8 1 0 2 / 5 e u s s I e Journal Pipeline Technology Journal Special Issue: Pipeline Safety in Germany Law al g le Regulation reference Energy Act High Pressure Gas Pipeline Regulation Technical Rules DVGW rules, DIN Standards Guidelines & In-Company Standards Standards and Operational Practices al nic h c te www.pipeline-journal.net ISSN 2196-4300
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Pipeline Safety in Germany A Success Story PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 3 EDITORIAL Pipelines are the lifeline of our society and our economy, thus they deserve our at- tention in order to work safely and reliably. Pipelines transport gas, oil, water and other products over long distances, mostly over thousands of kilometers, from production facilities to the user. On their way, pipelines traverse mountains, cross lakes and pass densely populated areas. Damages to pipelines threaten lives, can cause high costs and inflict harm to the environment. At the same time, more and more pipelines are crossing developing and emerging countries that do not have up to date technical standards, and this poses high risk. International exchange of experience is therefore indispensable to transfer knowledge on how to apply the most reliable and safe technology. This is impor- tant for all steps along the value-chain of pipelines: planning, construction and operation. Especially in the case of gas and oil pipelines, mistakes can lead to catastrophic incidents with far-reaching consequenc- es. Taking into account the fact that the pipeline network (high pressure) length totals about 4 million km, and is being extended by 25,000 km every year, we are obliged to exercise prudence and attention to safety. CEO DVGW Prof. Dr. Gerald Linke The Pipeline Technology Conference (ptc) and its publication the Pipeline Technology Journal (ptj) are instruments for fostering an exchange of experience and best prac- tice. During this, Europe’s leading pipeline conference, latest technological develop- ments are presented by scientists, operators, service providers and administrators. Dr. Klaus Ritter President EITEP Since the first ptc, more than 12 years ago, safety has been a core topic. Safety was also discussed prominently during the last ptc in May 2017. DVGW – the German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water – has been asked to report in a special session about its technical set of rules, their implementation in the field and their positive impact on pipeline practice. The German gas supply system excels in its high level of technical safety, not least due to the constant advancement of technical standards in the course of the DVGW’s work on the Set of Rules. The focus of this edition of the ptj is the statistical evaluation of damage incident and accident data, the holistic safety methodology of the DVGW and the further develop- ment of the Set of Rules, taking into consideration current case law and scientific investigations as well as enhancements of the Set of Rules review process. The decrease in the number of incidents in the German gas supply network in the past 30 years by 90% is a remarkable result of Germany’s safety process and leads - even though the pipeline network has increased considerably in length and has aged over the same period - to the current frequency of nearly 0.01 incidents per 1,000 km per year. Nevertheless, improvements have to be made in areas where incidents occur more frequently in order to systematically reduce incidents caused by technical or human error. The technical papers of the DVGW safety session are provided in this special edition of ptj. Due to the in- ternational interest in the aforementioned technical session, we have decided to augment this edition with additional papers with related topics. The Pipeline Technology Conference will continue to discuss latest safety-related technological develop- ments. The Pipeline Technology Journal will keep you informed. Dr. Klaus Ritter President EITEP Euro Institute for Information and Technology Transfer in Environmental Protection Prof. Dr. Gerald Linke CEO DVGW German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water The first publication of this special issue has met with a positive response worldwide. In Germany, the issue has occasionally been used for hearings in licensing procedures. This has prompted us to update and reprint the issue in English and German language. NEW RELEASE OCTOBER 2018
4 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL THIS ISSUE’S COMPLETE CONTENT NOVEMBER 2018 / ISSUE 5 TECHNICAL ARTICLES RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY Ensuring the Technical Safety of Gas Infrastructures in Germany Alfred Klees / Anika Groos DVGW Integrated Safety Concept of DVGW in Terms of Statistical Verification of Incidents Frank Dietzsch DVGW DVGW safety concept for construction, operation, maintenance of high-pressure gas pipelines A. Groos, M. Kurth, D. Jagozinski, Dr. M. Steiner DVGW, Gasunie, Open Grid Europe The Advantages of DVGW TSM – a Technical Safety Management System Peggy Zeppei ONTRAS Gastransport Enhanced Safety through expert assessments Christian Engel TÜV NORD Systems BIL – the Germany-wide information system for pipeline enquiries Jens Focke / Ingo Reiniger Pipeline Security: Public Awareness and Mitigation of Third Party Accidents Prof. Dr. Jürgen Schmidt / Natalie Schmidt / Johannes Biernath BIL CSE Application of Proactive Risk Management in Pipeline Integrity Ricardo Almandoz / Debora Veitia ROSEN Germany INDUSTRY AND PRACTICE DENSOLEN used for Field-Joint Coating on High Pressure Natural Gas Lines in Bavaria, Germany Denso Group Germany TAL - Transalpine pipeline commissions world’s first crude oil “run-of-pipeline” power plant Transalipine Pipeline REPORTS CONFERENCES / SEMINARS / EXHIBITIONS Linkedin Showcase ptc 2018 Preview www.twitter.com/pipelinejournal www.facebook.com/ Pipeline.Technology.Conference www.pipeline-journal.net ptj Job & Carrer Market Event Calender Company Directory Page 70 64 68 76 8 16 22 30 34 38 44 50 62 63
ENSURING THE TECHNICAL SAFETY OF GAS INFRASTRUCTURES IN GERMANY Alfred Klees, Anika Groos > DVGW – German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water
RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 9 ABSTRACT An extensive gas infrastructure system crisscrossing Germany ensures the high reliability of supply of heat and electricity to the civilian population, of process heat/ heat energy and natural gas as a raw material for organic chemistry to the industry, of highly efficient primary energies to power plants, and of alternative environmentally friendly fuels (CNG/LNG) to the transport industry. The German gas sup- ply system excels in its high level of technical safety, which is not least due to the constant advance- ment of technical standards in the course of the DVGW’s work on the Set of Rules. The focus of this article is on the statistical evaluation of damage inci- dent and acci- dent data, the holistic safety concept of the DVGW, and on the further development of the Set of Rules, taking into consid- eration current case law and scientific inves- tigations as well as an adjustment of the DVGW cod- ification process- es. It additionally discusses aspects that will affect the gas infrastructure in the context of the energy turnaround. This paper is the first of a series of technical articles that deal with the safety-related challenges facing the gas infrastructure. The German gas grid currently consists of 550,000 km worth of closely intermeshed pipelines. Gas transmission lines cover nearly all of Germany (Figure 1). The structure shown in the figure has been built and expanded over the last two to three decades using cutting-edge technologies and materials. Figure 1: Germany’s comprehensive gas infrastructure, this figure showing pressure classes > 4 bar Source: GeoBasic-DE/BGK 2012/DBI
10 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY Figure 2: Its central geopolitical location makes Germany a gas import and export hub Source: ENTSOG ENERGY SUPPLY FOR GERMANY AS AN INDUSTRIAL LOCATION Various energy carriers cover Germany’s annual primary energy demand of cur- rently about 3,644TWh (Figure 3), with 21 per cent of the primary energy coming from natural gas. Today 13 per cent of the energy demand is already covered by renewable energies; the intention is to substitute the remaining 87 per cent of fossil energies in the long run. National energy policy is aimed at con- siderably reducing the primary energy demand across all sectors by 2040 by way of potential energy savings and/or efficiency increases. Direct electricity generation from sun and wind does not produce waste heat, of which power plants such as e.g. coal- fired powered plants produce an amount greater than the generated electrical power. Assuming energy savings of ap- proximately 3 per cent per year will still keep the use of primary energy at about 50 per cent. Even assuming that energy demand could be reduced by as much as 3 per cent annually until 2040 as compared to the current trend, almost 50 per cent of today’s energy consumption, i.e. almost 2,000TWh, will still need to be provided in a sustainable way . Its geographical location makes Germany a hub for both gas imports and exports; as such, Germany plays a critical role in the European gas infrastructure network (Figure 2). The German gas grid has a twofold task: first, to link import and export points and second, to link the main production and consumption points. This makes it one of the most complex technical structures in Europe. Gas consumption is subject to strong fluctuations; it depends e.g. on the season, time of day, and economic cycles. Short-term supply and demand imbalances can be directly buffered in the transmission network. Germany’s geology provides for sufficient subsurface storage capacities so that even major fluctuations in consumption can be accommodated without difficulty . Currently, the predominant renewable energy sources are wind power and PV. It is foreseeable that this trend will continue in the future as biomass, hydropower and geothermal are limited resources. National energy policy intends to increase the demand for “electrical power” in e.g. households and the industry, raising the impres- sion that the world (of energy) is moving towards a fully integrated world of electricity, or all-electric-world, where energy is generated, transmitted, and consumed in the form of electricity. “The German gas grid has a twofold task: first, to link import and export points and second, to link the main production and con- sumption points. This makes it one of the most complex technical structures in Europe. Anika Groos
RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 11 Other 15.6TWh 0,40% Renewables 463.3TWh 13% Black coal 477.2TWh 13% Nuclear energy 278.1TWh 7% Natural gas 781.1TWh 21% 3643,9 TWH Lignite 434.7TWh 12% Mineral oils 1242.2TWh 34% Figure 3: Primary energy consumption in Germany in 2015: 13 per cent of the energy is already ob- tained from renewable sources. Germany intends to substitute the remaining 87 per cent of energy from fossil sources in the long run Source: AGEB 2016 Alternative gas technologies however can increasingly be found on the agenda of dis- cussions on energy policy. Only about 2,454TWh worth of final energy out of 3,644 TWh worth of primary energy will eventually reach the consumer on ac- count of conversion and transmission loss- es. The heat energy sector (space heating, hot water, and process heating) accounts for almost half of that (1,214TWH), while the electricity and transport sectors require con- siderably less energy (515TWh and 725TWh, respectively). Potential process heat energy savings are comparatively low. Moreover, electrically powered heat pumps can be used only up to a point because of the high temperatures required for their operation. Heat energy demand management however offers a huge energy-saving potential . The more stringent requirements of the German Heat Insulation Ordinance have already helped to sustainably reduce the demand for heat energy (Figure 4). Exploiting additional savings potentials offered by efficient appliance or insulation technologies could further reduce the current demand for primary energy. Highly efficient gas technologies, however, would make the most significant contribution towards drastical- ly reducing emissions. Simply shifting from obsolete heating systems to gas condensing boilers could save 20 million tons of CO2. This would go hand in hand with potential financial gains generated through en- ergy savings. A further reduction of emissions can be achieved using CHP and “gas-plus technologies” such as gas-powered heat pumps . ) a 2 m ( / h W k n i d n a m e d y g r e n e g n i t a e H 1st Heat Insulation Ordinance (WSchVO) 1978: 140 kWh/m²a max. Only approx. 12% of buildings achieve the optimum energy efficiency level. 1st WSchVO 1978-1984 2nd WSchVO 1984-1995 3rd WSchVO 1995-2007 EnEV (Energy Saving Ordinance) 2002-2006 Total (1.6%) Of which Kfw*-60 (0.8%) Of which Kfw*-40 (0.3%) Of which passive buildings (0.006%) *Reconstruction Loan Corporation Figure 4: Heat energy demand of buildings. The energy turnaround in the heat market happens to the existing infrastructure Quelle: Prof. Maas, Bestandsersatz als Variante der energetischen Sanierung, 2009; destatis Mikrozensus 2006, IWU, Bremer Energie Institut, 2012; Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, 2012 Folie: 1
