the Energy Industry Act by the publication of a code of engineering practice (cf. DVGW G 410 “Bestands- und Ereignisdaten- erfassung Gas” - Registration of Asset Inventory and Incident Data of Gas Infrastructures). This makes the ap- plication of the code mandatory for all gas infrastructure operators. The data are published annually on an internet portal or interface (cf. GaWaS.strukturdatenerfassung.de). Initial results of the data evaluation for the years 2011 to 2014 are presented in this article. DEVELOPMENT OF GAS DAMAGE AND ACCIDENT STATISTICS In 1978 Germany’s Ministry of Research and Technology commissioned a study into “Safety in municipal gas sup- ply companies for households and businesses” . The aim of the study was to develop proposals and concepts for improving the safety of public gas supply systems, and attempts were made in the analysis to establish a correlation between damage and accident events on the one hand and the occurrence of (unwanted) gas releases on the other. At that time the analysts only had access to information from heterogeneous data collections, e.g. derived from pipeline grid statistics from local supply companies or from quarterly reports in the Health Ser- vice series published by the Federal Statistical Office. An overview for the whole territory of the Federal Republic of Germany was just not available. Then in 1979 the “Safety and Fire-Fighting” group of experts of the Ministry of Research and Technology recommended producing damage and accident statistics for the public gas supply system. This recommendation was taken up by the DVGW which invited its members to exercise their personal responsibility by taking part in a data survey to commence on 1 January 1981 . This quasi mandatory requirement to participate in DVGW statistics continued right up until 2011. The current energy-law framework and the fact that the assets held by supply companies have been continually expanding with the addition of new types of plant such as biogas entry and/or conditioning systems or natural gas service stations for example must receive reasonable con- sideration when it comes to the future formulation of tech- nical rules and regulations. This is the background against which the DVGW “Registration of Asset Inventory and Incident Data of Gas Infrastructures” has been restructured. In 2011 the DVGW took up a recommendation by the joint national and regional “Gas Industry” committee to trans- form the damage and accident statistics which had been collected since 1980 into a code of engineering practice . In the meantime, since 2012 the registration of asset in- ventory and incident data of gas infrastructures has been a firm part of DVGW’s technical rules. The data registra- tion criteria described in the technical rule G 410 comprise the following reports (cf. figure 1): • • • • inventory data for gas pipelines, gas service lines and gas-related facilities, incident data for gas pipelines, gas service lines and gas-related facilities and customer installations of domestic and industrial gas usage, gas odour notifications, indications of interruptions of supply according to the Energy Industry Act. Figure 1: Data scope according to DVGW G 410 (A)
18 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY All operators of gas-technical energy systems as defined by the Energy Industry Act must now submit their inven- tory data to the DVGW each year. As in the past, incident data must be reported immediately after the occurrence of an incident to the DVGW, to the energy supervisor in the Federal ‘Land’ concerned and to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. This requirement does not apply to incidents only involving a release of gas only from pipelines or service connections with no other consequences – these must be reported annually by a due date. The DVGW treats data supplied by operators as confidential (cf. Figure 2). The DVGW publishes standardized reports at reasonable intervals. These reports contain only aggregated data from which no inferences can be drawn about individual system operators but which do reflect the general devel- opments taking place in the German gas industry. The reports make statements about changes in pipeline and plant inventory and about trends in safety performance indicators. The first report was published in 2016 . Figure 2: Data collection and reporting according to DVGW G 410 (A) RESULTS OF DATA ANALYSIS FROM 2011 TO 2014 ANALYSIS OF PIPELINE AND SERVICE CONNECTION INVENTORY Data is collected broken down by domestic service connec- tions, pipelines operated by distribution system operators (DSOs) and pipelines operated by transmission system operators (TSOs). For pipelines an additional distinction is made between pressures of MOP ≤ 16 bar and MOP > 16 bar. “All Operators of gas-technical energy systems must submit their inventory data to the DVGW each years. As in the past, incident data must be reported immedi- ately after the occurrence of an incident to the DVGW, to the energy supervisor in the federal state and to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy.” Frank Dietzsch For the first analysis, the released data for the data col- lection years 2011 to 2014 were averaged. A comparison of the sum of the pipeline lengths from the structural data collected by the DVGW (average for 2011 to 2014: 318,537 km) with the sum of the pipeline lengths of the 2014 network structural data of the Federal Network Agency BNetzA  (518,683 km) indicates a coverage of 66 %. For MOP > 1 bar pipelines the coverage is no less than 93 %. Service connections are differentiated by their pressure (MOP), diameter and material. All in all, 7,987,656 service connections with a total length of 131,946 km are cov- ered. Figure 1 shows the percentage breakdown by these distinguishing criteria. 72 % of all connections use PE as their material, reflecting the rapid system expansion in the last decades and a high rate of renewal of service connections in the gas sector. Approximately 300,000 km of DSO pipelines have been surveyed. Here again the proportion of plastic now pre- dominates, with 54 % of pipelines made from PE and 37 % from steel. With just 0.8 per thousand, grey cast iron is all but irrelevant in the overall pipeline inventory. If we look at the age structure of pipelines we find that 47 % were constructed or refurbished between 1990 and 2014. This bears witness to a young and modern gas grid, something which the material structure already indicated with PE and PE coating. The average age of the grid is around 30 years. DVGW statistics show that transmission system opera- tors own a reported pipeline inventory with a total length of 21,024 km. As well as MOP and year of construction, in their returns TSOs also differentiated pipelines in the MOP > 16 bar category by diameter, material, wall thick- ness and coating. In terms of possible comparability therefore, the DVGW has followed and applied the data collection criteria of the European EGIG statistics kept since 1970 (European Gas pipeline Incident data Group, cf. www.egig.eu). Similarly to the DSOs, the average age of these pipelines is something over 35 years. In statistical terms, the most frequent material used in TSO pipelines is StE 480 (40%), with a wall thickness of over 5 and up to 10 mm (47.1%) and with equal proportions of PE or tar/ bitumen coating (approx. 33% each).
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 19 RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY ANALYSES OF PIPELINE AND SERVICE CONNECTION INCIDENTS During the period from 1981 to 2010, leaks and damage incidents – divided into six categories of cause – were reported within DVGW damage and accident statistics. Starting from the 2011 reporting year, the definitions given in DVGW code of practice G 410 apply, with only incidents involving an unintended gas release being reported. the years 1995 and 2000. In more recent years there has been a clear tendency for material-specific damage rates to fall within the range of 0.1 incidents per kilometre (except for ductile cast iron). An analysis of the data also shows that mechanical third-party intervention (e.g. damage caused by excava- tors) is the main cause of incidents involving service connections and supply lines made of plastic. With service connections made of metal materials, a high percentage of corrosion is found to have been the cause of the incident. Com- pared with all other materi- als the damage rate of 0.8 incidents per kilometre for service connections made from ductile cast iron (GGG, cast iron with globolitic graphite) is the highest. The metal supply lines show a high proportion of corro- sion as the cause of incidents, with the percentage for bituminised steel lines being around 80 %. The propor- Figure 3: Trend in incidents from 1981 to 2014 on all gas pipelines Figure 3 shows that the incident rate on all gas pipelines has decreased by a factor of ten in the last two decades. The temporary rise in the incident rate in the late 1990’s was put down to an increased rupture hazard with grey cast iron (see also Figure 4), a trend that was countered with appropriate measures (a nationwide programme of grey cast iron rehabilitation). From the year 2000 onwards the incident curve falls more uni- formly compared with previous years, and this should be down to the improved quality and quantity of the collected data. The total number of incidents has been standardized to the corresponding total opera- tional experience so as to ensure comparability with the European EGIG database . The term ‘operational experience’ here refers to the cumulative total pipeline length which increases year on year by the current total pipeline length. Incidents on gas pipelines during the period 1991 to 2014 are shown in Figure 4 by pipe material. The peak in grey cast iron already mentioned is clearly visible between Figure 4: Trend in incidents between 1991 and 2014 on all gas pipelines by material groups tion is significantly less with younger steel pipelines with a PE coating. On average the incident rates for steel pipelines with a bituminised coating and cathod- ic protection (CP) are about one sixth of those with a bituminised coating but no CP. Compared with plas- tic-sheathed steel pipelines the positive influence of CP
20 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY can be clearly seen here, not least a consequence of the greater age of the lines. Among the supply pipelines too, grey cast iron (untreat- ed) returns the highest in- cident rate (0.363 incidents per kilometre). For TSO pipelines the num- ber of incidents is a mere 2.2 per thousand of the number reported for DSO supply lines, and so the sta- tistical analysis is limited to a consideration of the cause of the incident. Corrosion has the biggest share of incident causes, followed in second place by third-party mechanical intervention. Material defects and incorrect working (e.g. drilling, assembly and construction defects) follow together in third place. An analysis of the distribution of all incidents with a recorded leak size indicated for the period under review that approx. 56 % of incidents are very small in size (e.g. corrosion leaks), whereas only 1.4 % of incidents involved a very significant release of gas. Approx. 30 % of all in- cident reports were unable to give any qualified leakage size (meaning an unknown size of leak). Figure 6: Ratio of accidents in customer systems based on one million gas-heated homes incidents shows a continuous reduction, especially for the number of incidents based on operational experience in the past 20 years. In the period under review – 2011 to 2014 – third-par- ty mechanical intervention was the main cause of all immediately reportable incidents, with 39 %, followed by third-party thermal intervention with 25 %. IMMEDIATELY REPORTABLE INCIDENTS WITH CUSTOMERS’ SYSTEMS IMMEDIATELY REPORTABLE INCIDENTS WITH OPERATORS’ OWN SYSTEMS Trends in immediately reportable incidents involving systems owned by TSOs and DSOs since 1981 are shown in Figure 5. The rate of immediately reportable The ratio of immediately reportable incidents per annum to the number of gas-heated homes  for the period since 1981 is shown in Figure 6. Just as with the immediately reportable incidents in system operators’ own plants, the immediately reportable incidents in customer sys- tems also reflect a contin- uous decrease. In the past 15 years overall there have been between 1 and 2 acci- dents per million gas-heat- ed homes per annum. In the period 2000 to 2014, the immediately reportable incidents bro- ken down by causes are distributed between com- ponent defects “technical defects”, e.g. gas piping, gas appliances or waste gas systems (34 %), instal- lation-related defects “in- Figure 5: Trend in immediately reportable incidents since 1981
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 21 RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY The quantity and quality of the statistical data that is now available means that the information that is to hand provides a vital framework for decisions on rehabilitation issues for gas system operators in Germany. Taking their lead from DVGW Bulletin G403 1), companies can match these changes in the rates of incidents with their own data with a view to updating their renewal and mainte- nance strategies if need be. Furthermore, besides the evaluation and analysis of security-relevant operating statistics communication and reporting have a major significance. Regarding gas incidents and accidents the prompt availability of infor- mation is a substantial requirement in order to be able to give statements opposite market partners, the public and legal authorities and in order to specify causes and give professional assessments. 1) ‘Decision Support For The Maintenance Of Gas Distri- bution Networks’ References        Dietzsch, F./ Klees, A. (2011): Weiterentwicklung des Kennzahlensystems und des sicherheitsre- levanten Berichtswesens für die Gasversorgung. Energie Wasser Praxis, October 2011. Trepte, Lutz (1978): Sicherheit bei kommunalen Gasversorgungssystemen für Haushalt und Gewerbe. In: Forschungsbericht KT 7705 „Kommunale Technologien“ im Auftrag des Bundes- ministeriums für Forschung und Technologie. DVGW Circular G 5/1980 of 16 July 1980. Dietzsch, F./ Lange, R./ Schmidinger, J/ Steiner, M. (2016): Bestands- und Ereignisdatenerfas- sung Gas – Ergebnisse aus den Jahren 2011 bis 2014. In: energie | wasser-praxis No. 1/2016. Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen: Monito- ringbericht 2015 EGIG European Gas pipeline Incident data Group, www.egig.eu. BDEW Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft e.V.: Gaszahlen – Der deutsche Erdgasmarkt auf einen Blick. Author Frank Dietzsch DVGW – German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water Senior Technical Manager Gas Infrastructure Dietzsch@dvgw.de “In the period from 1981 until today the tendency of the absolute total incident rates has been decreasing by 90 Percent and is presently moving on a low histori- cal level of 0.01 incidents per 1,000 km per year.” Frank Dietzsch stallation errors” (10 %) and faults caused by customers such as “deliberate interference with the gas system” (28 %), “operator error/lack of maintenance” (14 %), “incorrect intervention in the gas system” (11 %) and “inadmissible changes in the set-up of gas appliances” (3 %). Defects caused by customers therefore account for 56 %. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS In the period from 1981 until today the tendency of the absolute total incident rates has been decreasing and is presently moving on a low historical level. The nor- malised incident rates on gas pipelines (transport and distribution network) are also decreasing and have stagnated for at least ten years independent from the pressure range. This can be interpreted as a steady improvement in qual- ity and safety standards in the operation of gas pipelines according to the DVGW codes of practice. The increased use of plastics as a material in pipeline construction by distribution system operators as well as the rehabilitation of pipelines made with grey cast iron is one reason for the general decline in incident rates. Incident analyses also indicate a significant reduction in corrosion incidents with steel pipelines that have cathodic protection (CP) as opposed to those with no active CP. We should emphasise the age-specific anal- ysis of the incidents which shows that gas pipelines constructed prior to 1970 return an incident rate that is significantly higher than more recent construction years. An analysis of all immediately reportable incidents shows the main cause as being mechanical intervention by third parties, followed by thermal third-party interven- tion. Thermal third-party intervention proves to be the main cause among domestic service connections while mechanical intervention by third parties is the predom- inant factor in high-pressure gas pipelines over 16 bar. It should be remembered here however that the level of incidents among transmission system operator pipelines with the greatest dimensions is very low, at just 2.2 per thousand of the rate for distribution system operators.
Dr. Michael Steiner > Open Grid Europe IMPLEMENTING THE INTEGRAL DVGW SAFETY CONCEPT AT
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 23 RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY ABSTRACT: The construction and especially the operation of high pressure gas pipelines has to be performed according to a very high safety standard considering economic aspects too. Hence the state of the art and relevant national and international experience should be used for the construc- tion and operations of high pressure gas pipelines. High pressure gas pipelines constructed and operated ac- cording to the rules of the DVGW are technically safe, but they have to be protected against impacts by third party in- terference or possible ground movement. To achieve such protection additional measures have to be taken especially for areas with additional need of protection because of possible hazards. For the construction of new pipelines technical measures are preferred whereas organizational actions should be selected for pipelines in operation. In this paper the systematic assessment of hazards and measures is described in extracts for the construction of high pressure gas pipelines or for pipelines in operation. In particular technical measures like increase of safety factor, depth of cover or marker posts and organizational measures, e.g. repeated Inline Inspection, CP-measures and PIMS are discussed. REVISED DVGW CODES OF PRACTICE Under the High Pressure Gas Pipeline Ordinance (Gasho- chdruckleitungsverordnung - GasHDrLtgV) high pres- sure gas pipelines in Germany that are used to transport natural gas at pressures over 16 bar must be constructed and operated so that they do not compromise the safety of their surroundings or have a detrimental effect on the environment . Section 2 of the Ordinance presumes that pipeline construction and operation will be state-of-the-art provided the DVGW codes of practice are complied with. The required state-of-the-art is anchored in particular in DVGW codes G 463 (A)  and G 466-1 (A)  which give a very detailed and comprehensive description of the con- struction and operation of high pressure gas pipelines. In the course of regular reviews a number of different project groups have analysed the safety philosophy of the DVGW codes for the transport of natural gas through underground high pressure gas pipelines and have gener- ally updated it in line with the state-of-the-art. Taking due account of the safety-related, environmental and com- mercial framework they have looked at the entire process of transmitting natural gas through buried high pressure pipelines, i.e. from the alignment planning stage through design and construction to operation and maintenance. Consideration was given among other factors to other national and international standards and in particular an analysis of past failures and incidents. “An evaluation of DVGW incident data collection up to 2014 indicates a very high safety standard and reliabil- ity as demonstrated for example by the sustained fall in the number of incidents. For example an almost 90% reduction in incidents on gas pipelines has so far been achieved since 1981 even though the total length of pipeline network has risen significantly.” Dr. Michael Steiner The DVGW rules of procedure  have laid down guide- lines for safety-related issues in particular, so for example the code of practice must ensure the safety of people and the environment. The deterministic safety concept is retained, although individual probabilistic additions are admittedly possible. The code of practice must reflect the state-of-the-art of transport using high pressure gas pipe- lines, and all sources of information and insights such as publications, international codes of engineering practice, experience, scienc e and opinions must be incorporated. Particular account must be given to the findings of failure statistics (e.g. DVGW failure and accident statistics accord- ing to DVGW G 410 , EGIG ) when setting the rules. The worst case failure scenario must be taken into con- sideration for if it cannot be reasonably ruled out or if minimal effects are to be anticipated. The safety measures must be specified as being mandatory, their effect, avail- ability and accuracy must be evaluated and they must be regularly reviewed in the light of new sources of informa- tion and findings. The potential risk should be considered with the nature, number and effectiveness of the safety measures, and the safety measures which are applied in practice must be incorporated in the engineering code . The deterministic safety concept for high pressure gas pipelines has been proven over many years of operation and the pipelines which have been laid accordingly are technically safe, yet they must still be protected from ex- ternal effects such as third- party interference or ground movements. The DVGW code of practice focuses on two main mechanisms for ensuring safety [7, 8, 9]. First there is the high level of technical safety equipment in high pressure gas pipelines, and second the protection of pipelines from external interference. To make sure that the selected safety measures can provide meaningful protection from possible hazards, a) all possible hazards must be analysed and b) the quality of the corresponding safety measures must be very high. The revised Technical Rules for the Construction of New High Pressure Gas Pipelines DVGW G 463 (A) place the emphasis on structural measures. When planning the route of high pressure gas pipelines for example, consid- eration must be given to their safety and to protecting
24 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY people and the environment. Factors to be allowed for include the future operation of the pipeline, existing soil conditions and potential outside interference. For the construction of high pressure gas pipelines the re- vised DVGW G 463 (A) has increased the following safety measures compared with other standards: • Max. usage factor of 0.625 or min. safety factor of 1.6 • Minimum depth of cover 1 m • • Additional marking and identification on construc- 100% weld seam testing tion sites • Water pressure testing with stress test within the development Where possible and proportionate, the pipeline should be routed in such a way that additional safety measures are not necessary. If a pipeline is being routed in areas with an increased need for safety, e.g. in built-up zones or ar- eas where additional interference with the high pressure gas pipeline is expected, then targeted safety measures must be provided. These measures have to be balanced against one another depending on the type of area and the hazard potential. Such targeted individual measures may involve increasing the safety coefficient, depth of cover, pressure testing requirements, marking or the extent to which tests are carried out, or providing pipeline warning tape or geotextile . The Technical Rules for the Operation and Maintenance of High Pressure Gas Pipelines DVGW G 466-1 (A) on the other hand place the safety emphasis on organisational measures such as condition-based inspection and more frequent inspections within the pipeline development. Po- tential safety-relevant aspects must be considered when planning and executing inspection and maintenance operations. These include external interference (e.g. from construction work), ground movements, corrosion, mill defects, leaks. Typical safety measures here include • Pipeline routing and leak tests sures may have to be provided depending on the nature of the area and of the likely hazard potential. On the one hand, according to DVGW G 466-1 (A) the frequency of in- spections and maintenance work must be condition-based and appropriate for local conditions, taking operating ex- perience into account . On the other hand, in areas with a heightened need for safety and protection, e.g. where other developments are approaching or have already ap- proached and where additional effects on the gas pipeline are to be expected, denser marking with signposts, signs or marker stones and if necessary with additional warning notices and information must be provided. According to DVGW Code of Practice G 463 (A) these additional sign- posts, signs or marker stones must be positioned along the pipeline’s axis and within sight of one another. If the markings are at a distance away from the pipeline’s axis owing to local conditions then the direction and distance must be indicated . The results of failure statistics (e.g. inventory and inci- dent data gathering according to DVGW G 410 or EGIG]) must be taken into account so it is essential that all se- rious incidents involving an unintended loss of gas and all detected interventions within the pipeline’s sphere of influence and which compromise safety must be anal- ysed for their causes and measures designed to avoid future recurrence . The revised DVGW incident data collection system for incidents involving an unintended loss of gas already takes account of the DVGW guide- lines in its structural manifestation for the assessment of safety measures and for updating the state-of- the-art. An evaluation of DVGW incident data collection up to 2014 indicates a very high safety standard and reliability as demonstrated for example by the sustained fall in the number of incidents . So for example an almost 90% reduction in incidents on gas pipelines has so far been achieved since 1981 (Figure 1) even though the total length of the pipeline network has risen significantly. • Monitoring cathodic cor- rosion protection Inline inspection • • Assessing ground movements • Monitoring construction work near pipelines to a reasonable degree. In areas with an increased need for safety, e.g. in built- up zones or areas which are to be developed or where ad- ditional effects on the high pressure gas pipeline are expected, shorter inspection cycles or improvement mea- Figure 1: Change in level of incidents on gas pipelines of all pressures since 1981 
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 25 RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY The distribution of incident causes for high pressure gas pipelines of over 16 bar is shown in Figure 2. Corrosion leaks and mechanical third party interference account for the first and second largest shares of incidents respectively. Material defects and incorrect working (e.g. drilling, assem- bly and construction defects) follow together in third place. A detailed look at the distribution of incidents associated with personal injury, deflagration, explosion, fire, flying debris or other circumstances that affect the public and that must be reported immediately is given in Figure 3. It shows that the chief cause of immediately reportable incidents on high pressure gas pipelines over 16 bar is mechanical third party interference at 74%, with thermal third party interference in second place at 16%. Figure 2: Incidents per kilometre for TSO pipelines of 16 bar and over  Just as with the serious incidents (ruptures) recorded in European failure statis- tics EGIG (Figure 4), serious, immediately reportable in- cidents for mechanical third party interference also occu- py first place for German gas pipelines of 16 bar and over (Figure 3). Serious incidents due to ground movements and manufacturing defects on the other hand are not recorded in Germany in the period under review. Whereas external interference is the main cause of incidents for European gas pipelines of 16 bar and over, for DVGW pipe- lines of 16 bar and over this is corrosion leakage. This is accounted for by the in part very much older gas pipe- lines which exist in Germany. At Open Grid Europe new high pressure gas pipelines are constructed according to the requirements of DVGW codes of practice – specifical- ly DVGW G 463 (A) – in con- junction with DIN EN 1594. The latest state-of-the-art for high pressure gas pipelines is therefore being applied in Germany. A systematic hazard analysis is carried out for each individual new pipeline project based on the requirements of the codes. Figure 3: Distribution of all serious immediately reportable incidents on service connections and pipelines  Figure 4: Failure statistics according to EGIG 
26 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY “Open Grid Europe deploys a large number of differ- ent safety measures that are state-of-the-art for high pressures gas pipelines in Germany. These measures enhance the technical safety of high pressure gas pipelines by adding effective protection of the line from external interference, thereby creating one of the safest pipeline systems.” Dr. Michael Steiner This safety review can result in additional safety measures. It is not normally possible to avoid densely populated areas when installing new high pressure gas pipelines, so structur- al safety measures are provided locally where required. Examples of such measures include • • • • increased cover depth and pipeline warning tape where land cultivation is very deep, an increased safety coefficient for large diameter pipe- lines with a high nominal pressure if a worst case cannot be reasonably ruled out, qualitatively improved pipe properties (increased strength, documentation of grinding, digital certificates, applying a barcode ) or stricter requirements for the pipe coating testing by the Coating Inspector  IMPLEMENTATION OF DVGW SAFE- TY CONCEPT AT OPEN GRID EUROPE To ensure that high pressure gas pipelines are operated safely, Open Grid Europe places increased emphasis on organisational measures in line with DVGW G 466-1 (A). These inspection and mainte- nance operations are planned and carried out giving due re- gard to the possible safety-rel- evant aspects. These aspects are essentially damage from outside, external corrosion and possible ground movements as shown by our own failure sta- tistics as well as those of the DVGW and EGIG. According to DIN EN 16348  typical safe- ty measures are surveillance, monitoring cathodic protec- tion, pipeline inspection using inline inspection methods and monitoring construction work. The deployed safety measures are listed against the potential hazards in integrity matrices and brought together to create Open Grid Europe’s Pipeline Figure 5: Integrity matrix for inline inspection Integrity Management System (PIMS) . The integrity matrix for inline inspection  is shown in Figure 5 by way of example. The frequency of individual measures can be increased in areas where there is a high safety requirement. The type of inspection is decided depend- ing on the design of the high pressure gas pipeline (e.g. piggable or not piggable, Figure 6). Open Grid Europe implements multiple safety measures in parallel so as to reduce the number of third party inci- dents in particular. In addition to the types of inspection referred to above, for groundworks close to pipelines these measures include the deployment of trained opera- tors of excavation machinery according to the BALSibau qualification concept (the “National Consortium of Pipe- line Operators for Minimising Damage during Construc- tion”, [17, 18]). Open Grid Europe also continues to support the ongoing expansion of the central portal for construc- tion enquiries provided by “BIL” (the National Information System for Pipeline Research) . Figure 6: Integrity assessment method for different construction standards