12 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY “By advancing the comprehensive safety concept that was developed in the early 1990’s, the DVGW has set a milestone in the evaluation and reduction of damage and incidents in the gas supply sector by 90 Percent within the last 30 years... Alfred Klees HOW SAFE IS GERMANY’S GAS INFRASTRUCTURE? In the light of continuing national and pan-European gas market regulations, current structural changes in the business environment and the fundamental reorgan- isation of the energy supply systems in Germany and Europe, it is the primary aim of the national economic and business policy to maintain a high standard of technical safety of the gas supply systems. By advancing the comprehensive safety concept that was developed in the early 1990s, the DVGW has set a milestone in the evaluation and reduction of damage and accidents in the gas supply sector. The statistical/stochastic anal- ysis of incidence data collected from the damage and accident statistics of the DVGW has served as a basis for the elaboration of the cause-oriented catalogue of measures. It has helped develop and introduce tangi- ble technology and process improvements as well as additional training and information measures for each cause-relevant target group, ensuring a sustainable high level of safety in the German gas supply industry. Figure 5 documents the resulting considerable reduction of the specific incident rate in the German gas grid . The measures derived from the incident analyses have been gradually integrated into the state-of-the-art technologies codified in the DVGW Set of Rules; they guarantee a comparatively high standard of safety, with the focus here on gas pipelines. External mechanical interferences account for the lion’s share of incidents, followed by corrosion damage. Defective material and incorrect work, e.g. tapping, assembly and construction defects, rank third. Incidents/1,000km of pipeline length 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,1 0,0 m k 0 0 0 1 , / s t n e d c n i I 1980 1990 2000 Year Optionaler Untertitel, Arial 28pt a F l i 2010 l i a F 2020 0,01 0 external interference corrosion constr/material hot tapping ground unknown gender, Arial 24pt Figure 5: History of gas pipeline incidents in Germany. Since 1980 the incident rate has dropped by 90% 0 external interference corrosion constr/material hot tapping ground unknown THE HOLISTIC DVWG SAFETY CONCEPT As the DVGW’s holistic safety concept is focused on suitable measures that can be implemented in all corre- sponding technical areas (Figure 7), it is not confined to the work on the Set of Rules. The qualification and certification of products, individu- als, service providers and management systems as well as of companies consequently play an important role. The following quality requirements, among others, have been defined to reflect the high standards of the Set of Rules: • • Gas supply and gas application technologies are governed by stringent legal regulations such as the German Energy Industry Law (EnWG), the German High Pressure Gas Pipeline Ordinance (GasHDrLt- gV), the German Low Pressure Connection Ordi- nance (NDAV), and the German Model Building Regulations (MBO), in which observation of and compliance with the DVGW Set of Rules are an- chored as generally recognised codes of practice and/or state-of-the-art technology. The products used in gas engineering, service-pro- viding com-panies, and the specialists/experts who are responsible for the technical acceptance tests are examined and certified on the basis of the DVGW Set of Rules. • Only companies/individuals who have proved their expert qualifications are allowed to carry out con- struction, modification or maintenance work on gas pipelines and gas facilities. In addition, and for the purpose of monitoring the compliance with the technical safety requirements stipulated by law and the Technical Rules, the DVGW provides the industry with guidance on practice-ori- ented Technical Safety Management (DVGW TSM). DVGW DVGW 0,05 itel der Präsentation, Arial 38pt hole hole rupture unknown rupture unknown • 0,05 0,04 0,03 0,02 r y · m k 0 0 0 1 r e p y c n e u q e r f e r u r y · m k 0 0 0 1 r e p y c n e u q e r f e r u 0,04 0,03 0,02 0,01
RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 13 This is why for two decades the DVGW Set of Rules has backed two methods to ensure safety: Protecting the lines against third party interference and equipping them with sophisticated technical safety features. The preference of safety dis- tances over technical safety solutions is not congruent with the historic experience of the DVGW Set of Rules because frequently identi- cal or even higher technical safety can be achieved by employing technological solutions other than dis- tances. In this context, the following primary safety measures have proved especially successful: Pipeline design with a high safety factor (1.6); • Installation of shut-off valves; • • 100 per cent check of construction site weld seams; • Hydrostatic tightness and strength tests of the pipe- line sections; • Marking of the pipeline route with signposts; • • Passive and active corrosion protection; Checking of the protective sleeve by so-called inten- sive measurements; Short inspection intervals for surveillance on foot and by air; Inspection by modern pigging technologies; Tightness tests to determine the smallest of leakages. • • • The following additional safety measures, among others, are also applied: • Higher depth of cover; • • Hydrostatic stress tests. Setting up of pipeline route warning tapes; Even comparable Sets of Rules such as, for instance, the German Technical Rules on Long-distance Pipelines (TRFL) do not contain any information on distances from built-up areas, as evidenced by an enquiry from the state parliament of Baden-Württemberg (Landtag) to the Fed- eral Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU): “... The statistical / stochastic analysis of inci- dence data collected from the damage and accidents statistics of the DVGW has served as a basis for the elaboration of cause-oriented catalogue of measures. Alfred Klees Figure 6: Decline of incidents in customer facilities since 1981 Source: BDEW, DVGW (Incidents in customer facilities per 1m natural-gas heated residential units) OBSERVATION OF CASE LAW AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH Ongoing technological progress keeps the Set of Rules of the DVGW constantly evolving, always with the aim of reflecting state-of-the-art technology. These evaluations also take into account case law developments. For example, the expedited ruling of the Higher Admin- istrative Court (OVG) of Lower Saxony in Lüneburg on 29 June 2011 led to an immediate construction freeze on some sections of the Northern European Natural Gas Pipeline. The OVG simultaneously assessed the safety of gas pipelines - disregarding the usual risk assessment pro- cedures employed for technical facilities - and defined more stringent safety measures in respect of such lines, employing a previously unknown safety technology - the distance from residential buildings. In “DVGW energie | wasser-praxis” 1/2012 the DVGW took a stance by mak- ing the following core statements: • • Supply lines shall be carefully guided up to residen- tial and industrial areas. Protecting the lines is the most effective protection of the public at large. • No further safety distances are generally required for lines running through a protection strip. • Not only distances but also any other technical mea- • sures have to be taken into consideration. The analysis of the Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing (BAM)  only looks at certain aspects and relates to worldwide incidents on pipe- line that were partially built and operated according to obsolete standards.
14 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY (Landtag von Baden-Württemberg [Regional Parlia- ment of the Federal State of Baden Württemberg]), Drs. 14/6687, p. 28): “In knowledge of the BAM research report the new TRFL will also not specify any minimum distances to be kept to built-up areas with residential buildings. The BMU communicated that the revised Tech- nical Rules for Pipelines (TRFL) intentionally do without the definition of safety distances. It has to be decided on a case-by-case basis which specific action to take. Within the meaning of this definition, case-by-case refers to special situations as mentioned and described in TRFL no. 5.2.5. Since the individual measures listed under TFRL 5.2.5 are not exhaustive (“e.g.”), an increase of the distance could be counted among these measures. This means that in a specific case it shall be tested whether one or more of the listed measures will/has to compen- sate for the concrete, higher potential risk. However, the proximity to residential buildings alone does not consti- tute such a special situation.” This goes to show that all in all, the TRFL defines ‘state- of-the-art’ differently from the expedited OVG ruling. TECHNICAL REGULATION BASED ON SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH The DVGW “Safety of Gas Pipelines” project group took part in the scientific investigations and summarised the findings for the concrete work on technical regulations by the DVGW expert panels. The following guidelines are now observed in the context of preparing technical regulations: • • • • • The deterministic safety concept of the technical reg- ulations will be maintained, however with the option of adding probabilistic statements. The Set of Rules shall protect man and nature; safety measures applied in the field today shall be integrated into the Set of Rules. The documents of the Set of Rules shall reflect the state-of-the-art and consider all sources of knowledge. Incidents and findings from damage statistics (DVGW damage and accident statistics (G410), European Gas pipeline Incident data Group (EGIG), etc.) shall be tak- en into account especially when drafting regulations. The worst-case damage scenario, e.g. total rupture, shall be taken into account. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the pipeline incidents evaluated by the BAM research report 285 partially date far back in the past. It is, therefore, extremely significant that most of the incidents that were evaluated are asso- ciated with lines built according to a now-obsolete state- of-the-art. Many other incidents occurred in non-Europe- an countries where other sets of rules apply. • Mandatory technical safety measures shall be spec- ified; their efficiency, availability and accuracy shall be evaluated and harmonised at regular intervals with new sources of knowledge. Risk potentials shall be taken into account regarding the type, number, and efficiency of the protective measures. • Furthermore, the report focuses exclusively on damage impacts, completely ignoring the root causes of the incidents or the probability of damage occurrence. The determination of the severity of damage such as the blast radii mentioned in the research report or the calcu- lation of risk arising from the operation of gas pipelines therefore are of very limited validity . At the same time, the DVGW has developed a method- ological approach with the intention being to logically represent the implementation of the above-mentioned guidelines; this procedure specifies binding goals, to be confirmed by the members, for each project group com- missioned with elaborating a document that forms part of the Set of Rules. On 14 November 2011, the Administrative Court (VGH) of Mannheim  issued a formal decision in respect of the BAM research report, in which it refutes the contention that the research report would demand specific minimum distances. The decision moreover holds that the state-of- the-art can also be ensured without defining unambig- uous minimum distances. Furthermore, the VGH Mann- heim generally recommended not departing from the standards stipulated in the Set of Rules, unless in case of substantiated scientific and technological advances. Although the DVGW’s opinion - which was published in 2011 - on the expedited ruling of the OVG Lüneburg made clear that applying the DVGW Set of Rules en- sured consonance with the state-of-the-art, the DVGW additionally evaluated the safety-related integrity of gas pipelines on a scientific level . The guidelines have also been incorporated into the cur- rent version of the Rules of Procedure GW 100 of Febru- ary 2016 and thus constitute a binding guidance for the work of the DVGW committees with its main focus on taking into account new knowledge sources. CONCRETISATION OF SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS AS STATE-OF-THE-ART The DVGW Set of Rules feeds on the wealth of practical experience from companies as well as incident statistics analyses and other relevant sources of knowledge. Tar- geted scientific research completes the evaluation mate- rial for the codification of state-of-the-art technology. Meanwhile, a large number of DVGW Sets of Rules has been adjusted (see information box) against the back-
ground of diverse scientific research as well as techno- logical progress and the knowledge derived from it. Some of the fundamental changes are illustrated by way of ex- ample of DVGW Standards G 463 and G 495, as follows: Crucial safety-relevant amendments in DVGW Standard G 463 “High Pressure Gas Steel Pipelines for a Design Pressure greater than 16 bar - Construction”, July 2016: • • • Specification in the scope of application that there is no upper limit on nominal diameters and design pressures; Increase of the pipeline depth of cover to at least 1.0 metres; Cathodic corrosion protection shall always include gas transmission lines; Gas transmission pipelines shall be piggable; • • Harmonised rate of use of 0.625; • Stricter requirements for the marking of gas transmis- sion pipelines in built-up areas. Crucial safety-relevant amendments in the DVGW Stan- dard G 495 “Gas Plants and Systems - Operation and Maintenance”, November 2016: • Consideration of the latest health and safety regulations • in respect of the operation and testing of gas plants; Integration of requirements on the monitoring of heat transfer cycles in respect of corrosion; • Further development of the requirements for the condi- tion-based maintenance (CBM) of gas plants and exten- sion of CBM to domestic pressure regulators based on the findings of the relevant research projects; Increased consideration of design features such as re- dundant safety features of devices and rails to increase their intrinsic safety and reduce the likelihood of failure; Inclusion of the requirements on the operation of mobile gas measurement and pressure reduction stations. • • What is more, a large number of new papers published in 2015 and 2016 have been prepared applying the above-mentioned enhanced safety-relevant guidelines. The revised Sets of Rules are based on the scientific findings from various analyses, among other things, and, therefore, constitute key elements in continuing the scheduled publication series on ensuring technically safe gas supply to and in Germany. References . Konersmann, R.; Kühl, C.; Ludwig, J.: Forschungsbericht 285 „Zu den Risiken des Transports flüssiger und gasförmi- ger Energieträger in Pipelines“; Editor: Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing (BAM), Berlin 2009. . Landtag von Baden-Württemberg (Regional Parliament of the Federal State of Baden Württemberg), Drs. 14/6687, p. 28. . Dietzsch, F., Klees, A. (2011): Weiterentwicklung des Kennzahlensystems und des sicherheitsrelevanten Berichtswesens für die Gasversorgung. In: DVGW energie | wasser-praxis, October 2011. . Working Group on Energy Balances (AGEB): Evaluation table on the energy balance in Germany from 1990 to 2015, as of July 2016. . Handbuch der Gasversorgungstechnik, K. Homann, T. Hüwener, B. Klocke, U. Wernekinck, DIV Deutscher Industrieverlag GmbH, 2017, Munich. . Klees, A., Schwigon, A.: Sicherheit von Gasfernleitungen – das Technische Regelwerk im Licht der aktuellen Rechtsprechung, in: DVGW energie | wasser-praxis, Volume 1/2012. . ASUE e. V.: Technikinfo CO2-Vermeidung, as of January 2016. RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 15 Authors Alfred Klees DVGW – German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water Head of Department Gas Technologies and Energy Systems firstname.lastname@example.org Anika Groos DVGW – German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water Specialist Infrastructure email@example.com Inspection Solutions for Non-Piggable Pipelines World Wide Self propelled BiDi Tethered Inspection Tool Technology is a cost efficient approach. www.ktn.no Norway • Germany • France • Spain • Scotland O f fi c e L o c a t i o n s : KTN NORWAY Postbox 109 Ytre Laksevåg 5848 Bergen NORWAY
INTEGRATED SAFETY CONCEPT OF DVGW IN TERMS OF STATISTICAL VERIFICATION OF INCIDENTS Frank Dietzsch > DVGW – German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water
RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 17 ABSTRACT The guarantee of a high safety standard of the gas infrastructure must be the highest goal of economic and operational action within the framework of proceeding national and European regulation and the organisational changes interrelated in the companies . At the beginning of the 1990th DVGW, the German Association for Gas and Water, developed an integrat- ed safety concept and thereby set a milestone for the evaluation and reduction of incidents and accidents in the German gas infrastructure. The basis for the develop- ment of the cause-oriented tool box was the statistical analysis of data coming from the incidents and accident statistics of DVGW. By means of this precise technical and process improvements as well as further trainings and awareness campaigns could be developed and in- troduced which have led to a high safety level within the German gas infrastructure. In 2011 the damage and accident statistics were made state-of-the-art according to Section 49 of the Energy Industry Act by the publication of a code of engineering practice (cf. DVGW G 410 “Bestands- und Ereignisdaten- erfassung Gas” - Registration of Asset Inventory and Incident Data of Gas Infrastructures). This makes the ap- plication of the code mandatory for all gas infrastructure operators. The data are published annually on an internet portal or interface (cf. GaWaS.strukturdatenerfassung.de). Initial results of the data evaluation for the years 2011 to 2014 are presented in this article. DEVELOPMENT OF GAS DAMAGE AND ACCIDENT STATISTICS In 1978 Germany’s Ministry of Research and Technology commissioned a study into “Safety in municipal gas sup- ply companies for households and businesses” . The aim of the study was to develop proposals and concepts for improving the safety of public gas supply systems, and attempts were made in the analysis to establish a correlation between damage and accident events on the one hand and the occurrence of (unwanted) gas releases on the other. At that time the analysts only had access to information from heterogeneous data collections, e.g. derived from pipeline grid statistics from local supply companies or from quarterly reports in the Health Ser- vice series published by the Federal Statistical Office. An overview for the whole territory of the Federal Republic of Germany was just not available. “Precise technical and process improve- ments as well as further trainings and aware- ness campaigns led to a high safety level with- in the German gas infrastructure. Frank Dietzsch was taken up by the DVGW which invited its members to exercise their personal responsibility by taking part in a data survey to commence on 1 January 1981 . This quasi mandatory requirement to participate in DVGW statistics continued right up until 2011. The current energy-law framework and the fact that the assets held by supply companies have been continu- ally expanding with the addition of new types of plant such as biogas entry and/or conditioning systems or natural gas service stations for example must receive reasonable consideration when it comes to the future formulation of technical rules and regulations. This is the background against which the DVGW “Registration of Asset Inventory and Incident Data of Gas Infrastruc- tures” has been restructured. In 2011 the DVGW took up a recommendation by the joint national and regional “Gas Industry” committee to transform the damage and accident statistics which had been collected since 1980 into a code of engineering practice . In the meantime, since 2012 the registration of asset inventory and incident data of gas infrastructures has been a firm part of DVGW’s technical rules. The data registration criteria described in the technical rule G 410 comprise the following reports (cf. figure 1): • • • • inventory data for gas pipelines, gas service lines and gas-related facilities, incident data for gas pipelines, gas service lines and gas-related facilities and customer installations of domestic and industrial gas usage, gas odour notifications, indications of interruptions of supply according to the Energy Industry Act. Pipeline network Pipeline facilities Consumer installation Asset data Details on specific length of pipelines (for gas service lines: additionally amounts) Details related to amounts ------ Incident Data Detailed Information Detailed Information Detailed Information Then in 1979 the “Safety and Fire-Fighting” group of experts of the Ministry of Research and Technology recommended producing damage and accident statistics for the public gas supply system. This recommendation Gas odour notifications Indications of interruptions of supply Figure 1: Data scope according to DVGW G 410 (A)