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 27 RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY SUMMARY To sum up we can say that to offset the potential hazards which threaten pipelines, Open Grid Europe deploys a large number of different safety measures that are state- of-the-art for high pressure gas pipelines in Germany. In accordance with current DVGW codes of practice these measures enhance the technical safety of high pressure gas pipelines by adding effective protection of the line from external interference, thereby creating one of the safest pipeline systems. Author Dr. Michael Steiner Open Grid Europe Head of Integrity michael.steiner@open-grid- europe.com References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Verordnung über Gashochdruckleitungen, Gashochdruckleitungsverordnung - GasHDrLtgV, Ausgabe 18.05.2011 DVGW Arbeitsblatt G 463 (A), Gashochdruckleitungen aus Stahlrohren für einen Betriebsdruck von mehr als 16 bar – Errichtung, Juli 2016 DVGW Arbeitsblatt G 466-1 (A), Gasleitungen aus Stahlrohren für einen Betriebsdruck von mehr als 16 bar – Betrieb und Instandhaltung, Entwurf Dezember 2016 Geschäftsordnung DVGW GW 100, Tätigkeit der DVGW-Fachgremien und Ausarbeitung des DVGW-Regelwerkes, Februar 2016 DVGW Arbeitsblatt G 410 (A), Bestands- und Ereignisdatenerfassung Gas, März 2012 9th Report of the European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (period 1970- 2013), EGIG (www. egig.eu), February 2015 Sicherheit von Gasfernleitungen-das Technische Regelwerk im Licht der aktuellen Rechtspre- chung; Technisches Komitee des DVGW „G-TK-1-1 Gastransportleitungen“; A. Klees, A. Mazur; energie-wasser-praxis 1/2012 Technische Sicherheit in der Gas- und Wasserbranche; A. Klees, B. Niehues; energie-was- ser-praxis 12/2004 Basissicherheit von Pipelines gewährleistet eine hohe Sicherheit und Verfügbarkeit; J. Arens- meier, H.-J. de la Camp, M. Steiner; 3R international (47) Volume 5/2008 DVGW Merkblatt G 411 (M), Untersuchung von Ereignissen an Gasleitungen und gastechni- schen Anlagen; Draft August 2016 Bestands- und Ereignisdatenerfassung Gas – Ergebnisse aus den Jahren 2011 bis 2014; F. Dietzsch, R. Lange, J. Schmiedinger, M. Steiner; energie-wasser- praxis 1/2016 First-time use of barcodes and scanner systems from the steel pipe up to the finished long-dis- tance pipeline; A. Grassmann, M. Steiner, D. Schmidt, O. Kahn, F.-M. Knoop; 3R Special Edition 2/2012 Der Coatinginspector – Qualitätssicherung beim passiven Korrosionsschutz auf Pipelinebau- stellen; H. Jansen, Th. Löffler, A. Grassmann; 3R int; 9/2014 DIN EN 16348, Gas infrastructure. Safety Management System (SMS) for gas transmission inf- rastructure and Pipeline Integrity Management System (PIMS) for gas transmission pipelines. Functional requirements; Sept. 2013 The Pipeline Integrity Management System of E.ON Ruhrgas AG; G. Linke, R. Michel, M. Steiner, H.-W. Theilmeier-Aldehoff; 3R international (45) Volume 7/2006 Inline Inspection from an operator’s point of view; Th. Hüwener, H. Watzka, G. Linke, F. Kutsch, M. Ahlers, M. Steiner; 3R international Special Edition 2/2007 Bundesweite Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Leitungsbetreiber zur Schadensminimierung im Bau, Balsibau; www.balsibau.de DVGW GW 129, Sicherheit bei Bauarbeiten im Bereich von Versorgungsleitungen – Schulungs- plan für Ausführende, Aufsichtsführende und Planer, 09/2006 Paradigmenwechsel in der Leitungsauskunft; J. Focke; 31. Oldenburger Rohrleitungsforum; 9.2.2017; Oldenburg
Christian Engel > TÜV NORD Systems ENHANCED SAFETY THROUGH EXPERT ASSESSMENTS ABSTRACT In the construction of pipelines for the transport and storage of combustible, corrosive or toxic gases and wa- ter-polluting fluids, independent inspections by experts is an essential aspect of quality assurance which contrib- utes significantly to the safety of these systems. This does not only apply to new projects, but also to modifica- tions, conversions or maintenance measures. This approach has proven itself in Germany for many decades and contributes to making these systems some of the safest in the world.
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 29 RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS ACCORDING TO THE TECHNICAL REGULATIONS Different laws, regulations and technical rules apply to the various types of pipeline systems in Germany de- pending on the medium being transported. In the area of public gas supply, the UVPG (Environmental Impact Anal- ysis Act), the Ordinance Regulating High Pressure Gas Pipelines and the DVGW (German Technical and Scientif- ic Association for Gas and Water) regulations are applied in conjunction with relevant DIN EN standards, e.g. DIN EN 1594. With regard to construction supervision and inspections by experts, the DVGW worksheets GW 350, G 434, G 462/I, G 462/II and G 463 as well as the VdTÜV data sheet on pipelines 1001 are to be mentioned here. For other pipelines, e.g. the transport of water-endanger- ing substances or flammable gases which do not serve to supply the general public, the UVPG, the Pipe Trans- mission Ordinance and the TRFL (Technical Rule for Pipelines) apply. For pipelines and installations in the field of oil and gas storage systems, the requirements for mining law are additionally applied. For lines which run exclusively within factory premises, requirements for the tests of the Pressure Equipment Directive and the Operational Safety Ordinance are applied. Quality monitoring by experts accompanies the above described plants/systems over their entire life cycle: starting with planning and approval procedures, via construction, commissioning and operation to decom- missioning. The quality monitoring measures by inde- pendent experts in the various phases are described in the following sections. QUALITY MONITORING BY EXPERTS PLANNING AND APPROVAL PHASE Independent experts may carry out studies on safety and feasibility even during the planning and approval phase. A higher degree of acceptance for public projects or also greater legal certainty in the approval procedure, for instance, can be attained in the process. The examination of the notification or approval docu- ments by independent experts usually leads to an even smoother course of the notification or approval proce- dure by the competent authority. Here, obvious errors or other deficiencies can be corrected before the docu- ments are submitted, which can significantly reduce the official approval procedure time and effort. “Quality monitoring by external experts accompa- nies the pipelines in Germany over their entire life cycle, starting with planning and approval proce- dures, via construction, commissioning an d opera- tion to decommissioning.” Christian Engel CONSTRUCTION Within the framework of construction, independent experts assess the qualifications of the companies involved (pipeline construction, corrosion protection, non-destructive tests) and the personnel employed, the quality of the construction work, including non-destruc- tive tests, pipe laying and coating. The basis for the tests to be performed is the VdTÜV-Merkblatt Rohrleitungen (data sheet on pipelines) 1001. After the pipeline has been laid properly and the con- struction examination has been completed, the pipeline is subjected to a cohesive or partial strength test and leak test (pressure test). This pressure test is the integral proof of the proper construction and laying of the pipe- line before its commissioning. By performing the construction and pressure test by independent experts, it is ensured that a high-quality pipeline is produced which in later operation can result in lower costs and can be safely operated. COMMISSIONING Before commissioning, the necessary safety devices of the pipeline system are checked by independent experts with regard to the suitability of the equipment used, the setting of limit values and the functional capability of the safety devices. This ensures that all the important equipment of the pipeline system is suitable and safe to operate so that, for example, unacceptable operating conditions can be reliably prevented and, where appropriate, leakages can be reliably detected. The tests also include the explosion protection of the installations. “By performing the construction and pressure test by independent experts, it is ensured that a high-qual- ity pipeline is produced which in later operation can result in lower costs and can be safely operated.” Christian Engel
30 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY OPERATION During operation, pipelines which are subject to the Pipeline Directive are inspected every two years by inde- pendent experts. Installations subject to mining law are also tested on a regular basis. The tests cover the condition, the proper functioning of the safety devices and the CP (cathodic protection) as well as the tightness of the pipeline. Furthermore, a multitude of further quality assurance tests can be performed by experts. These range from the selection and verification of suitable pipeline inspection tools (ILI) via the qualification of the inspection tools and the evaluation of the results of inspection tools, to service life estimates and damage investigations. In the case of modifications in the pipeline environ- ment, e.g. construction of new buildings, construction of new roads, etc., the expert’s opinions can be used to ensure the safe condition of the pipeline by which certain measures established by the expert are taken to secure and protect the pipeline. DECOMMISSIONING In the context of decommissioning, proper drainage and cleaning is controlled by experts in the case of certain pipelines; in particular, pipelines for the trans- port of water-endangering substances. This ensures that there is no danger to persons or the environment due to the shut-down of pipeline sections. IMPACT OF QUALITY MONITORING Quality monitoring by experts leads to a reliable, high-quality transmission pipeline with a long service life and low costs during operation. The involvement of independent experts also minimises the liability of the owner/operator, since gross negligence is gener- ally to be excluded. Even if quality monitoring can never be completely comprehensive and can only be carried out in ran- dom samples, a higher quality can be achieved by “Quality monitoring by external experts leads to a reliable, high-quality transmission pipeline with a long service life and low costs during operation.” Christian Engel means of concrete detection of errors and the timely introduction of corrective measures. Furthermore, a psychological effect comes into play because, as a rule, all parties concerned deliver higher quality when it is known that monitoring is carried out by an inde- pendent third party. Moreover sometimes the other perspective and/or the expert’s experience also helps to detect, uncover and correct mistakes. REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPERTS Owing to the diverse tasks at all stages of the life cycle of a pipe transmission system, experts must have broad training and sound expertise. Experts must therefore un- dergo an extensive training program before they are au- thorised to perform independent tests. Expertise must be kept up-to-date by means of regular further training. It is also desirable to have a strong service provider mental- ity, since the tasks rarely take place near one´s place of residence, not always in good weather nor during normal working hours. Since certain decisions must be taken and implemented, conflict management and powers of self-assertion are among the optimal qualities of a good expert. Other characteristics include perseverance and reliability and a certain flair for tact is also necessary when communicating test results. Author Christian Engel TÜV NORD Systems Head of Inspection Body for Pipelines firstname.lastname@example.org
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ABSTRACT In macroeconomic terms, the cost of compensating dam- age to pipeline/cables and cables caused by construction work amounts to an estimated €2 billion per annum. Much of this damage is due to a lack of information on the location of pipeline/cables during the site investiga- tion phase prior to the commencement of construction. Indeed, both building contractors and pipeline/cable/ cable operators seeking to obtain such information will often find that identifying pipeline/cable/cable routes and their operators is far from easy. An all-digital process available online can go a long way to simplify such inquiries, contributing to the safety of all the players involved. The following report describes the current situation and requirements, and provides a pro- posal based on recent operative experience in this field. SITUATIONAL CONTEXT Digital business processes are on the increase in all industrial sectors. In general, the aim is to boost effi- ciency, eliminate redundancies and achieve a closer interlinkage of sensor technology and machine control with dedicated technical business processes. In general, commercial business processes are highly standardized and already largely automated without requiring adjust- ment to specific customer profiles. Widely accepted for private as well as commercial monetary transactions, online banking is a good example of this. In the context of “Industry 4.0”, the focus is on connected manufacturing which can be improved by using suitable sensor technologies and evaluation of measured data in order to optimize production cycles. In the energy sector, the introduction of Industry 4.0 processes has not yet progressed quite so far. This is partly due to the fact that the focus is not so much on production schemes and that the human interface plays a dominant role in monitoring processes. Germany’s digital association BITKOM demands for “digital ecosystems” to be developed in order to promote the digitalization of the German national economy. PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 33 RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY To implement digitalization, Big Data analysis and automation in the context of Industry 4.0, the following requirements must be met: 1. The business process must be digitizable and comply with a standardized process comprising input and output data that lends itself to automatic processing. 2. The immanent transaction must generate a benefit that can be increased by automated processes which can be digitally supported. 3. The underlying logic of the business process ideally uses intranet - or possibly even internet - services for data storage and data provision/system deployment. STATUS QUO OF PIPELINE/CABLE INQUIRIES Most of the business processes of pipeline/cable oper- ators in all domains nowadays serve to monitor critical infrastructures, for instance monitoring underground pipeline/cable networks. As statistically proven, there is a risk of pipeline/cables being damaged by excavators or at least of increased interference with pipeline/cable corridors. All these activities are undertaken without full knowledge of underground pipeline/cable locations. In the context of civil engineering, more than 100,000 instances of structural damage occur within a calendar year, which according to actuarial assessments amount to €500 million in damages paid. Much of this damage could be prevented by setting up a fully functional inquiry process. Providing information on the location of pipeline/cables and construction supervision are business processes that are crucial to safety and form part of a pipeline/cable operator’s core competencies. In this context, safety is the overarching topic involving the following aspects: • • Pipeline/cable infrastructure safety to protect and keep pipeline/cables intact and prevent injury to per- sons or damage to resources Reliability of the inquiry process in which - the inquiry constitutes a legally secure claim to correct and full information and its exchange between the party pursuing the construction activities and the supervising operator(s) an inquiry process that is transparent in case of damage and an ensuing lawsuit - “The cost of compensating damage to pipelines caused by construction work amounts to an esti- mated €2 billion per annum. Much of this damage is due to a lack of information on the location of these assets.” Jens Focke • Data security in the context of data provision and archiving, also preventing the improper use of data The afore mentioned aspects are explained in detail below as they contribute to safety in different ways. The requirement of generating a benefit (as listed under 2. above) can thus be met by means of a digitally supported business process.
34 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY When investigating a potential construction site, the party pursuing the construction activities is obligated to obtain information on the location of pipeline/cables if it wants to avoid liability for negligence in case of damage. Presumably, the party in question will even be aware of this, but it appears that in a rural area where pipeline/ cable corridors are not clearly marked, the magnitude of not meeting this obligation is perceived as comparable to knowingly exceeding a speed limit while driving a car. The likelihood of damage occurring is perceived as low and readily accepted. This would seem to be the only explanation as to why in- terference with pipeline/cable networks occurs time and again, without having inquired about their location. This is essentially the reason why pipeline operators reg- ularly incur substantial expenses to carry out site inspec- tions, both on the ground and by helicopter. According to pipeline/cable operators, the number of inquiries on pipeline/cable locations has doubled since 2010, probably owing to the increase in building activi- ties. While according to section 254 BGB [German Civil Code], pipeline/cable operators are required by law to respond to any inquiries received, there is no general legal duty to inquire. On the inquiry side, this leads to a situation that is nothing short of absurd: The inquiry process involves time-consuming research in order to identify the pipeline/ cable operators in charge of a certain area. Bigger com- panies have organized this task more or less efficiently while smaller companies tend to place inquiries via mail- ing lists that are often not exhaustive. The information to be obtained and exchanged between inquirer and pipeline/cable operator is not subject to any standards and requirements, and thus varies greatly in terms of the content and details communicated. A mean- ingful communication, however, requires current knowl- edge of the situation inquired about. The emergence of new operators and new pipeline/cable routes in biogas, solar and cable grids, etc. does not make this any easier. Also, established operators may have changed names due to regulations, resulting in the formation of new cor- porate units and contacts. In the interest of customer orientation, many energy utilities now provide a telephone number or email address to contact for pipeline/cable inquiries on their website. In some cases, construction information is requested, and very rarely a geographical description of the site. Down- load services are provided to known inquiring companies only upon prior registration. For municipal utilities, this is a feasible and secure solution. However, it means the in- quirer has to know about this option. In big German cities, underground cables serve up to 40 services and opera- tors, i.e. much more than just the conventional gas, water, power and district heating lines provided by the municipal utilities as commonly known. In this confusing situation, inquirers often choose to proceed as follows: • • • Place several inquiries on the various portals provided by pipeline/cable operators Set up a mailing list to contact operators known to them Send emails randomly to a list of recipients that is too exhaustive or • Outsource the inquiry process to a local company specialized in this field Figure 2: Pipeline/cable inquiry process illustrating the leeway in terms of inquiry and archiving. It can be seen, that only the process to be implemented on the operator side has been standardized by the rules and regulations (code of practice GW118) • Use commercial services to obtain information on the local companies potentially in charge, and forward the inquiry if necessary
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 35 RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY Based on the number of incidents caused by third-party interference in pipeline/cable networks, one must con- clude that, as a third option, some consciously take the risk of not inquiring. For the reasons outlined above, inquirers may feel that they are anyway unlikely to obtain exhaustive and re- liable information on the location of pipeline/cables in the area. Accordingly, the unrecorded number of con- struction projects carried out without prior inquiry and involving an unknown risk potential can therefore be assumed to be significant. Due to the complexity of the situation, inquirers need to • • • • • automatically reach all operators without first having to identify who is in charge. submit a complete and fully specified inquiry, i.e. detailing all the information required. receive a timely response. archive the replies received from a multitude of op- erators in a structured way. receive status updates on the processing of their inquiry from the operator. NEED FOR ACTION Regarding interference with pipeline/ cable routes, operators of the critical chemical, gas and oil pipeline infrastruc- tures relate the following experiences: • • Incidents still occur on a daily ba- sis, even though excavators should be well aware of the risk potential. Excavator damage to steel pipes results in corrosion which can be detected at some later stage in the course of regular in-line inspections, by which time it is im- possible to determine who caused it, so operators are left to bear the rehabilitation costs. • When it comes to planning and constructing new pipeline/cables, operators, too, require information on the underground facilities pres- ent in the area. Addressing munic- ipalities in order to find out who is responsible in such matters will often disclose only those operators running pipeline in public space. Mostly, however, new cable routes and existing pipeline/cables are not located in public ground. • Pipeline operators receive a large number of inquiries that are irrele- vant in that they do not fall within their competence and domain of responsibility. This is due to the fact that many inquirers tend to in- clude too many random recipients in their mailing lists. 13TH PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE 12-14 MARCH 2018, ESTREL CONVENTION CENTER, BERLIN www.pipeline-conference.com IN CONJUNCTION WITH 2ND PIPE AND SEWER CONFERENCE 12-14 MARCH 2018, ESTREL CONVENTION CENTER, BERLIN www.pipeandsewer.com Sponsors AATS
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 37 RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY “With 1 million construction sites in Germany each year and figures rising, the construction industry is in need of information on pipelines and cables and their routes both underground and aboveground. A simplified inquiry process an contribute to safety and effectiveness.” Jens Focke The intention of the approach proposed by BIL is to increase safety so as to generate a tangible benefit for all players involved, including insurance companies and claimants in case of damage. The approach is always assessed against the state of the art. An ideal scenario must not only be prescribed as a goal to strive for, but should also be taken as an invitation to get involved in a joint approach. A joint approach mitigates risks and thus contributes to safety. An all-digital business process is transparent and quick. With solid arguments on its side, this is what BIL strives to achieve with its Germany-wide construction inquiry system. References . . . . . BITKOM. Press release of October 18, 2016: Deutscher ITK-Markt wächst um über 160 Milliar- den Euro, October 2016, Deutscher Verein des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V. DVGW, Technische Regel – Arbeitsblatt GW118, ISSN 0176-3512, DVGW Bonn, January 2008, European Parilament, Directive 2007/2/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of March 14, 2007, establishing an Infrastructure for Spatial Information in the European Commu- nity (INSPIRE), March 2007, Focke, BIL – Das Bundesweite Informationssystem zur Leitungsrecherche, BIL eG, Proceedings of the 30th Oldenburger Rohrleitungssymposium 2016, Vulkan-Verlag, ISBN, 978-3-8027- 2799-3, February 2016, Institut für Bauforschung e.V., Analyse von Kabel- und Leitungsschäden Forschungsbericht IFB-11562 /2014, Hannover April 2014 PROPOSED SOLUTION AND OPERATIVE EXPERIENCE A centralized inquiry portal with a high level of user accep- tance is the only solution. As a single point of entry, it has to meet the requirements outlined above. It must be noted that this should to be considered an approach still under development rather than a destination already reached. With 1 million construction sites in Germany each year and figures rising, the construction industry is in need of information on pipeline/cable and cable routes both un- derground and aboveground. A simplified inquiry process can contribute to safety and effectiveness. One year after going live, the BIL portal has recorded an annual number of over 800 inquiries per week. Pipeline/ cable operators and inquirers from the construction sector rate this as a success. However, there is still a lot of poten- tial to be tapped by getting even more operators involved, which will lead to an increase in inquiries from construction enterprises in the region as well as from operators. In this regard, the microeconomic benefit that certainly exists is almost secondary, as the primary achievement is the increased safety in civil engineering that averts macroeconomic damage. BIL’s cooperative form of or- ganization is without alternative because it makes clear that there is no intention to generate profits and requires it to observe absolute transparency in the way its pres- ents itself on the market. See Figure 1 for Inquiries received for Germany via the BIL portal. SAFETY AS AN OPPORTUNITY Generating a benefit in terms of safety is a goal worth striving for in the interest of operators, regardless of whether stipulated by law or not. Those who leave the introduction of necessary protec- tive procedures and expedient safety measures to the legislator will run the risk of losing control over their core business. The goal therefore must be a centralized and harmo- nized pipeline/cable information process consisting of the inquiry, the information provided and the archiving of both. A simplified process that benefits the inquirer will be generally beneficial and enhance safety in many respects. Conversely, when operators choose to realize a silo approach, this entails risks that inquirers alone can hardly mitigate. Author Jens Focke BIL - Federal German Construction Enquiry Portal Chief Executive Officer email@example.com
PIPELINE SECURITY PUBLIC AWARENESS AND MITIGATION OF THIRD PARTY ACCIDENTS AS NEW LAYER OF PROTECTION FOR THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE GAS Prof. Dr. Jürgen Schmidt / Natalie Schmidt / Johannes Biernath CSE Center of Safety Excellence
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 39 RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY “Gas transmission pipelines belong to the critical infrastructure – they are essential for the energy supply. Statistics show a continuous decrease in the number of incidents per 1000 km pipeline length as a result of a permanent increase in tech- nical safety in the last thirty years. Especially in Germany population density increases while public acceptance of incidents decreases continuously.“ Prof. Dr. Jürgen Schmidt ABSTRACT Gas transmission pipelines belong to the critical infra- structure – they are essential for the energy supply of the industry and public households. International and nation- al statistics1,2 show a continuous decrease in the number of events per 1000 km pipeline length as a result of a permanent increase in Technical Safety during the last thirty years. Nevertheless, catastrophic incidents like gas explosions in Ghislenghien3, Gräveneck4 or Oppau5 can’t be fully excluded. Third party activities, especially through excavators and drilling machines, are the main the reason for these incidents. The most effective topic to further enhance the current safety standard of gas transmission pipelines is the protection of the critical gas infrastructure from external impacts. Especially in Germany popula- tion density locally increases while public acceptance of incidents decreases con- tinuously. An innovative pipeline security concept is needed - it is time for a para- digm shift: pipelines shall additionally be protected by (1) a Third party anti-collision system (THANCS) based on latest Industry 4.0 opportunities and (2) an active role of the population to ensure pipeline securi- ty. As a consequence, the European Risk Communication Platform (EURIC) is found- ed at the CSE Center of Safety Excellence to deepen the research in this field. Figure 1: Event frequency per km in the German gas transmission network between 1981 and 2014 according to statistics of DVGW INTRODUCTION AND STATE OF THE ART The gas network extends to over 510,000 km6 within Germany and ensures the public and industrial energy supply. According to the German Energy Industry Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz)7, the secu- rity of the energy supply and the Technical Safety of these pipelines must be ensured. Technical Safety was significantly increased over the last decade in the areas of corro- sion protection, pipeline construction, mon- itoring and in-line inspection systems. As a result, international and national statistics show a continuous decrease in the event frequency per km8,9,see Figure 1. Figure 2: Frequency of incidents in registered pipelines due to EGIG13 Although Technical Safety is significantly enhanced, still major catastrophic incidents such as in Ghislen- ghien (2004)10, Gräveneck (2007)11 and Oppau (2014)12 occur. The risk for these incidents is very low, but they cannot be fully excluded. The main reasons for such events are external inter- ferences, in particular by excavators, drills, as well as agricultural and forestry equipment, according to the data of EGIG (European gas pipeline incident data group, a consortium of the 17 major European gas pipelines operators), Figure 2.