18 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY All operators of gas-technical energy systems as defined by the Energy Industry Act must now submit their inven- tory data to the DVGW each year. As in the past, incident data must be reported immediately after the occurrence of an incident to the DVGW, to the energy supervisor in the Federal ‘Land’ concerned and to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. This requirement does not apply to incidents only involving a release of gas only from pipelines or service connections with no other consequences – these must be reported annually by a due date. The DVGW treats data supplied by operators as confidential (cf. Figure 2). distinction is made between pressures of MOP ≤ 16 bar and MOP > 16 bar. For the first analysis, the released data for the data col- lection years 2011 to 2014 were averaged. A comparison of the sum of the pipeline lengths from the structural data collected by the DVGW (average for 2011 to 2014: 318,537 km) with the sum of the pipeline lengths of the 2014 network structural data of the Federal Network Agency BNetzA  (518,683 km) indicates a coverage of 66 %. For MOP > 1 bar pipelines the coverage is no less than 93 %. The DVGW publishes standardized reports at reasonable intervals. These reports contain only aggregated data from which no inferences can be drawn about individual system operators but which do reflect the general devel- opments taking place in the German gas industry. The reports make statements about changes in pipeline and plant inventory and about trends in safety performance indicators. The first report was published in 2016 . Service connections are differentiated by their pressure (MOP), diameter and material. All in all, 7,987,656 service connections with a total length of 131,946 km are cov- ered. Figure 1 shows the percentage breakdown by these distinguishing criteria. 72 % of all connections use PE as their material, reflecting the rapid system expansion in the last decades and a high rate of renewal of service connections in the gas sector. Approximately 300,000 km of DSO pipe- lines have been surveyed. Here again the proportion of plastic now predominates, with 54 % of pipelines made from PE and 37 % from steel. With just 0.8 per thousand, grey cast iron is all but irrelevant in the overall pipeline inventory. If we look at the age structure of pipelines we find that 47 % were constructed or refurbished between 1990 and 2014. This bears witness to a young and modern gas grid, something which the material structure already indi- cated with PE and PE coating. The average age of the grid is around 30 years. DVGW statistics show that transmission system operators own a reported pipeline inventory with a total length of 21,024 km. As well as MOP and year of construction, in their returns TSOs also differentiated pipe- lines in the MOP > 16 bar category by diam- eter, material, wall thickness and coating. In terms of possible comparability therefore, the DVGW has followed and applied the Figure 2: Data collection and reporting according to DVGW G 410 (A) RESULTS OF DATA ANALYSIS FROM 2011 TO 2014 AnAlysis of pipeline And service connection inventory Data is collected broken down by domestic service con- nections, pipelines operated by distribution system oper- ators (DSOs) and pipelines operated by transmission system operators (TSOs). For pipelines an additional “All Operators of gas-technical energy systems must submit their inventory data to the DVGW each years. As in the past, incident data must be reported immediately after the occur- rence of an incident to the DVGW, to the energy supervisor in the federal state and to the Feder- al Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. Frank Dietzsch
RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 19 The total number of inci- dents has been standard- ized to the corresponding total operational experience so as to ensure comparabil- ity with the European EGIG database . The term ‘operational experience’ here refers to the cumula- tive total pipeline length which increases year on year by the current total pipeline length. Figure 3: Trend in incidents from 1981 to 2014 on all gas pipelines data collection criteria of the European EGIG statistics kept since 1970 (European Gas pipeline Incident data Group, cf. www.egig.eu). Similarly to the DSOs, the aver- age age of these pipelines is something over 35 years. In statistical terms, the most frequent material used in TSO pipelines is StE 480 (40%), with a wall thickness of over 5 and up to 10 mm (47.1%) and with equal proportions of PE or tar/bitumen coating (approx. 33% each). ANALYSES OF PIPELINE AND SERVICE CONNECTION INCIDENTS During the period from 1981 to 2010, leaks and damage incidents – divided into six categories of cause – were reported within DVGW damage and accident statistics. Starting from the 2011 reporting year, the definitions given in DVGW code of practice G 410 apply, with only incidents involving an unintended gas release being reported. Incidents on gas pipelines during the period 1991 to 2014 are shown in Figure 4 by pipe material. The peak in grey cast iron already men- tioned is clearly visible between the years 1995 and 2000. In more recent years there has been a clear tendency for material-specific damage rates to fall within the range of 0.1 incidents per kilometre (except for ductile cast iron). An analysis of the data also shows that mechanical third-party intervention (e.g. damage caused by exca- vators) is the main cause of incidents involving service connections and supply lines made of plastic. With service connections made of metal materials, a high percentage of corrosion is found to have been the cause of the incident. Compared with all other materials the damage rate of 0.8 incidents per kilometre for service connections made from ductile cast iron (GGG, cast iron with globolitic graphite) is the highest. The metal supply lines show a high proportion of cor- rosion as the cause of incidents, with the percentage Figure 3 shows that the inci- dent rate on all gas pipelines has decreased by a factor of ten in the last two decades. The temporary rise in the in- cident rate in the late 1990’s was put down to an increased rupture hazard with grey cast iron (see also Figure 4), a trend that was countered with appropriate measures (a nationwide programme of grey cast iron rehabilitation). From the year 2000 onwards the incident curve falls more uniformly compared with pre- vious years, and this should be down to the improved quality and quantity of the collected data. Figure 4: Trend in incidents between 1991 and 2014 on all gas pipelines by material groups
20 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY for bituminised steel lines being around 80 %. The pro- portion is significantly less with younger steel pipe- lines with a PE coating. On average the incident rates for steel pipelines with a bituminised coating and cathodic protection (CP) are about one sixth of those with a bituminised coating but no CP. Compared with plastic-sheathed steel pipe- lines the positive influence of CP can be clearly seen here, not least a conse- quence of the greater age of the lines. Among the supply pipelines too, grey cast iron (untreated) returns the highest incident rate (0.363 incidents per kilometre). Figure 6: Ratio of accidents in customer systems based on one million gas-heated homes For TSO pipelines the number of incidents is a mere 2.2 per thousand of the number reported for DSO supply lines, and so the statistical analysis is limited to a con- sideration of the cause of the incident. Corrosion has the biggest share of incident causes, followed in second place by third-party mechanical intervention. Material defects and incorrect working (e.g. drilling, assembly and construction defects) follow together in third place. An analysis of the distribution of all incidents with a recorded leak size indicated for the period under review that approx. 56 % of incidents are very small in size (e.g. corrosion leaks), whereas only 1.4 % of incidents involved a very significant release of gas. Approx. 30 % of all incident reports were unable to give any qualified leakage size (meaning an unknown size of leak). Figure 5: Trend in immediately reportable incidents since 1981 immediAtely reportAble incidents with operAtors’ own systems Trends in immediately reportable incidents involving systems owned by TSOs and DSOs since 1981 are shown in Figure 5. The rate of immediately reportable incidents shows a continuous reduction, especially for the number of incidents based on operational experience in the past 20 years. In the period un- der review – 2011 to 2014 – third-party mechanical intervention was the main cause of all immediately reportable incidents, with 39 %, followed by third-par- ty thermal intervention with 25 %. immediAtely reportAble incidents with customers’ systems The ratio of immediately reportable incidents per annum to the number of gas-heated homes  for the period since 1981 is shown in Figure 6. Just as with the immedi- ately reportable incidents in system operators’ own plants, the immediately reportable incidents in customer systems also reflect a continuous de- crease. In the past 15 years overall there have been between 1 and 2 accidents per million gas-heated homes per annum. In the period 2000 to 2014, the immediately reportable incidents broken down by causes are distributed
RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 21 The quantity and quality of the statistical data that is now available means that the information that is to hand provides a vital framework for decisions on rehabilitation issues for gas system operators in Germany. Taking their lead from DVGW Bulletin G403 1), companies can match these changes in the rates of incidents with their own data with a view to updating their renewal and mainte- nance strategies if need be. Furthermore, besides the evaluation and analysis of security-relevant operating statistics communication and reporting have a major significance. Regarding gas incidents and accidents the prompt availability of infor- mation is a substantial requirement in order to be able to give statements opposite market partners, the public and legal authorities and in order to specify causes and give professional assessments. 1) ‘Decision Support For The Maintenance Of Gas Distri- bution Networks’ References        Dietzsch, F./ Klees, A. (2011): Weiterentwicklung des Kennzahlensystems und des sicherheitsre- levanten Berichtswesens für die Gasversorgung. Energie Wasser Praxis, October 2011. Trepte, Lutz (1978): Sicherheit bei kommunalen Gasversorgungssystemen für Haushalt und Gewerbe. In: Forschungsbericht KT 7705 „Kommunale Technologien“ im Auftrag des Bundes- ministeriums für Forschung und Technologie. DVGW Circular G 5/1980 of 16 July 1980. Dietzsch, F./ Lange, R./ Schmidinger, J/ Steiner, M. (2016): Bestands- und Ereignisdatenerfas- sung Gas – Ergebnisse aus den Jahren 2011 bis 2014. In: energie | wasser-praxis No. 1/2016. Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen: Monito- ringbericht 2015 EGIG European Gas pipeline Incident data Group, www.egig.eu. BDEW Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft e.V.: Gaszahlen – Der deutsche Erdgasmarkt auf einen Blick. Author Frank Dietzsch DVGW – German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water Senior Technical Manager Gas Infrastructure firstname.lastname@example.org “In the period from 1981 until today the tendency of the absolute total incident rates has been decreasing by 90 Percent and is pres- ently moving on a low historical level of 0.01 incidents per 1,000 km per year. Frank Dietzsch between component defects “technical defects”, e.g. gas piping, gas appliances or waste gas systems (34 %), installation-related defects “installation errors” (10 %) and faults caused by customers such as “deliberate interfer- ence with the gas system” (28 %), “operator error/lack of maintenance” (14 %), “incorrect intervention in the gas system” (11 %) and “inadmissible changes in the set-up of gas appliances” (3 %). Defects caused by customers therefore account for 56 %. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS In the period from 1981 until today the tendency of the absolute total incident rates has been decreasing and is presently moving on a low historical level. The normalised incident rates on gas pipelines (transport and distribution network) are also decreasing and have stagnated for at least ten years independent from the pressure range. This can be interpreted as a steady improvement in qual- ity and safety standards in the operation of gas pipelines according to the DVGW codes of practice. The increased use of plastics as a material in pipeline construction by distribution system operators as well as the rehabilitation of pipelines made with grey cast iron is one reason for the general decline in incident rates. Incident analyses also indicate a significant reduction in corrosion incidents with steel pipelines that have cathodic protection (CP) as opposed to those with no active CP. We should emphasise the age-specific anal- ysis of the incidents which shows that gas pipelines constructed prior to 1970 return an incident rate that is significantly higher than more recent construction years. An analysis of all immediately reportable incidents shows the main cause as being mechanical intervention by third parties, followed by thermal third-party interven- tion. Thermal third-party intervention proves to be the main cause among domestic service connections while mechanical intervention by third parties is the predom- inant factor in high-pressure gas pipelines over 16 bar. It should be remembered here however that the level of incidents among transmission system operator pipelines with the greatest dimensions is very low, at just 2.2 per thousand of the rate for distri- bution system operators.