40 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY The probability of incidents to occur due to construction activities in distribution and house service connections is much higher than in long distance gas transmission pipelines. In contrast, impacts with damage to property and personal injury are usually low. An extract of various incidents during the last months is summarized in Table 1. Date Location Incident 08/05/2016 Alheim 30/05/2016 Cham 22/06/2016 Bad Wiessee Rupture of a gas transmission pipeline by an excavator14 Rupture of a gas transmission pipeline by an excavator15 Damage of a gas transmission pipeline by an excavator16 14/07/2016 Eltville-Hat- tenheim Cut off of a gas transmission pipeline by an excavator17 11/08/2016 Wunsiedel 25/08/2016 Wiesbaden- Erbenheim Damage of a gas transmission pipeline by an excavator18 Construction worker gets se- riously injured by a jet flame caused by an accident at a gas transmission pipeline19 16/09/2016 Hetter- scheidt Rupture of a gas transmission pipeline by an excavator20 26/09/2016 Ahrensburg Damage of a gas transmis- sion pipeline on a construc- tion area21 Table 1: Non-representative list of open source publications of external interferenc- es on gas distribution lines by excavators in Germany within 5 month of 2016 If the pipeline is damaged, combustible and explosive gas is released. A small spark can cause an ignition and an explosion due to, for example, the contact between the pipeline metal and the excavator bucket. The damages can be particularly devastating, if the gas has been dis- tributed in the buildings before the explosion takes place, Figure 3, especially in areas with high population density. “Despite preventing measures, with about 1 million construction activities annually in Germany, accidental events on gas pipelines can only hardly be avoided. About 80 % of the damage on pipelines are human errors due to work with machinery.” Prof. Dr. Jürgen Schmidt The German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water (DVGW) has defined a very high safety standard to ensure the Technical Safety of pipelines during plan- ning, construction and operation and, hence, to protect people and the environment against potential hazards of the pipeline. In addition, a protection of the pipeline from external interferences on the same safety level is needed. This is challenging, because Technical Safety mea- sures are lacking. Worldwide, organizational measures to prevent an incident due to third party activities are standard. In Germany, Technical Safety measures for construction and earthwork are regulated in many codes such as DVGW GW462-1, GW315 und GW381, TV A-StB 12 worksheets or also BGI 759 as organizational measures. Prior to any earthwork precise local maps of the pipeline network need to be requested, pipe network operators must be identified and in case the excavation work takes place in the vicinity of pipelines, workers often need to prevent a collision by means of carefully shoveling, before the roundup will continue. Despite these measures, with about 1 million construc- tion activities annually in Germany, accidental events on gas pipelines can only hardly be avoided. About 80% of the damage on pipelines are “human errors” due to work with machinery22. Training, strengthening of a safety culture, additional technical measures and public awareness are the main driver towards a higher level of security for gas pipelines. BALSIBAU for example is an initiative of the DVGW to increase the training standard of excavator drivers and drilling operator. Unfortunately, the training is not yet mandatory. Figure 3: major catastrophic event in Itzehoe (Germany) 2014 through an explosion of a gas distribution line caused by a third-party intervention Source: dpa
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 41 RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY Another major step to enhance the prevention of accidents is a central system for construction applications – an inter- face between construction industry and pipe network op- erator. In 2015 several pipe network operator have founded BIL as an information platform for critical infrastructure in Germany. BIL is an important prevention measure and may further be integrated into a pipeline security concept. Industry 4.0 opens the opportunity for a link between con- struction machines and gas network maps. Renewable Energy is very popular in Germany and seem to be available limitless and with less potential hazards compared to natural gas. For a major part of the Ger- man society the need for natural gas is not obligatory. Any incident and especially a catastrophic incident may strengthen the public demand to further increase the security of natural gas pipelines. Hence, a continuous improvement of the existing Technical Safety concept for gas pipelines by means of adaptation to the current State of Safety Technology is necessary. In addition, the quality of pipeline security measures to protect against an exter- nal interference need to be increased. PIPESECURE2020 – NEW LAYER OF PRO- TECTION FOR PIPELINE SECURITY The CSE Center of Safety Excellence initiated the “THANCS” program (Third party Anti-Collision System) with the intention to combine latest navigation and detec- tion technologies for a development of a new excavator anti-collision system to avoid third party incidents. In addition, an innovative communication concept should encourage the motivation of the general public to secure actively the protection of pipelines. Based on the Nudg- ing-Principle, people’s behavior should be altered in a predictable way without prohibitions, instructions or sig- nificant changes in economic incentives23. Present types of communication are used mostly for an information transfer to strengthen the public perception of safety, but do not encourage the public awareness. The development of new layer of protection in a security concept for the gas infrastructure to protect pipelines from external interferences is the aim of the project “PipeSecure2020” at the CSE Center of Safety Excel- lence. The CSE-Institute is a non-profit competence center for research and education in the field of process and plant safety. The center is guided by an industrial advisory board in the areas of chemicals, petrochemicals, oil and gas and has special knowledge and decades of experience in han- dling and protecting risks of technical plants. The partner of the CSE Institute - the CSE-Society: Society for the Promotion of the Process and Plant Safety e.V. – includes about 40 renowned companies and institutions. Among others, BASF, Bayer, Linde, Siemens, Gasunie Germany, Thyssengas and Open Grid Europe as well as the German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water DVGW, but also many small and medium-sized enterpris- es, universities and worldwide partners. The CSE-Institute´s mission is to develop innovative safety concepts in order to increase the global and cross-industry safety of critical infrastructures. An indus- trial-scale testing installation to perform flow measure- ments and type testing of safety device with pressures up to 3400 bar (~ 50 000 psi) is under construction, Figure 4. The facility is built in co-operation with the Fraunhofer Institute for Chemical Technology in Pfinztal near Karlsruhe, Germany. Research is embedded in an interdisciplinary educa- tion of young academics in the field of process and plant safety at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, the Technical University of Kaiserslautern and the Univer- sity of Applied Science in Karlsruhe. Directors of the CSE-Institute are Prof. Dr. Jürgen Schmidt and Prof. Dr. Jens Denecke with more than 35 years of experience in protection of technical plant, especially chemical and petrochemical plants. To introduce a new awareness and mitiga- tion concept, latest findings of risk accep- tance and communication shall be applied to parties living within a zone of potential consequences of natural gas pipelines. Risk shall be understood, accepted as part of a life, but no fear shall be inspired. In many cases, engineering and objective argumenta- tions, which are dominated by numbers, are insufficient to encourage the necessary trust in the communication. The situational cir- cumstances of those communications have to be suited to the typical application proce- dure (heuristics) of nontechnical people. Figure 4: CSE High pressure loop for flow measurements and type testing at pressures up to 3400 bar (~50 000 psia)
42 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY THANCS PROGRAM The CSE-Institute aims to develop an innovative alarm system to automatically warn the operator of an exca- vating machine when approaching a gas pipeline and switches off the construction or agricultural machinery before an actual contact happens. On the one side, this Technical Security measures increase the protection of gas pipelines for the construction industry. On the other side, potentially affected persons in the vicinity of gas pipelines are also better protected. As a first easy and inexpensive preventive security mea- sure, a warning system embedded in a mobile device is planned. Machine operators of excavators and drilling machines will be warned of a potential damage to gas pipelines optically and acoustically from their mobile device. Gas network operators will be identified and informed about the actual risk situation evaluated on the basis of e.g. the population density in the surrounding of the pipeline. To enable the availability in rural areas (gaps in the mobile device network) or urban building situations, in a subsequent step this alarm system will be enhanced to a local autonomous system. An appropriate detection system for gas pipelines must be found in addition to the mobile device warning system. Measuring systems from other branches like the arche- ology and the measuring principle of the geomagnetism offer a good source base for that purpose. On the basis of the autonomous alarm system, a prototype of an auto- matic anti-collision system in a construction machine that switches off the machine before a contact with a gas pipeline happens (Industry 4.0 Device) can be developed. For the conversion of these Technical Security measures precise geodata are necessary for the spatial position of all pipelines. Present offers for pipeline network informa- tion like the nationwide management system of pipeline net data information (BIL) are currently based on avail- able two-dimensional geographical data. These data are received from responsible gas net operators with a certain degree of incompleteness and exactness, for instance, of the depth of a pipeline. The European guideline INfrastructure for SPatial InfoR- mation in Europe (INSPIRE) may lead on a long term basis to more precise electronically available data of critical infrastructures but may involve further potential securi- ty weak points. The digitization and the comparison of data from the information of gas net operators and public sources is a challenge within the project. Suitable mea- suring methods, for instance, GPS detection or ultrasonic measurements, must be further optimized to allow the integration of these data from inspection devices. EURIC: EUROPEAN RISK COMMUNICATION PLATFORM A comprehensive protection from external interferenc- es on gas pipelines may be attained if in addition to the construction industry the society or at least potential- ly affected people are integrated. This new concept of protection does not yet exist in any European country, neither in Germany nor in another European land. The population will be involved actively into the protection of critical infrastructure and promote the awareness in pub- lic. Analogous to the behavioral employment protection in companies that demand a personal responsibility of their employees for their own safety, the CSE Center of Safety Excellence aims to develop a suitable communication concept and public education program. For this purpose, the risk perception of the population has to be examined regarding the hazards of the critical infra- structure. The risk perception and acceptance of the pop- ulation shall be investigated for different risk-based and deterministic concepts of Technical Safety. On this basis, the behavioral pattern of the population in present public information events, can be directed. Risks have to be ap- pointed openly and target-audience-oriented, civil reliance has to be built and converted into a positive attention. To date, the public discussion on technical risks, for exam- ple, in project approval procedures, is mostly only based on a mediation of information that strengthens the secu- rity feeling of the citizens, indeed, but does not promote general attention in the public. Potential hazards are often not addressed but faded-out. The high level of Technical Safety may lead to an “emotion of zero-risk” in the society with the consequence of zero awareness even to obvi- ously risky situations. Instead of acting towards hazard mitigation or following an escape reflex a minority of the society tend to fully fade-out hazardous situations. Hence, an innovative communication draft should be compiled outgoing by current citizen’s information and integrated in new media and topical results of risk perception. For this, qualitative customer surveys will be carried out on the ba- sis of morphological effects and communication research. A major aspect is to develop a communication strategy. The aim of the new communication strategy is to train people’s awareness on risks and to motivate them to report potential hazards to a central information system. In this context, the term mindfulness of the public means to understand, detect and report potential hazards or ab- normalities in construction areas. This concept is based on the Nudging Principle and should influence the civil behavior without giving orders or imposing bans. For this, it is essential that a respectable trust base is created be- tween the population and the gas net operator or a third party (e.g., the CSE Center of Safety Excellence).
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 43 RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY The strategy should motivate the population to announce potential hazards to a central information system from their point of view, which initiates safety relevant mea- sures according to a risk judgement and informs gas net operators and authorities if necessary. The situational circumstances of those communications must be suited to the typical application procedure (heuristics) of non- technical people. At the same time, an assessment matrix for the classifica- tion of the hazard potential, which is based on simple, au- tomated risk assessment methods, should be developed. In this way, measures can be defined in a catalog, which may be activated depending on the respective hazard message. Thereby, a determination of the necessary infor- mation for the evaluation of potential hazards is essential. SUMMARY The CSE Center of Safety Excellence initiates the Pipe- Secure2020 program with the objective to improve the security of the critical infrastructure gas by protecting the pipeline from external interferences. This should be done (1) by an innovative alarm system for machine operators of excavators and drilling machines and by a further devel- opment to an automatic anti-collision system for such devices. For that, precise local geo-data of gas pipelines are needed. The development of (2) risk-based communi- cation measures has the aim of encouraging not only ma- chine operators, but also the population according to the principle of Nudging, so that any impermissible approach to a gas pipeline is preventively avoided. The new program aim to result in a comprehensive new protection approach to pipeline security for critical gas infrastructure. References 1. European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG): 8th EGIG-report 1970-2010, gas pipeline incidents, N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie, Groningen, 2011. 2. Frank Dietzsch (DVGW), Ronny Lange (inetz GmbH), Jonas Schmidinger (bnNETZE GmbH) & Dr. Michael Steiner (Open Grid Europe GmbH). Bestands- und Ereignisdatenerfassung Gas – Ergebnisse aus den Jahren 2011 bis 2014; Energie | wasser-praxis 1/2016 3. www.stern.de/panorama/weltgeschehen/belgien-15-tote-bei-gasexplosion-3072720.html 4. www.spiegel.de/panorama/gasexplosion-in-hessen-100-meter-flamme-schoss-auf-dorf-zu-a-502565.html 5. www.spiegel.de/panorama/ludwigshafen-gasexplosion-hinterlaesst-ein-truemmerfeld-a-999175.html 6. Bundeskartellamt, Bundesnetzagentrur für Elektrizität Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen: Monitoringbericht 2015, März 2016 7. Bundesministerium der Justid und für Verbraucherschutz: Gesete über die Elektrizitäts- und Gasversorgung (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz – EnWG), 2005, Teil 6, S. 86-89 8. Frank Dietzsch (DVGW), Ronny Lange (inetz GmbH), Jonas Schmidinger (bnNETZE GmbH) & Dr. Michael Steiner (Open Grid Europe GmbH). Bestands- und Ereignisdatenerfassung Gas – Ergebnisse aus den Jahren 2011 bis 2014; Energie | wasser-praxis 1/2016 9. European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG): Gas Pipeline Incidents – 9th EGIG Report; Februar 2015 10. www.stern.de/panorama/weltgeschehen/belgien-15-tote-bei-gasexplosion-3072720.html 11. www.spiegel.de/panorama/gasexplosion-in-hessen-100-meter-flamme-schoss-auf-dorf-zu-a-502565.html 12. www.spiegel.de/panorama/ludwigshafen-gasexplosion-hinterlaesst-ein-truemmerfeld-a-999175.html 13. European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG): Gas Pipeline Incidents – 9th EGIG Report; Februar 20 14. A. Meyer: Gasleitung zerstört: Großeinsatz der Alheimer Wehren; Mai 2016; HNA; URL: www.hna.de/ lokales/rotenburg-bebra/alheim-ort317754/gasleitung-zerstoert-grosseinsatz-alheimer-wehren- 6380747. html (Stand 30.09.2016) 15. F. Betthausen: Baggerfahrer reißt Gasleitung auf; Mai 2016; URL: www.mittelbayerische.de/region/cham/ gemeinden/cham/baggerfahrer-reisst-gasleitung-auf-22798- art1384632.html (Stand 30.09.2016) 16. Tegernseerstimme: Bagger reißt Gasleitung ab, Juni 2016,URL: www.tegernseerstimme.de/bagger-reisst- gasleitung-ab/214203.html (Stand 30.09.2016) 17. Wiesbadener Kurier: Gasleitung in Hattenheim beschädigt, Juli 2016; URL: www.wiesbadener- kurier.de/ lokales/rheingau/eltville/gasleitung-in-hattenheim-beschaedigt_17085954.htm (Stand 30.09.2016) 18. 18 Focus NWMI/Wunsiedel PI: Gasleitung angebaggert, August 2016; URL: www.focus.de/regional/bayern/ wunsiedel-polizei-gasleitung-angebaggert_id_5814681.html (Stand 30.09.2016) 19. Wiesbadener Kurier: Unfall an Gasleitung in Wiesbaden-Erbenheim: Bauarbeiter durch Stichflamme schwer verletzt, August 2016; URL: www.wiesbadener-kurier.de/lokales/wiesbaden/nachrichten-wiesbaden/ unfall- an-gasleitung-in-wiesbaden-erbenheim-bauarbeiter-durch-stichflamme-schwer-verletzt_17234701. htm (Stand 30.09.2016) 20. DPA-OTS/Feuerwehr Heiligenhaus: Gerissene Gasleitung nach Baggerarbeiten (Meldung 26/2016), September 2016; URL: www.focus.de/regional/nordrhein-westfalen/heiligenhaus-unfall-gerissene-gaslei- tung-nach-baggerarbeiten-meldung-26-2016_id_5950542.html (Stand 30.06.2016) 21. DOB: Leck an Gasleitung: Polizeit evakuiert Häuser, September 2016; URL: www.abendblatt.de/region/ stormarn/article208300213/Leck-in-Gasleitung-Polizei-evakuiert-Haeuser.html (Stand 30.09.2016) 22. BGI 759: Schutzmaßnahmen bei Erdarbeiten in der Nähe erdverlegter Kabel und Rohrleitungen; Berufsge- nossenschaft Energie Textil Elektro Medienerzeugniss; September 2010 23. Richard Thaler und Cass Sunstein: Improving decisions about health, wealth and happiness; 2008 Authors Prof. Dr. Jürgen Schmidt Johannes Biernath CSE Center of Safety Excellence CSE Center of Safety Excellence CEO of the CSE-Institute Research Associate firstname.lastname@example.org email@example.com Natalie Schmidt CSE Center of Safety Excellence Research Associate firstname.lastname@example.org
APPLICATION OF PROACTIVE RISK MANAGEMENT IN PIPELINE INTEGRITY Ricardo Almandoz / Debora Veitia ROSEN Germany
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 45 RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY ABSTRACT Risk management is an essential element in the pipeline integrity management process. Risk management involves not only the estimation of risk profiles and comparison against tolerable criterion but also ensuring that measures to treat the risk are effectively assessed and implemented. Performing risk assessments can assist operators and engineers in understanding critical issues such as: • which threats are more likely to endanger the pipe- line’s integrity, • which areas of the pipeline are more susceptible to “If risk is managed proactively rather than reactively, operators should be able to apply preventive and miti- gate measures early enough to prevent pipeline failure from occurring. In addition, adopting a proactive / pre- ventive strategy would allow resources to be effectively utilized for the optimization of maintenance plans.“ Ricardo Almandoz • failure from the active threats, and if failure occurs, how is the released product likely to be dispersed and possibly affect critical receptors. preventative mitigation measures. Managing data and assessments in a suite provides the added benefits of consistency and traceability. If risk is managed proactively rather than reactively, oper- ators should be able to apply preventative and mitigative measures early enough to prevent pipeline failure from occurring. In addition, adopting a proactive/preventative strategy would allow resources to be effectively utilized for the optimization of maintenance plans. Enabling such assessments requires an effective risk model, hence ef- forts are focused on modelling and estimating the risk of pipeline failure in a quantitative manner. Such models can be highly complex, detailed, and require large amounts of data integration; in addition, they need to generate risk factors in a consistent and transparent manner to support effective decision making. ROSEN’s Quantitative Pipeline Risk Assessment Model (QPRAM) was developed to address the expectations and challenges inherent in identifying and assessing risk factors. QPRAM incorporates probability, consequence, and risk elements into a modular framework, and allows flexible construction of customized models to reflect specific applications such as pipeline location, fluid type, data availability and required level of complexity. This paper describes how the QPRAM methodology was developed and implemented in collaboration with a Eu- ropean gas pipeline operator. A customized risk model was constructed together with the operator to reflect bespoke conditions and challenges associated with the operating environment, known threats, and data avail- ability and quality. The model provides essential risk factors at high-resolution intervals along their lines, and was calibrated using real data to ensure that the result- ing risk profiles are reflective of the threats and operat- ing experience in their region. The integration of pipeline data and the implementa- tion of QPRAM is managed in ROSEN’s Asset Integrity Management Software (ROAIMS) suite. This enables the operator to identify and compare the risk of pipelines in their network, identify active threats to any pipeline, focus on areas with elevated risk, and assess the benefits of Upon completion of risk assessments, proposed preven- tative and mitigative measures are analyzed together with other integrity assessments such as fitness-for-purpose assessments to provide an overall integrity management plan that provides guidance to the operators on what should be done, where and when, to ensure the pipeline’s integrity is proactively managed. INTRODUCTION RISK MANAGEMENT DESCRIPTION Risk management is an essential element in the pipe- line integrity management process. Risk management involves estimation of risk profiles, comparison of the re- sults against tolerable criteria and ensuring measures to treat the risk are effectively assessed and implemented. Often, risk is evaluated up to the ‘assessment’ stage i.e. efforts are focused on defining models, processing data for executing analyses to generate probability, conse- quence and risk factors, and then comparing the results with acceptability thresholds, or simply generating risk metrics to visualize the results. Identifying areas of inter- est is clearly not enough to prevent assets from failing, therefore the ‘management’ aspect involves assessing and implementing effective preventative & mitigative (P&M) measures to treat and control the risk. Risk assessment is an essential step in the process of supporting operators with proactive decision making. Identifying points or areas of interest along the pipeline asset not only provides an awareness of the likelihood of failure or degradation due to credible drivers at spe- cific locations, as well as the potential elevated impacts to receptors in the case of failure, but more importantly assists in determining when and where to apply P&M measures. However, reaching this stage relies heavily on meaningful assessment results, which are often chal- lenging to achieve.
46 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY Various fundamental aspects must be properly addressed in order to reach the milestone of being able to effectively manage risk. These include: Enabling an effective strategy: The risk approach should meet key principles (e.g. should be an integral element of the IM process, should assist with decision making, should be systematic and continuous, transparent and consistent), have a framework for implementation, be well communicated, and continuously executed and moni- tored. The ISO 31000 [Ref.1] standard provides generic guidelines on the principles, framework and process that could be applied for risk management. Other pipe- line-specific guidelines such as ASME B31.8S [Ref. 2], IGEM TD/2 [Ref. 3] or DNV RP F116 [Ref. 4] provide rec- ommendations for managing integrity and risk. Operators often reference these guidelines while producing their individual corporate frameworks. An effective strategy should facilitate continual improvement and enhance- ment of risk management within an organization. Defining an effective risk model: There are document- ed and known risk model classes, ranging from simple ‘qualitative’ models depending largely on subject matter, expert judgement, and producing risk results in relative terms, to more complex ‘quantitative’ models that re- quire large quantities of numeric input data, remove sub- jectivity, and yield results in absolute terms. To assess risk, an effective risk model and structure is required in order to estimate the risk factor results. The risk model is a set of structured rules (algorithms) that use available information and data relationships to estimate the per- formance of the system from a risk perspective. Although there are several guideline documents ad- dressing risk assessments of pipelines, such as ASME B31.8S [Ref. 2] for onshore gas transmission pipelines or DNV RP F116 [Ref. 4] for offshore pipelines, there is no industry standard for defining uniformity among risk models. As such, models developed and applied in the industry vary considerably in their complexity, structure, effectiveness and usability. There is an art and a skill to finding a balance between factors such data availability, complexity, integrating subjectivity and absolute infor- mation, tailoring models to meet bespoke conditions, and result transparency, consistency and interpretability when defining effective models. Gathering and integrating effective data: Having a model alone does not produce risk results; a risk model is basi- cally a placeholder, and only when data is introduced are profiles of the risk factors generated. Managing data can have several associated challenges, including but not limited to access and editing by multiple users, availabil- ity, quality and security, inconsistency with formats and database structures, processing, alignment and integra- tion into a centralized repository, onerous and increas- ing data volume, and resource availability. As expressed in the point above, data availability and accuracy is an important influencing factor for tailoring risk models; sometimes adopting a phased approach to updating and fine-tuning models relative to data availability is recom- mended. Data is usually reflective of a snapshot in time, therefore it is important to continuously gather, process and integrate data to assess risk throughout the asset’s lifecycle. Availability, accuracy and integration of data in a timely and consistent manner is also critical for yield- ing meaningful risk results. Generating meaningful, interpretable & consistent results: The pipeline industry is tending to more semi-quantitative and quantitative risk approaches that require objective measures of probability, consequence and risk factors. Results yielded from analyses should therefore be quan- tifiable, measurable and comparable. Analyses can return extensive results, however expressing metrics in a way that optimally supports decision making is important. Us- ing combined views of matrixes, charts, tables, and maps assists with visualizing, assessing, understanding, and communicating results, as well as planning treatment ac- tivities. Transparency and consistency of results, and the ability to assess different levels of detail, from overview profiles to root causes, are also necessary. Results pro- duced from an analysis are usually compared with tolera- ble criterion to identify and differentiate areas that exceed acceptable thresholds and therefore require treatment. Performing sensitivity analyses: Upon identifying areas of interest from the assessment stage, various feasible P&M measures should be assessed to control and reduce the risk to within a tolerable level. This is often supported by a carrying out a combination of what-if sensitivity and cost-benefit analyses. These measures are barriers that if effectively applied could reduce the pipeline’s likelihood of degradation and even failure; these include a combi- nation of treatment, maintenance, inspection, surveying, assessment, repair/rehabilitation and quality assurance activities. Obtaining a practicable balance between cost, gain, loss, and timing of P&M measures is required, al- though potentially challenging. QPRAM METHODOLOGY ROSEN’s Quantitative Pipeline Risk Assessment Model (QPRAM) was developed to address expectations and challenges with identifying and assessing risk factors. Al- though pipeline risk and integrity management is a global challenge, the issues faced can be very local and individu- al. Therefore, having the flexibility to tailor the risk model to address bespoke conditions and challenges associat- ed with the operating environment, known threats, data availability, and quality is important.
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 47 RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY applied to the historic failure frequency to generate a modified failure frequency profile along the pipeline. When the mech- anistic, operational and environmental con- ditions and the preventative and mitigative measures vary along the pipeline, a new dynamic segmentation is produced. Inspection data (such as from an intel- ligent inline inspection) and associated assessments (such as fitness for service) provide relatively accurate information regarding presence, size, and criticality of anomalies in the pipeline, which in turn can be used to infer the presence and severity of the active threat in the line. This data (if available and relevant) is then compared with the modified failure frequency to generate a refined failure frequency profile along the pipeline. The result is a highly detailed profile of the modified (or refined) failure frequency val- ues showing the variation relative to historic frequency. Thus, areas of the pipeline are identified that are more or less likely to fail than average (baseline) and by how much. The QPRAM workflow contains modular elements which aid in estimating risk factors QPRAM incorporates probability, consequence and risk elements into a modular framework and allows flexibility in constructing customized models to reflect specific applications such as pipeline location, fluid type, data availability, subject matter expert input, and required level of complexity. THREAT ANALYSIS QPRAM provides a common framework for evaluating the likelihood of failure due to credible threats by assessing the historic failure frequency of the pipeline system with a combination of mechanistic, operational and environ- mental conditions. The model assesses the severity of conditions that could affect the pipeline’s integrity deg- radation, and compares the severity against the quality and effectiveness of passive and active preventative and mitigative measures. Historic failure frequency is a fundamental input to the model and should ideally reflect expected local condi- tions; however if this data is not available, regional or na- tional statistics could be used. The severity of the driving mechanistic, operational and environmental conditions, combined with the quality and effectiveness of preventa- tive and mitigative measures, produce a ratio that is then CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS The aim of the consequence analysis is to estimate the relative impact to receptors in close proximity to and along the pipeline should the pipeline fail. To this end, QPRAM utilizes a common 4-stage process: 1. Characterize the most likely failure scenarios: If a pipe- line fails due to a specific credible threat, the failure mode likelihood (leak vs full bore rupture) is assessed. Upon release of the product in the environment, vary- ing credible failure scenarios are evaluated, leading to the development of an event tree. Common simplified scenarios are rupture of the pipeline followed by im- mediate ignition of the product, resulting in jet fire, or leak of the pipeline followed by no ignition. 2. Calculate the hazard zone: Depending on the scenario being assessed, the impact could affect a zone rela- tive to the failure point along the pipeline. For exam- ple, the scenario of a rupture of the pipeline followed by immediate ignition of the product resulting in a jet fire produces thermal radiation, and the intensity of this radiation at varying distances from the fire could be determined using a point source method [Ref. 5]. By considering tolerable thermal radiation intensity thresholds, associated impact radii could be calculat- ed to determine hazard zone areas.
48 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY 3. Identify receptors likely to be affected: Receptors such as people, environment and infrastructure that could be affected by the failure are identified. The pipeline and surrounding receptors are constructed within a Geographical Information Systems (GIS) environment, and detailed spatial queries are execut- ed at regular intervals along the pipeline to identify where receptors could be affected within the hazard zone of a potential failure scenario. 4. Estimate the potential damage to affected receptors: The severity of the impact to the receptors from the respective scenario is estimated both separately and holistically using a common metric. This could be measured for example in cost-specific terms, expect- ed fatality, or interruption of supply. Not only the impact to physical receptors within the hazard zone is estimated, but also economic impacts (including loss of product & production, and repair and recom- missioning costs), as well as less tangible impacts such as company image (including confidence, share price, etc.) are assessed. RISK ASSESSMENT Risk of failure is the product of probability of failure results (from the threat analysis) and the consequences of failure results (from the consequence analysis). Prob- ability, consequence, and risk values can be mapped to categorizations and compared on metrics such as corporate risk matrices. Additional risk metrics such as distance-based profiles of the risk value could be gener- ated, showing the total risk or comparing the risk among the credible threats; such profiles highlight points or ar- eas of interest. Risk factor profiles could also be visual- ized on a map view to associate segments with elevated probability, consequence or risk with spatial data sets such as populated areas, infrastructural density or envi- ronmental hotspots. IMP DESCRIPTION The Integrity Management Plan (IMP) is developed to set out the requirements for future inspection, monitoring and maintenance activities to control and mitigate credible Section Length (km) Construction date (year) Diameter (inch) Wall thickness (mm) Pipe Material Design Pressure (MPa) MAOP (MPa) 1 2 45 80 1972–1973 1973–1974 28 28 6.5/7.92/10.31 6.5/7.92/10.31 X60 Х60С X60 Х60С 5.4 5.4 4.8 5.4 Table 1: Pipeline characteristics Figure 1: RA Results: Risk category profile
integrity threats and risk. The plan compares historical ac- tivities to the latest risk and integrity related assessments to determine the appropriateness and frequency of future activities. Examples of integrity-related assessments which could be integrated into an IMP include fitness-for-purpose assessments and risk assessments. The proposed activities and frequencies outlined in an IMP should support product transmission under safe and reliable conditions. Risk Assessment and IMP should be regularly reviewed to ensure that credible threats are being properly managed. Changes to the operation of a pipeline or surrounding environment should trigger a review or re-assessment. In addition to the generation of an action plan, key per- formance indicators should be set to measure the effec- tiveness of the plan and subsequent activities. Examples of these performance metrics include: • Say/do ratio (activities planned vs activities com- pleted during the measurement period) • Maintenance effectiveness (planned maintenance • hours vs unplanned maintenance hours) Risk reduction (difference between the risk from the start to the end of the measurement period) • Non-compliance tasks (number of reported vs • non-compliance tasks in the measurement period) Repair Reduction (number of planned repairs follow- ing the next inline inspection vs the current plan) CASE STUDY The QPRAM methodology was applied in a gas pipeline; characteristics are shown in Table 1. There have been four identified failures in this pipe- line, two of which were attributable to stress corrosion cracking. The primary impact was product loss. The data required for risk assessment includes inline inspection, above ground-surveys, gas composition, and operation- al parameters. The consequence model expresses the potential consequence of failure in terms of cost (BLV). These values are dependent upon local factors such as labor and material costs. The results of the threat and consequence analyses were combined to calculate the risk along the pipeline and highlight those areas where the risk is higher so that recommendations could be generated to reduce the risk to acceptable levels. The risk results are displayed in Figure 1. When the results are expressed in terms of probability and cost (per event), the risk value is an expression of the lia- bility i.e. the average cost of failure per year. The stacked PoF, CoF and Risk Profiles are displayed in Figure 2. 13TH PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE 12-14 MARCH 2018, ESTREL CONVENTION CENTER, BERLIN www.pipeline-conference.com Sponsors AATS In Conjunction with IN PARALLEL TO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AND EXHIBITION ON PIPE AND SEWER TECHNOLOGIES 2ND PIPE AND SEWER CONFERENCE
50 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY Figure 2: RA Results: PoF, CoF & Risk profiles
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 51 RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY As can be noticed, the highest risk value (~142 BLV/year) occurs at ~121000 m, where the section is adjacent to one of the more populated areas, including roads, and also has a relatively high likelihood of failure. An alter- native way of viewing the risk results is cumulatively, as displayed in Figure 3. Figure 4 below provides a comparative distance-based view of the risk profiles of the threats. As can be seen, third-par- ty damage (TPD) is the most critical threat for this line; it clearly yields the higher PoF profiles. Thus it makes sense to prioritize resources to mitigate this threat. For the case in question, the focus will be on assessing the risk from TPD. The cumulative risk for the pipeline was 3,245 BLV/year. While the risk is fairly uniform along the length of the pipeline, with small peaks at populated locations, this chart shows that almost half the risk cumulates in the final 25 km (~1/5) of the pipeline. Any risk reduction measures deployed in this section would have a significant effect on the overall risk. In cumulative terms, it is the risk of third-party damage in the final 25 km that is of primary significance here. Once the main drivers for the primary threat are identi- fied, sensitivity analyses can be performed to define a maintenance plan to treat the elevated risk. It is important to mention that before applying corrective or preventive actions, a quality check of the data used for the assess- ment must be executed. Additional data collection or review could also be required to reduce any uncertainty that might exist regarding the analysis. The main aim of the operator is to focus efforts on reducing failure frequency and preventing failure, since there are lim- ited activities possible that could reduce the consequences. Operators therefore need to identify which threats increase the risk of failure, and define a strategy to mitigate them. The Driver Mitigation Ratio (DMR) charts provide a good indication of the root causes/leading factors that increase susceptibility, which is helpful in determining where to invest the resources. Figure 5 illustrates the profile of the DMR along the line for each driver of TPD. Figure 4: RA Results: Fixed Segmentation (Total PoF profile) Figure 3: RA Results: Risk Profile and Cumulative Risk
• A procedure for regularly informing landowners of the presence of the pipeline and potential dangers of causing damage does not exist. There is a legisla- tive requirement to maintain a 200 m right of way in respect to high pressure gas pipelines. Surveillance of this area is carried out at fixed intervals (annually) but the survey frequency does not take population density into account. Based on the analysis performed, some recommenda- tions could be considered to support the continued safe, reliable and environmentally responsible operation of the pipeline, such as: • A third-party damage prevention program should be • • developed, including landowner and public liaison. Following its implementation, the effectiveness of the program should be subject to regular review. Surveillance activities should be planned and exe- cuted using a risk-based approach that prioritizes high-consequence areas. Generally speaking, these areas cover the final 25 km of the pipeline. Regarding the single top-of-line dent, previous recom- mendations should be reviewed to ensure they were completed. If no recommendations or actions were completed, the following should be carried out: • Consult records (e.g. surveillance reports, land access records, etc.) to determine if the dent is located in an area at risk for third-party damage. If the dent is located in an area at high risk for third party damage, execute a local above-ground survey at the location of the dent to determine if there is associated coating damage. If the dent has associated coating damage, it should be excavated to determine its origin and significance, and repaired as appropriate based on the findings. • • 52 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY Figure 5 shows the drivers for TPD that vary the most along the line, which are pipe disposition, population near ROW, parallel pipelines in ROW (same operator) and areas susceptible to external interference in ROW. One recom- mendation to consider for reducing this effect is to in- crease patrolling of the last 25 km of the line to twice per year, especially because this is an influential area where considerable consequences would be likely to arise from third party damage. Another recommendation might be to inform the local population and landowners, perhaps with the support of the public education system and to ensure the effectiveness of the public education system. IMP As mentioned before, IMP compares historical activities to the latest risk- and integrity-related assessments to determine the maintenance plan. For the case in question, data from fitness-for-purpose assessments, records of inspection, and monitoring and maintenance frequencies were also taken into consideration. Considering TPD as the most critical threat in this case, some important findings from the overall review should be mentioned: • • The pipeline route is predominantly rural with a small proximity to villages (~15%). The nominal burial depth is 0.9 m and the line is buried for its length with the exception of 3 above- ground crossings. These locations are noted as having an increased wall thickness of 10.31 mm as mitigation against impact. • One dent was not reported by the ILI due to being outside the detection capacity of the inspection tool. The defect is considered top of line and was identi- fied as possible gouging, and may therefore be due to third-party damage. This defect was initially discov- ered in 2013, after which the section was recoated. Figure 5: RA Results: Driver Mitigation Ratio TPD
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 53 RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY Based on the recommendations from IMP, a sensitivity analysis was performed to evaluate the risk-reduction effectiveness of these actions before their implemen- tation. This resulted in a reduction in the PoF profile, as shown in Figure 6. As can be noticed, the implementation of some mitigation actions is able to significantly reduce the risk. Table 2 shows the comparison between total length in each risk category before and after the mitigations. The 78% reduc- tion of total length in the high-risk category is remarkable. Original After mitigations Risk Category Very Low Low Medium High Length (m) 108662.90 12702.83 2668.36 1505.85 Length (m) 108662.90 12810.85 3727.69 338.51 Table 2: Length by risk category comparison Figure 6: RA Results: PoF profile comparison (before and after mitigations) Figure 7: RA Results: Risk for TPD (before and after mitigation)
54 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY Figure 8: RA Results : Cumulative risk (after mitigations on TPD) After implementing these simple actions, the highest risk value is 100 BLV/year at ~111000 m, corresponding with one populated area. At the previous location with highest risk at ~121000 m the risk value was reduced to 97 BLV/ year. With these actions the cumulative risk was reduced by 6% (cumulative risk is now 3,058 BLV/year). CONCLUSION As was explained, ROSEN’s Quantitative Pipeline Risk Assessment Model (QPRAM) is a methodology that takes into account the particular conditions for each operator, which is a great advantage over other available methods. Particularly noteworthy is the ability to perform this kind of analysis after risk assessment, making this is a power- ful tool that allows operators to optimize resources. This is especially welcome when dealing with restrictions. Operators can also define a maintenance plan based on their possibilities and available resources through sensi- tivity analyses that help them assess the optimized risk treatment options. As a result, reactive maintenance will tend to decrease as proactive maintenance increases, leading to a reduc- tion of the maintenance budget and ultimately a more reliable system. References  ISO 31000, Risk Management, 2015  ASME B31.8S, Managing system integrity of gas pipelines, 2016  IGEM/TD/2 Edition 2, Transmission and Distribution (TD) – Assessing the risks from high pressure natural gas pipelines, 2015  DNV RP F116, Integrity Management of submarine pipeline systems, 2017  C-FER Report 99068, A Model for Sizing High Consequence Areas associated with Natural Gas Pipelines, 2000 Authors Ricardo Almandoz ROSEN Germany Risk and Integrity Engineer email@example.com Debora Veitia ROSEN Germany Risk and Integrity Engineer firstname.lastname@example.org
Play Video VERSATILE. Always a leading innovator, we supply customers with cutting-edge diagnostic and system integrity solutions. This, bound with our focus on flexibility, reliability, cost and quality, leads to offerings beyond your expectations. www.rosen-group.com
56 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL INDUSTRY AND PRACTICE INDUSTRY NEWS: DENSO GROUP GERMANY – DENSOLEN® USED FOR FIELD-JOINT COATING ON HIGH-PRES- SURE NATURAL GAS LINES IN UPPER BAVARIA, GERMANY DENSO Group Germany, manu- facturer of corrosion prevention systems for welded seam coatings, rehabilitation and complete pipe coatings, is supplying corrosion prevention materials for approx- imately 3,000 steel pipe welded seams for the construction of the MONACO transport line in the east of Munich. The DENSOLEN® 2-tape system – proven over decades of use – will be installed on a 40-kilometre stretch of pipeline with nominal diameters of up to DN 1200, using highly developed application equipment. The DENSOLEN®-N60/-S20 sys- tem is designed for use at consis- tently high operating temperatures, making it the ideal solution for this Corrosion prevention for approximately 3,000 welded seams Reliable application with the DENSOMAT®-11 long-distance natural gas line, which can withstand pres- sures of up to 100 bar. The tape system has convinced in other major pipeline projects such as OPAL and NEL in Germany. Reliable and precise application of corrosion prevention tape using automatic machine technology For the customer, automation is a very important con- sideration. The petrol-fuelled or electric DENSOMAT®-11 wrapping devices guarantee a high level of application reliability, and automatically maintain a constant wind- ing tension and overlap width. Three of these machines will be available for use on the pipeline. Mr. Bockstaele, Head of QSHE at the leading construction company DENYS, mentioned that due to the DENSOMAT®-11 the
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 57 INDUSTRY AND PRACTICE Fast and precise application of DENSOLEN®-N60/-S20 workload of the workers could be reduced as this wrap- ping device is “easily twice as fast” as manual applica- tion equipment. The smaller winding device DENSOMAT®-KGR Junior is manually operated, light and exceptionally flexible. It is ideal for coating of short pipe bends or for use on sites that are difficult to access, such as the steep slope that will present an installation challenge in this project. With the DENSOLEN® tape systems and the accompa- nying specially designed, reliable DENSOMAT® wrap- ping devices, DENSO is providing a complete corrosion prevention solution for the field-joint coating of the steel pipes. The MONACO long-distance natural gas line ensures that gas can be transported as required from and to the large natural gas storage facilities in Bavaria and Austria. Completion of the work is scheduled for 2018; the new pipeline will be commissioned later that year. More information is available at www.denso.de. Contact: Michael Schad Head of Sales International Email: email@example.com Steep slope at the installation site of the high-pressure gas line MONACO in Upper Bavaria
58 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL CONFERENCES / SEMINARS / EXHIBITIONS WELCOME TO THE 12TH PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE REPORT 2017 From the 2nd to the 4th of May, representatives of the international gas, oil, water, and product pipeline sectors met in Berlin at the Pipeline Technology Conference (ptc), the leading event for the Pipeline industry in Europe. In addition to the established focus on operations and repairs, pipeline construction is also taking on an increasingly important role at the ptc. For the first time, the In- ternational Pipeline & Offshore Contractors Association (IPLOCA) held its Region- al Meeting as part of the ptc. On the first day of the conference, participants in the meeting were also invited to visit the accompanying exhibition, where they were able to learn about new developments from a variety of construction-specific exhibitors. With its own job & career market for employers and job applicants and a number of new exhibitors, the accompanying exhibition has once again grown in size. Visi- tors were able to learn about new developments and have in-depth discussions at a total of 58 stands. 90% of the exhibitors have already announced their plans to participate in the next ptc.
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 59 CONFERENCES / SEMINARS / EXHIBITIONS The entire conference program offered a range of networking opportunities. On the evening before the conference, the 43 members of the Advisory Committee, together with the speakers, session chairs, and exhibitors, were invited by the organizer to a Pre-Conference Reception. The following evening, the traditional get-together sponsored by the ROSEN Group was held as part of the exhibition. A special highlight was a dinner at the Wasserwerk Berlin, where the historic industri- al architecture of the 100-year-old pumping station provided a unique backdrop for an unforgettable meal, complete with musical entertainment. Workshops and seminars on “Pipeline Leak Detection” and “In-Line Inspection of On- shore and Offshore Pipelines” followed the end of the ptc at noon on the 4th of May. The 13th Pipeline Technology Conference will be held again in Berlin from the 12th to the 14th of March, 2018. The conference will be held next year in parallel with the Pipe and Sewer Conference (PASC). More information on opportunities to partici- pate can be found at www.pipeline-conference.com and www.pipeandsewer.com EUROPE’S LEADING PIPELINE CONFERENCE AND EXHIBITION
60 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL CONFERENCES / SEMINARS / EXHIBITIONS ptc 2017 45 DIFFERENT NATIONS DELEGATIONS FROM 83 DIFFERENT PIPELINE OPERATORS FROM ALL AROUND THE WORLD 458 DELEGATES 58 EXHIBITORS 80 PRESENTATIONS 20 TECHNICAL SESSIONS ACCOMPANYING SCIENTIFIC POSTER SHOW THEMATIC FOCUS: AUTOMATION COATING COMPOSITE REPAIR CONSTRUCTION DECOMMISSIONING INLINE INSPECTION INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT LEAK DETECTION OFFSHORE TECHNOLOGIES PLANNING & DESIGN REPAIR SAFETY STANDARDS & REGULATIONS TRENCHLESS TECHNOLOGIES Estrel Convention Center Berlin
62 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL CONFERENCES / SEMINARS / EXHIBITIONS JOB & CAREER MARKET YOUR OPPORTUNITY TO ATTRACT PROFESSIONALS AND HIGH POTENTIALS The international pipeline community is in need of additional personnel. We need more experienced pro- fessionals, but we also need young graduates to join our ranks. Despite attractive working conditions, many companies encounter problems while they are reaching out to potential re- cruits. There are many competing in- dustry sectors who are also in need of high potentials. This results in many vacant jobs in the pipeline community, for operators, technology providers and service providers alike. This necessity has driven us to develop a new service for the global pipeline industry. The ptj job and career market is the right service to support existing recruitment efforts, and to boost their range and effectiveness.
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 63 CONFERENCES / SEMINARS / EXHIBITIONS ONE SERVICE - MULTIPLE CHANNELS International Uni- versities Offensive approach: We push forward and gen- erate attention to our career market directly at the universities. We also collect CVs from inter- national graduates and experts and forward it directly to you. Webseite Continuous promotion : Your vacancies are published on the Pipeline Technology Journal (ptj) website for a year. In Addition, the ptj contains your vacancies too. Biweekly Newsletter Dead on target: We send your vacancies or your company profile to our database of 50.000 interna- tional pipeline professionals. International Events Physical appearance: The job & career market has an indi- vidual booth during all EITEP events in Berlin, Cairo and upcoming event locations. Questions? You get: Please contact Mr. Admir Celovic for further information and booking requests. firstname.lastname@example.org +49 / 511 / 90992-20 The most cost-effective support to your recruitment efforts available to the market
64 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL COMPANY DIRECTORY CONFERENCES / SEMINARS / EXHIBITIONS Automation Siemens Germany www.siemens.com Certification Bureau Veritas Germany www.bureauveritas.de Coating Denso Germany www.denso.de Kebulin-gesellschaft Kettler Germany www.kebu.de Polyguard Products United States www.polyguard.com TDC International Switzerland www.tdc-int.com TIB Chemicals Germany www.tib-chemicals.com Construction Herrenknecht Germany www.herrenknecht.com Petro IT Ireland www.petroit.com Construction Machinery Maats Netherlands www.maats.com Worldwide Group Germany www.worldwidemachinery.com Corrosion Protection TPA KKS Austria www.tpa-kks.at Engineering ILF Consulting Engineers Germany www.ilf.com Inline Inspection A.Hak Industrial Services Netherlands www.a-hak-is.com Baker Hughes United States www.bakerhughes.com KTN AS Norway www.ktn.no Pipesurvey International Netherlands www.pipesurveyinternational.com Romstar Malaysia www.romstargroup.com NDT Global Germany www.ndt-global.com Rosen Switzerland www.rosen-group.com
66 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL CONFERENCES / SEMINARS / EXHIBITIONS 13TH PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE 12-14 MARCH 2018, ESTREL CONVENTION CENTER, BERLIN, GERMANY 2ND PIPE AND SEWER CONFERENCE 12-14 MARCH 2018, ESTREL CONVENTION CENTER, BERLIN, GERMANY Europe’s Leading Pipeline Conference and Exhibition, taking place at the Estrel Berlin, Berlin, Germany www.pipeline-conference.com International Conference and Exhibition on Pipe and Sew- er Technologies, taking place at the Estrel Berlin, Berlin, Germany www.pipeandsewer.com n o i t c n u n o c n j I Next Issue: December 2017 In the next Edition of ptj: Offshore www.pipeline-journal.net BONUS DISTRIBUTION AT PTJ PARTNER EVENTS Irani Pipeline Show 23 - 24 October 2017 Tehran, Iran Rio Pipeline ADIPEC 24 - 26 October 2017 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 13 - 16 November 2017 Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates 13th Pipeline Technology Conference (ptc) 12 - 14 March 2018 Berlin, Germany 2nd Pipe and Sewer Conference (PASC) 12 - 14 March 2018 Berlin, Germany Midstream Oil and Gas Congress 2018 26 - 27 March 2018 Copenhagen, Denmark
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