THE INTEGRAL DVGW SAFETY CONCEPT FOR CONSTRUCTION, OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF HIGH-PRESSURE GAS PIPELINES Anika Groos, Detlef Jagozinski > DVGW Michael Kurth > Gasunie Germany Dr. Michael Steiner > Open Grid Europe
RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 23 ABSTRACT The construction, operation and maintenance of high-pressure gas pipelines require conscientious planning and execution, taking numerous aspects into account. The focus must always be on ensuring that the surrounding is not impaired and that the safety of peo- ple and the environment is not endangered. In order to guarantee this, the DVGW rules and regulations form an integral safety concept, which is in a continuous adapta- tion process, so that it can be ensured that the pipelines correspond to the state of the art. DVGW REGULATIONS DEFINE STATE OF THE ART FOR HIGH-PRESSURE GAS PIPELINES According to the Ordinance on High Pressure Gas Pipelines (GasHDrLtgV), high pressure gas pipelines for the transport of natural gas at pressures above 16 bar in Germany must be constructed and operated in such a way that they do not impair the safety of the surround- ings and do not have a harmful effect on people and the environment . Section 2 of the GasHDrLtgV assumes that construction and operation are state of the art if the rules and regulations of the German Gas and Water Association (DVGW) are observed. The state of the art required for this is anchored in the DVGW regulations, in particular in DVGW Codes of Practice G 463 and G 466-1 [2, 3]. These two Codes of Practice describe the con- struction, operation and maintenance of high-pressure gas pipelines in detail. In the course of the regular revision, the safety philos- ophy of the DVGW regulations and the corresponding technical regulations were adapted in various project groups to the state of the art for high-pressure gas pipe- lines for transporting natural gas at pressures above 16 bar. The overall process of transporting gaseous natural gas through underground high-pressure gas pipelines was considered, i.e. from route planning, construction, operation and maintenance. In some cases, the project groups - e.g. for technical safety - were staffed on an interdisciplinary basis by: • • • • • • Legislation - Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy (BMWi) Enforcement Agency - Energy supervision authori- ties of the federal states, Bavaria, NRW, Saxony Experts – DVGW, TÜV Nord Science - Universities, KIT-Karlsruhe, TU Clausthal Rule Setters – AfR, DVGW Federal Agency - Federal Institute for Materials Re- search and Testing (BAM) During the revision, the corresponding DVGW codes of practice were adapted to the state of the art for high-pressure gas pipelines. Additional international “An evaluation of DVGW incident data collection up to 2014 indicates a very high safe- ty standard and reliability as demonstrated for example by the sustained fall in the number of incidents. For example an almost 90% reduction in incidents on gas pipelines has so far been achieved since 1981 even though the total length of pipeline network has risen significantly. Dr. Michael Steiner standards and national codes such as the Technical Rules for Pipelines  were also taken into account. Furthermore, past incidents and events as well as current findings from the point of view of safety engineering were taken into account. Even though the quality of pipe- line construction and operation is today extraordinarily high due to the continuous technical progress in the manufacturing and testing procedures and the fact that DVGW rules and regulations describe the safety require- ments for the construction, operation and maintenance of high-pressure gas pipelines very comprehensively and concretely, the requirements are to be specified in more detail and more bindingly as far as reasonable. Since the large number of technical specifications and preventive safety measures in the DVGW Standards and Codes of Practice are not marked as risk-reducing measures for the protection of man and the environment and are therefore not immediately recognisable to the layperson, because they are directly integrated into the process concept, the holistic DVGW safety concept will be explained in more detail here. HOLISTIC DVGW SAFETY CONCEPT The revised rules and regulations took into account the guard rails for safety-related topics laid down in the revised DVGW Rules of Procedure DVGW GW 100 . Thus, the protection of man and the environment is to be ensured by the regulations. The deterministic safety concept will continue to be maintained, although individual probabilistic supplements are possible. The rules and regulations must reflect the state of the art of transport with high-pressure gas pipelines, including all sources of knowledge such as publications, international rules and regulations, experience, science and opinions. When establishing regulations, particular consideration shall be given to the results from incident statistics, e.g. DVGW inventory and event data acquisition according to DVGW Code of Practice G 410, incidents of gas pipelines according to DVGW Code of Practice G 411, European incident data according to EGIG [6, 7, 8]. The safety measures specified in the DVGW rules and regulations shall be binding, their effectiveness, availability and accuracy shall be evaluated and regularly compared with new sources of knowledge. Furthermore, the potential
24 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY risk shall be considered with regard to the type, number and effectiveness of the protective measures and the protective measures already applied in practice by many operators shall be included in the regulations. • A high-pressure gas pipeline must be able to with- stand all expected loads during commissioning. Furthermore, the loading capacity and the operation- al and environmental loads must not change unac- ceptably over time. Also, additional unacceptable loads are to avoid. For this reason, changes in load and loading capacity must be checked in relation to condition and impact and countermeasures must be taken in the event of impermissible changes. Safety-related measures to avoid hazards caused (for example by the actions of third parties or en- vironmental hazards such as ground movements) must be proven qualitatively in terms of their effect, accuracy and availability - for example statistically or by operational experience - whereby the quality of the measures is based on the possible effects. • Thus, according to the principle of inherent safety, hazards can be eliminated or their probability reduced for high-pressure gas pipelines by preventive protective measures such as high values of pipe covering, wall thickness or material toughness as well as by laying them in areas without hazards. An additional increase “Open Grid Europe deploys a large num- ber of different safety measures that are state- of-the-art for high pressures gas pipelines in Germany. These measures enhance the tech- nical safety of high pressure gas pipelines by adding effective protection of the line from ex- ternal interference, thereby creating one of the safest pipeline systems. Dr. Michael Steiner in safety is achieved if several independent measures are applied. Such measures can be grouped into lay- ers of protection, whereby a distinction is made here between preventive safety measures and primary and secondary protective measures, dual strategy according to Figure 1 . The application of these levels of safety to high-pres- sure gas pipelines results in correspondingly adapted measures for different hazards. The levels of safety are schematically summarised in Figure 2 as example of possible corrosion. Here, preventive structural mea- sures, i.e. passive corrosion protection (coating) and active cathodic corrosion protection are combined with organisational protective measures, such as in- spections and expert tests. Figure 1: Layers of Protection for high-pressure gas pipelines [according to 13]
In order to systematically compare all possible safety as- pects with the safety-related specifications or additional measures to protect the pipeline, a hazard analysis or RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 25 safety study by independent experts is usual or an as- sessment can be carried out in accordance with DVGW Code of Practice G 1001 “Safety in gas supply - Manage- ment of risks” . Since no methodology including limit values for a quantitative risk analysis is available for high-pressure gas pipelines in Germany, a qualitative assessment is recommended here. Figure 2: Layer of Protection for a risk of corrosion [according to 13] Figure 3: Incident development since 1981 at gas pipelines of all pressure levels  Figure 4: Incidents per 1000 km for pipelines of transmission system operators above 16 bar  ADAPTATION OF THE DVGW REGULATIONS BASED ON OP- ERATIONAL EXPERIENCE Since the results from incident statistics are to be considered, all serious events with unintentional gas release and all identified safety-endangering interven- tions in the area of influence of the pipe- line are to be analysed with regard to the cause in accordance with DVGW Code of Practice G 466-1 and necessary measures for future avoidance are to be derived . The new version of DVGW incident data acquisition for events with unintention- al loss of gas already takes the DVGW guard rails into account in its evaluation of safety measures and the update of the state of the art. For example, the evaluation of recording until 2014 shows a very high safety stan- dard and a very high reliability, which can be demonstrated, for example, by the con- tinuously decreasing number of events . Thus, from 1981 to the present day, it has been possible to achieve an almost 90% reduction in the number of incidents on gas pipelines, even though the length of the pipeline network has risen sharply at the same time (Fig. 3). Figure 4 shows the distribution of all immediately reportable event causes for high-pressure gas pipelines of more than 16 bar. The majority of the events are caused by corrosion leaks and, in second place, by mechanical external influences. Material defects and improper work (e.g. assembly and construction defects) follow together in third place. The detailed consideration of the distri- bution of events subject to immediate reporting which are associated with per-
26 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY sonal injury, deflagration, explosion, fire, flying debris or other public events is shown in Figure 5. The main cause of immediately reportable events on high-pressure gas pipelines above 16 bar is 74% of mechanical external events, followed by 16% of thermal external events. areas or areas to be newly built, areas of intersections with traffic routes or areas in which additional impacts on the gas pipeline are to be expected. The measures taken to protect the pipeline minimise the probability of occurrence and thus the risk of an incident. As in the case of the serious events from the Europe- an damage statistics EGIG, the immediately reportable events for the mechanical external impacts of gas pipelines above 16 bar in Germany also rank first, but are far below the European value in the per mile range. Serious events for ground movements and manufacturer errors did not occur in Germany during the period under consideration. While the main cause of the events for gas pipelines above 16 bar in Europe is damage by third parties, for pipelines above 16 bar in Germany this is corrosion leakage, which can be explained by the fact that some of the gas pipelines in Germany are much older than those in Europe. Since, according to DVGW Code of Practice G 466-1, all possible safety-relevant aspects have to be taken into account when determining safety-related measures for construction, inspection and maintenance , the con- sideration of past events results in a focus on measures for the protection of the pipeline against corrosion leaks and manufacturer/construction faults as well as, in par- ticular, damage from the outside or due to soil impacts. As measures for the protection of the pipeline, addition- al mostly structural measures during construction, e.g. marking of the pipeline route, as well as predominantly organisational measures for the existing pipeline, e.g. re- current inspection, especially in areas with an increased need for protection, should be taken. Such areas with an increased need for protection are, for example, built-up Since, according to DVGW Code of Practice G 466-1, all possible safety-relevant aspects have to be taken into account when determining safety-related measures for construction, inspection and maintenance , the con- sideration of past events results in a focus on measures for the protection of the pipeline against corrosion leaks and manufacturer/construction faults as well as, in par- ticular, damage from the outside or due to soil impacts. As measures for the protection of the pipeline, addition- al mostly structural measures during construction, e.g. marking of the pipeline route, as well as predominantly organisational measures for the existing pipeline, e.g. re- current inspection, especially in areas with an increased need for protection, should be taken. Such areas with an increased need for protection are, for example, built-up areas or areas to be newly built, areas of intersections with traffic routes or areas in which additional impacts on the gas pipeline are to be expected. The measures taken to protect the pipeline minimise the probability of occurrence and thus the risk of an event. STATE OF THE ART FOR THE CONSTRUC- TION OF HIGH-PRESSURE GAS PIPELINES The revised Technical Regulation for the Construction of New High-Pressure Gas Pipelines, DVGW Code of Practice G 463, focuses on safety measures on structur- al measures. For example, the safety and protection of people and the environment must be taken into ac- count when routing high-pressure gas pipelines. Among other things, the fu- ture operation of the pipeline, existing soil conditions and possible third-party influences must be taken into account. In DVGW Code of Practice G 463, for example, the following protec- tive measures were increased in com- parison with other standards for the construction of high-pressure gas pipelines: Figure 5: Distribution of all immediately reportable events to house connections and pipelines 
RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 27 • • • • • • Safety coefficient minimum of 1.6 (usage factor of maximum 0.625) depth of cover minimum 1 m 100% of girth welds to be checked increased amount of marker posts in areas of dense population increased hydrostatic test in areas of dense population use of ductile linepipes acc. to DIN EN ISO 3183, attachment M, PSL 2 In addition, higher requirements are specified in built-up areas. For example, a more dense marking of the pipe routing, e.g. by sign posts, must be provided and the pipe must be subjected to a water pressure test accord- ing to the pressure/volume measurement method D2 in accordance with DVGW Code of Practice G 469  or VdTÜV Code of Practice for Pipe 1060 . After the test according to the pressure/volume measurement meth- od D2, the geometry test for corresponding geometrical deviations including limit values is specified in DVGW Code of Practice G 463. Where possible and proportionate, the line should be laid out in such a way that no additional protective measures are required. If routing is carried out in areas with an increased need for protection, e.g. in built-up areas or in areas in which additional impacts on the high-pressure gas pipeline are to be expected, individual additional protective measures shall be provided. These measures must be weighed against each other depend- ing on the type of area and the potential hazard. Such individual measures may be, for example, the increase of safety factor, depth of cover, pressure test requirement, marking or scope of testing or the provision of a route warning tape or geotextile . If, on the other hand, a new high-pressure gas pipeline is not routed through a built-up area, no additional measures are required. In order to protect the pipeline, DVGW Code of Practice G 463 specifies the distance to underground installations, high-voltage installations and wind turbines. STATE OF THE ART FOR OPERATION AND MAIN- TENANCE OF HIGH-PRESSURE GAS PIPELINES The Technical Rules for the Operation and Maintenance of High Pressure Gas Pipelines DVGW Code of Practice G 466-1, on the other hand, places the safety-related emphasis on organisational measures such as con- dition-oriented inspections and shortened inspection intervals (e.g. inspection cycles within counstruction). When defining and carrying out the inspection and maintenance measures, possible safety-relevant as- pects have to be considered. These include, among other things, external impairments, e.g. due to construction activities, soil movements, corrosion, manufacturing de- fects and leaks. Typical protective measures here are: Surveillance / Inspection by walking or helicopter • • Monitoring of cathodic corrosion protection • • • Monitoring of construction activities in the vicinity of Inline Inspections (intelligent pigging) Evaluation of ground movements pipelines The basic requirement for systematic consideration is to apply suitable quality assurance and management systems and, in particular, a pipeline integrity manage- ment system, e.g. PIMS according to . Such a PIMS is to be understood here as a series of suitable activi- ties and procedures by which an operator maintains the integrity of the gas pipeline in order to ensure safe and reliable operation. One focus of the safety-related specifications concen- trates on corresponding cycles in particular for zones within built-up areas. Thus, adapted cycles for the sec- ondary safety measure of route control are specified and in areas with an increased need for protection, recurrent proof of the effectiveness of corrosion protection ac- cording to DVGW Code of Practice GW 10  is re- quired. This strengthens the role of the experts [21 - 24]. Piggable high-pressure gas lines are also condition-ori- ented and repeatedly have to be inspected. Typical cycles for a repeated, here newly defined “Intensive CP measurement technique” as well as inline inspection are 10 to 25 years. Furthermore, the DVGW and the opera- tors of high-pressure gas pipelines support safety mea- sures to prevent damage by third parties. These include BALSibau for damage minimisation during construction [25, 26] and the “Bundesweite Informationssystem zuzr Leitungsrecherche” (nationwide information system for pipeline research) BIL . In areas with an increased need for protection, e.g. in built- up or newly constructed areas or in areas in which addi- tional impacts on the high-pressure gas pipeline are to be expected, shortened inspection cycles or improvement measures may have to be provided depending on the type of area and the potential hazard. On the one hand, in accordance with DVGW Code of Practice G 466-1, the time intervals of inspection and maintenance measures shall be appropriately specified with regard to the condi- tion, taking into account the operating experience and the local conditions . On the other hand, in areas with an increased need for protection, e.g. in areas with approach- ing or already approached constructions and in areas in which additional impacts on the gas pipeline are to be expected, a more dense marking by marker posts or signs and, if necessary, with increased warning notices and information, shall be provided as a preventive measure. In accordance with DVGW Code of Practice G 463, these new marker posts or signs must always be placed on the line axis and within sight of each other. If this marking is removed from the line axis due to local conditions, the di- rection and distance to the line axis must be specified .
28 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY ONGOING ACTIVITIES In the course of the ongoing updating of the DVGW code of practice, the safety specifications on the topics of operational inline inspections (DVGW Code of Practice G 450), measures for construction work (DVGW Information GW 315) and principles and organisation of on-call service (DVGW Code of Practice GW 1200) are currently being revised. In DVGW project groups, the systematic evalua- tion and justification of safety-related specifications for construction, operation and maintenance as well as the investigation of events by third parties are also performed. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION The revision of DVGW Codes of Practice G 463 and G 466- 1 shows that the integral safety concept for high-pressure gas pipelines presented here, based on the DVGW rules and regulations, has proven its worth in operation, so that pipelines laid accordingly are technically safe. Neverthe- less, they must continue to be protected against external influences. For this reason, the DVGW Standards and Codes of Practice specify a high level of technical safety equipment as well as measures to protect the line from external influences. From the consideration of past events, the main focus for measures to protect the pipeline is on corrosion, material defects and external damage. To protect the pipeline, there- fore, additional measures are specified, usually structural (e.g. increased water pressure test with stresstest) for the construction of the pipeline and mainly organisational (e.g. repeated inspections in areas with an increased need for protection, e.g. within buildings) for the existing pipeline. In summary, it can be seen that the current DVGW Stan- dards and Codes of Practice contain numerous preventive safety-related provisions according to the state of the art for high-pressure gas pipelines in Germany. With these measures, the technical safety of high-pressure gas pipe- lines is supplemented by the effective protection of the pipeline against external influences and the framework for one of the safest pipeline systems is given. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Verordnung über Gashochdruckleitungen, Gashochdruckleitungsverordnung - GasHDrLtgV, Ausgabe 18.05.2011 DVGW Arbeitsblatt G 463 (A), Gashochdruckleitungen aus Stahlrohren für einen Betriebsdruck von mehr als 16 bar – Errichtung, Juli 2016 DVGW Arbeitsblatt G 466-1 (A), Gasleitungen aus Stahlrohren für einen Betriebsdruck von mehr als 16 bar – Betrieb und Instandhaltung, Entwurf Dezember 2016 Geschäftsordnung DVGW GW 100, Tätigkeit der DVGW-Fachgremien und Ausarbeitung des DVGW-Regelwerkes, Februar 2016 DVGW Arbeitsblatt G 410 (A), Bestands- und Ereignisdatenerfassung Gas, März 2012 9th Report of the European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (period 1970- 2013), EGIG (www.egig. eu), February 2015 Sicherheit von Gasfernleitungen-das Technische Regelwerk im Licht der aktuellen Rechtsprechung; Technisches Komitee des DVGW „G-TK-1-1 Gastransportleitungen“; A. Klees, A. Mazur; energie-was- ser-praxis 1/2012 Technische Sicherheit in der Gas- und Wasserbranche; A. Klees, B. Niehues; energie-wasser-praxis 12/2004 Basissicherheit von Pipelines gewährleistet eine hohe Sicherheit und Verfügbarkeit; J. Arensmeier, H.-J. de la Camp, M. Steiner; 3R international (47) Volume 5/2008 DVGW Merkblatt G 411 (M), Untersuchung von Ereignissen an Gasleitungen und gastechnischen Anlagen; Draft August 2016 Bestands- und Ereignisdatenerfassung Gas – Ergebnisse aus den Jahren 2011 bis 2014; F. Dietzsch, R. Lange, J. Schmiedinger, M. Steiner; energie-wasser- praxis 1/2016 First-time use of barcodes and scanner systems from the steel pipe up to the finished long-distance pipeline; A. Grassmann, M. Steiner, D. Schmidt, O. Kahn, F.-M. Knoop; 3R Special Edition 2/2012 Der Coatinginspector – Qualitätssicherung beim passiven Korrosionsschutz auf Pipelinebaustellen; H. Jansen, Th. Löffler, A. Grassmann; 3R int; 9/2014 DIN EN 16348, Gas infrastructure. Safety Management System (SMS) for gas transmission infrastructure and Pipeline Integrity Management System (PIMS) for gas transmission pipelines. Functional requirements; Sept. 2013 The Pipeline Integrity Management System of E.ON Ruhrgas AG; G. Linke, R. Michel, M. Steiner, H.-W. Theilmeier-Aldehoff; 3R international (45) Volume 7/2006 Inline Inspection from an operator’s point of view; Th. Hüwener, H. Watzka, G. Linke, F. Kutsch, M. Ahlers, M. Steiner; 3R international Special Edition 2/2007 Bundesweite Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Leitungsbetreiber zur Schadensminimierung im Bau, Balsibau; www.balsibau.de DVGW GW 129, Sicherheit bei Bauarbeiten im Bereich von Versorgungsleitungen – Schulungsplan für Ausführende, Aufsichtsführende und Planer, 09/2006 Paradigmenwechsel in der Leitungsauskunft; J. Focke; 31. Oldenburger Rohrleitungsforum; 9.2.2017; Oldenburg Anika Groos DVGW – German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water Specialist Infrastructure email@example.com Detlef Jagodzinski DVGW – German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water Specialist Infrastructure firstname.lastname@example.org Authors Michael Kurth Gasunie Germany Manager Technical Operation email@example.com Dr. Michael Steiner Open Grid Europe Head of Integrity michael.steiner@open-grid- europe.com
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THE ADVANTAGES OF DVGW TSM – A TECHNICAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Peggy Zeppei > ONTRAS Gastransport ABSTRACT Companies that operate technical systems, e.g. the German gas transmission system operator ONTRAS Gastransport GmbH, must ensure operational safety at all times, that all associated procedures and processes com- ply with the applicable laws and regulations, and that the company is also prepared to react in case of emergencies. Haphazard trial and error might be a possibility to achieve this. However, considering that the methods used should fit process control as well as legal requirements, some kind of organised management system featuring concrete steps in a predefined order is necessary. A practicle exam- ple is the QM System of ONTRAS.
RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 31 management system. ISO 9001 is process-oriented and specifies the minimum requirements for a quality management system. A QM system of this kind should enable an organization to, at least, reduce its error rate and resultant costs. Another commonly used standard is ISO 14001, last updated in 2015. It defines the requirements for the certifiable environmental management system (EMS) of an organisation. The standard should allow an organisa- tion to continuously improve its environmental impact, achieve compliance with legal and other environmental requirements, and reach its environmental objectives. Therefore, the organisation needs to identify its significant environmental aspects and the associated impacts as well as suitable criteria for controlling the environmentally relevant processes. This standard also monitors whether the environmental goals have been achieved and documents the continuous improvement with suitable indicators. A common standard for occupational health and safety (OH&S) is OHSAS 18001. It defines the requirements for the occupational health and safety management system of an organisation. These requirements include, for ex- ample, a suitable OH & S management system, including mechanisms for organising occupational health and safety and its hazards and risks within a company. THE ADVANTAGES OF DVGW TSM – A TECHNICAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Companies that operate technical systems, e.g. the German gas transmission system operator ONTRAS Gastransport GmbH, must ensure operational safety at all times, that all associated procedures and process- es comply with the applicable laws and regulations, and that the company is also prepared to react in case of emergencies. Haphazard trial and error might be a possibility to achieve this. However, considering that the methods used should fit process control as well as legal requirements, some kind of organised manage- ment system featuring concrete steps in a predefined order is necessary. In order to build up such a system, it is best to start with a plan that sets defined targets. In the first instance, the in- dividual steps for various procedures are analysed to define the processes. After implementation, it is nec- essary to develop a com- prehensive review process that determines which envis- aged goals have been achieved and to what extent. The results of this review process will make it possible to adapt or correct processes, where necessary. It is import- ant to document all the steps and resulting processes as well as implementation methods and progress. GENERAL REMARKS All the management systems presented here follow the same scheme (fig. 1): • Plan: Defining targets and the action required for “TSM Systems provide processes to ensure a safe operation and to minimize risks of organi- sational faultssystems. Peggy Zeppei implementation TECHNICAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT (TSM) • Implement: Installing the planned steps to achieve the envisaged targets • Check: Checking to be sure that the implemented action generates the expected effect • Act: Learning from and improving the system continuously There are two groups of common management systems: • Management systems for defining and improving a company’s quality and safety of processes: Quality (and safety) management systems (QM) • Management systems to minimise risks of organisa- tional faults: Technical safety management systems (TSM) QUALITY AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT (QM) There are several standards that fulfil quality and safety requirements. Most important, nationally and interna- tionally, is the common standard ISO 9001 from 2015. It covers quality management (QM) and aims at a con- tinuous improvement of the company’s internal quality Technical Safety Management Systems aim to minimise risks of organisational faults. The German DVGW TSM system is based on compliance with laws, regulations and the generally accepted rules of technology that apply Figure 1: TSM implements a continious cyclic process of planning, checking and improving
32 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY throughout the industry and are the same for all compa- nies. Thus, the technical rules and DIN standards of the German DVGW regulations provide legal certainty and a basis for all activities in the gas industry. The advantage is that as an association, the DVGW acts economically independently, neutrally and is not profit-oriented. Thus, the DVGW ensures transparent rulemaking processes. For ONTRAS as Germany’s second-largest transmission system operator, the relevant TSM regulations are the technical rule G 1000 from 2005 defining requirements for the qualification and organisation of the normal oper- ation of gas infrastructure, and the technical rule G1001 from 2015 defining the risk management of the technical gas infrastructure. As the company is also responsi- ble for operating 22 biomethane injection plants, the technical rule G 1030 from 2010 is also relevant defining the requirements for organisation and qualification of operators of biogas plants. In detail, the TSM of the DVGW (referred to from here on as “TSM”) comprises a process of constant updat- ing to reflect the latest statutory requirements. As a management system for technical safety, it has been well established in the German utilities industry since 1999. It provides an outstanding component of technical self-administration in the energy industry and is essen- tially based on the know-how and the engagement of the experts of the sector. A regular recertification pro- cess provides systematic updates of the whole system and its benefits. TSM focusses on the organisation of the company. Like the camera in a classic Hollywood movie that zooms from a wide angle with landscape, horizon and people into the smallest detail, in the total view TSM analyses the organisational structures and looks for clear defini- tions of technical disciplinary responsibilities and func- tions. It prevents in particular an overlap in competence, being one of the main causes of faults. Zooming in, TSM considers the processes within the organisation and the departments of the company. It looks for the acquisition of important work processes, the coordination among involved units of the organisation and aims to create transparent processes that can be updated if necessary. In order to help a company in establishing its individual TSM system, DVGW offers a wide range of guidelines with checklists and questionnaires. These aids can assist the respective company to systematically review its struc- tural and procedural organisation by self-assessment. ONTRAS TSM AND RELATED DOCUMENTS “With such a system a company ensures professional reaction during normal operation and in cases of emergency. Peggy Zeppei documents fit perfectly to our business needs. Typical applications include: • checklists for construction site inspections, also avail- able as an app • various documents for the cooperation with service providers • audit of service providers according to ISO 9001 • question catalogue for service providers, e.g. check- lists for on-duty vehicle equipment • ONTRAS regulations for service providers regarding on-call service and maintenance • on-call service organisation • operating instructions for the operation/maintenance intervals of biomethane plants, • concrete regulations for liquefied petroleum gas sup- pliers (e.g. safety plan for LPG filling) • comprehensive service contracts using the SAP-sys- tem (access for service providers - activation orders and billing) exAmple 1: construction site inspection Our construction site inspection app for iPhones helps auditors with their work in the field. Detailed and easy to handle checklists guide them through their tasks and document all the steps and results transparently (fig. 2). The auditor has to check, among others: • Whether site documentation is available and complete. • Whether site equipment/first aid equipment is satis- factory. • Whether fire protection has been correctly organised and equipment and information about this are available. • Whether hazardous substances are present, and if so, whether they are being properly handled. • Whether the necessary materials are available and are properly stored. • Whether the security of the site is satisfactory. • Whether scaffolding, ladders and stepladders are avail- able and in the right place. • Whether the people at the site use their personal pro- tective equipment correctly. • … • Whether construction machines (such as diggers, cranes, and drilling instruments) are satisfactory and are properly positioned. Since its foundation in 2006, ONTRAS has been devel- oping its own company rules and regulations for relevant standards in addition to or due to a the lack of existing regulations. We do this in order to ensure that all our exAmple 2: check-up of on-cAll duty vehicles ONTRAS has developed another app to check on-call duty vehicles.
RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 33 for at least two years. After expiry, it has to be renewed by a new audit that will mainly focus on selected process- es. If the result of the first audit is negative, the company may repeat the whole process, taking into account the first audit results and trying to update and optimise the negatively rated processes and documents. By certifying its TSM system, ONTRAS improved the safety of its employees, its transmission system and facilities whilst also minimising the organisational risks and organisational negligence. Furthermore, interac- tion with our service providers is much easier and the involved processes are more transparent. The introduced comprehensive site inspection system avoided technical faults and violations of legal as well as internal regula- tions. For example, in 2017 we inspected about 880 con- struction sites and registered approx. 80 findings, most of which could be quickly eliminated. Generally, it makes sense and is cheaper to prevent incidents before they occur than to deal with the consequences afterwards. Authors Peggy Zeppei ONTRAS Gastransport GmbH Head of Central Services firstname.lastname@example.org Figure 2: A systematic check list provides easy and quick handling of site checks The app considers the on-call schedule (timeliness/up to-date, telephone list) and whether a mobile phone is on board. It enables the user to determine quickly whether the respective vehicle is properly equipped by checking the barrier materials, measuring equipment, emergency lighting, tool kit, plans and documentation, camera and other photography equipment, fire extinguisher and so on. HOW THE TSM CERTIFICATION PROCESS WORKS How the process of a typical TSM audit works and how to get the envisaged certificate is explained using the example of ONTRAS TSM certification. After the company indicates to DVGW its intention to be TSM certified, it receives an examination catalogue with the respective guidelines. On this basis, the company answers an extensive questionnaire for preliminary ex- amination and prepares the requested documents, such as organisational charts, organisation of departments, relevant regulations among others. In the first audit, the DVGW auditors will randomly test the resulting docu- ments during several examination talks and look at spe- cific processes in detail. Afterwards, the auditors will give their first impression and present initial results of their examination. If everything was as expected and all results were positive, DVGW will send the complete examination report along with the coveted TSM certificate that is valid “The systematic approach enables a con- tinuous learning from and improvement of the processes and further education of employees. Peggy Zeppei
ENHANCED SAFETY THROUGH EXPERT ASSESSMENTS Christian Engel > TÜV NORD Systems ABSTRACT In the construction of pipelines for the transport and storage of combustible, corrosive or toxic gases and wa- ter-polluting fluids, independent inspections by experts is an essential aspect of quality assurance which contrib- utes significantly to the safety of these systems. This does not only apply to new projects, but also to modifica- tions, conversions or maintenance measures. This approach has proven itself in Germany for many decades and contributes to making these systems some of the safest in the world.
RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 35 REQUIREMENTS ACCORDING TO THE TECHNICAL REGULATIONS Different laws, regulations and technical rules apply to the various types of pipeline systems in Germany de- pending on the medium being transported. In the area of public gas supply, the UVPG (Environmental Impact Anal- ysis Act), the Ordinance Regulating High Pressure Gas Pipelines and the DVGW (German Technical and Scientif- ic Association for Gas and Water) regulations are applied in conjunction with relevant DIN EN standards, e.g. DIN EN 1594. With regard to construction supervision and inspections by experts, the DVGW worksheets GW 350, G 434, G 462/I, G 462/II and G 463 as well as the VdTÜV data sheet on pipelines 1001 are to be mentioned here. For other pipelines, e.g. the transport of water-endanger- ing substances or flammable gases which do not serve to supply the general public, the UVPG, the Pipe Trans- mission Ordinance and the TRFL (Technical Rule for Pipelines) apply. For pipelines and installations in the field of oil and gas storage systems, the requirements for mining law are additionally applied. For lines which run exclusively within factory premises, requirements for the tests of the Pressure Equipment Directive and the Operational Safety Ordinance are applied. Quality monitoring by experts accompanies the above described plants/systems over their entire life cycle: starting with planning and approval procedures, via construction, commissioning and operation to decom- missioning. The quality monitoring measures by inde- pendent experts in the various phases are described in the following sections. QUALITY MONITORING BY EXPERTS PLANNING AND APPROVAL PHASE Independent experts may carry out studies on safety and feasibility even during the planning and approval phase. A higher degree of acceptance for public projects or also greater legal certainty in the approval procedure, for instance, can be attained in the process. “Quality monitoring by external experts accompanies the pipelines in Germany over their entire life cycle, starting with planning and approval procedures, via construction, commissioning and operation to decommis- sioning. Christian Engel CONSTRUCTION Within the framework of construction, independent experts assess the qualifications of the companies involved (pipeline construction, corrosion protection, non-destructive tests) and the personnel employed, the quality of the construction work, including non-destruc- tive tests, pipe laying and coating. The basis for the tests to be performed is the VdTÜV-Merkblatt Rohrleitungen (data sheet on pipelines) 1001. After the pipeline has been laid properly and the con- struction examination has been completed, the pipeline is subjected to a cohesive or partial strength test and leak test (pressure test). This pressure test is the integral proof of the proper construction and laying of the pipe- line before its commissioning. By performing the construction and pressure test by independent experts, it is ensured that a high-quality pipeline is produced which in later operation can result in lower costs and can be safely operated. COMMISSIONING Before commissioning, the necessary safety devices of the pipeline system are checked by independent experts with regard to the suitability of the equipment used, the setting of limit values and the functional capability of the safety devices. This ensures that all the important equipment of the pipeline system is suitable and safe to operate so that, for example, unacceptable operating conditions can be reliably prevented and, where appropriate, leakages can be reliably detected. The tests also include the explosion protection of the installations. The examination of the notification or approval docu- ments by independent experts usually leads to an even smoother course of the notification or approval proce- dure by the competent authority. Here, obvious errors or other deficiencies can be corrected before the docu- ments are submitted, which can significantly reduce the official approval procedure time and effort. “By performing the construction and pressure test by independent experts, it is en- sured that a high-quality pipeline is produced which in later operation can result in lower costs and can be safely operated. Christian Engel
36 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY OPERATION During operation, pipelines which are subject to the Pipeline Directive are inspected every two years by inde- pendent experts. Installations subject to mining law are also tested on a regular basis. The tests cover the condition, the proper functioning of the safety devices and the CP (cathodic protection) as well as the tightness of the pipeline. Furthermore, a multitude of further quality assurance tests can be performed by experts. These range from the selection and verification of suitable pipeline inspection tools (ILI) via the qualification of the inspection tools and the evaluation of the results of inspection tools, to service life estimates and damage investigations. In the case of modifications in the pipeline environ- ment, e.g. construction of new buildings, construction of new roads, etc., the expert’s opinions can be used to ensure the safe condition of the pipeline by which certain measures established by the expert are taken to secure and protect the pipeline. DECOMMISSIONING In the context of decommissioning, proper drainage and cleaning is controlled by experts in the case of certain pipelines; in particular, pipelines for the trans- port of water-endangering substances. This ensures that there is no danger to persons or the environment due to the shut-down of pipeline sections. IMPACT OF QUALITY MONITORING Quality monitoring by experts leads to a reliable, high-quality transmission pipeline with a long service life and low costs during operation. The involvement of independent experts also minimises the liability of the owner/operator, since gross negligence is gener- ally to be excluded. Even if quality monitoring can never be completely comprehensive and can only be carried out in ran- dom samples, a higher quality can be achieved by “Quality monitoring by external experts leads to a reliable, high-quality transmission pipeline with a long service life and low costs during operation. Christian Engel means of concrete detection of errors and the timely introduction of corrective measures. Furthermore, a psychological effect comes into play because, as a rule, all parties concerned deliver higher quality when it is known that monitoring is carried out by an inde- pendent third party. Moreover sometimes the other perspective and/or the expert’s experience also helps to detect, uncover and correct mistakes. REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPERTS Owing to the diverse tasks at all stages of the life cycle of a pipe transmission system, experts must have broad training and sound expertise. Experts must therefore un- dergo an extensive training program before they are au- thorised to perform independent tests. Expertise must be kept up-to-date by means of regular further training. It is also desirable to have a strong service provider mental- ity, since the tasks rarely take place near one´s place of residence, not always in good weather nor during normal working hours. Since certain decisions must be taken and implemented, conflict management and powers of self-assertion are among the optimal qualities of a good expert. Other characteristics include perseverance and reliability and a certain flair for tact is also necessary when communicating test results. Author Christian Engel TÜV NORD Systems Head of Inspection Body for Pipelines email@example.com
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BIL – THE GERMANY-WIDE INFORMATION SYSTEM FOR PIPELINE ENQUIRIES Jens Focke, Ingo Reiniger > BIL - Federal German Construction Enquiry Portal
RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 39 INTRODUCTION The foundation of BIL eG by 17 German pipeline com- panies from the chemical, high-pressure gas and min- eral oil sectors on 15 June 2015 cleared the path for developing the national information system for pipeline enquiries, BIL. With the implementation of an internet portal and a database backend, at the start of 2016 BIL will provide the first cost- free portal for information on pipelines in Germany. MOTIVATION FOR ESTABLISHING BIL BIL eG is a registered, non-profit cooperative. The or- ganisational form of non-profit registered cooperative (eG) provides the necessary secure legal framework. In addition, the eG legal form promotes the joint endeav- ours of all involved parties in making building activi- ties safer and is intended to motivate pipeline, utility and telco companies from all sectors, who can join the cooperative as members, to support this initiative. BIL does not pursue any commercial interests and will col- laborate with operating companies and system provid- ers. BIL will provide free information on pipelines and cables to enquirers. BIL-member companies (as of 10/2018) » 66 participating companies » Liquid Pipeline Operators » Gas transmission Operators (TSO) » Water Transmission Operators » Wind and Solar » Multi Utilities » Cable Operator » High Voltage Transmission Operators » over 120.000 enquiries since operational start » > 500 enquiries /week in 2018 » 13.000 registered users Illustration 1: Member typ and BIL-achievements till start of operation As pipeline operators, the founding members of BIL eG have had particular problems with the construction industry’s lack of knowledge on the location of pipe- lines: often they are affected years later if damages to the subterranean pipeline infrastructure are detected during monitoring and inspection measures. In addition, undesirable costs may be incurred if civil protection operations need to be carried out, especially in rural “The cost of compensating damage to pipelines caused by construction work amounts to an estimated €2 billion per annum. Much of this damage is due to a lack of infor- mation on the location of these assets. Jens Focke areas, when pipelines have been hit unexpectedly by a building contractor during earthworks. At the same time name changes, organisational changes and unknown boundaries to service zones do not make it particularly easy for the building industry to identify the relevant companies and contact persons. In these times of ever increasing construction activities, it is therefore neces- sary to standardise and simplify information requests on pipeline locations. BIL provides an internet-based – and thus permanently available – process, built on digital processing of location information using IT-based work(- force) management systems. BIL aims to incorporate the operators’ existing planning information solutions in order to provide a standardised, lean and digital enquiry procedure to the building industry. FOCUSSING ON THE CORE PROCESS BIL wants to focus on the core process of the enqui- ry itself and access the online planning information systems of the operators without interfering with the internal workflow implemented therein. The BIL enqui- ry platform will enable enquiring building contractors to enter their building request with all technical details and corresponding location information as a geograph- ical building area. The enquiry will be passed on to all pipeline companies available via BIL. By comparing the building area to the service areas of the operators (which are invisible to the enquirer), BIL checks online who is responsible for the pipelines/cables in the area and then sends the enquirer a list of the relevant operator or op- erators. The operators in charge receive the information from BIL, check whether they are affected and communi- cate all information via the BIL portal. This way, the task of checking if pipelines/cables are affected remains with the operator and their planning information generates the relevant information for the enquirer. Enquiry Responsibility Check Transfer to relevant company Illustration 2: Core of the BIL enquiry process
40 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY COMMUNICATION AND INTEGRATION The main tasks and function of the BIL infrastructure are the digital check of who is responsible for a cer- tain area and communicating this information via the portal. To this end, operators simply need to enter their geographical area of responsibility in BIL, specified as a corridor around a pipeline or as an area surround- ing their service area. The data is transferred to BIL in standard graphic data formats. It comprises self-defined area polygons only, no pipeline data and pipeline routes. Operators are responsible for entering and updating their geographical areas of responsibility. • If, on that basis, BIL identifies that an operator is re- sponsible for a particular area, the operator has several options for incorporating the digital building request by BIL into its processes. The differences lie only in the way in which the system is integrated into their workflow. The operators themselves are responsible for analysing the information in their database as to which, if any, pipelines are affected: • Replying to the enquiry from the system of the pipeline company: the digital enquiry (alphanumeric information and area polygon) can be transferred via a web interface directly to the operator’s system where it will be checked if their infrastructure is affected. Once it has been confirmed in the opera- tor’s system that none of their pipelines are affected, a “not affected” reply can be sent back to the BIL portal instantly and passed on to the enquirer from there. The information exchange with the enquirer takes place via the BIL portal. This process can also be used by participants who do not have their own infrastructure and where this service is outsourced to an engineer’s office or a group company. Processing the enquiry by the operator directly via the BIL portal without system connection: in this case the participating operator decides if their pipe- lines or systems are affected based on the coverage area stored in the system. A manually created “not affected” or “affected” reply to the enquirer, possibly with .pdf attachments, can then be entered in the BIL portal. In cases where the operator’s infrastructure is affected, additional digital planning information may be sent along with the reply. In either case BIL does not interfere with the operator’s workflow for processing enquiries and checking if their infrastructure is affected. The system offers the added value of allowing the building industry to make individ- ual requests and filter “non-responsibilities” online, and allowing pipeline operators/utilities to make information available in a digital, standardised format. enquiry arrived (enquiry + plans) registration with GeoNAM acknowledgement of receipt contribution of management yes no handing over the crossing documentation yes second check no answer no statement statement approved yes Construction support needed? yes construction support no acknowledgement of receipt Change of documentation needed? no yes update documentation process Illustration 3: Separation of BIL and operator’s core process
RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 41 for this purpose. Each type of building work generates a buffer zone of a particular size around the construc- tion site. Therefore the operators’ geographical areas of responsibility are affected to different degrees by the var- ious types of construction works. Naturally, larger buffer zones must be observed for extraordinary structures than for local construction work. This way, operators can keep their areas relatively small without missing a relevant enquiry. TECHNICAL SCOPE BIL provides a web-based information solution for enquirers (e.g. building contractors, planners, authori- ties etc.) and participants (pipeline companies) with the following functionality: • • • interface for the building industry or other enquirers to request free information regarding all types of building work, communication platform providing the required information and documents, database function with geo- graphical reference for integrat- ing the operator’s geographical area of responsibility to analyse potential responsibilities as part of a digging request. The overall system is made up of the following three components: • • • • portal solution that can be ac- cessed as a web service via the internet, database-driven information system for storing the partic- ipants’ areas of responsibility (geographical situation of grid areas) and related information, integrated Web Map Services (WMS) for providing geographi- cal reference data and maps, database backend for long-term storage of enquiry and infor- mation data from enquirers and operators. The solution comprises the workflow between the enquirer and the par- ticipants as outlined in illustration 2 and 3 with the following additional features (examples): Geographical context: BIL requires the construction area to be entered as a spatial polygon based on map material including layout plans and official maps. The coordinate system ETRS89 forms the geodesic basis. Construction site classification: the enquirer must inform operators about the type of construction work via BIL. BIL provides a list of differ- ent types of civil engineering work eG Die Leitungsauskunft Going ahead for Safety! Internet-Portal for Construction Enquiries Cost-free Request Service Organised as Registered Corporative www.bil-leitungsauskunft.de/information-in-english/
42 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY Area calculated by BIL based on the type of construction work it is an economic necessi- ty gladly supported by the building industry. Polygon submitted by the enquirer Minimum distance between construction work and object to be protected Enquiries by the building industry are to be accom- modated free of charge and in a technically attractive manner, with the objective of reaching more pipeline com- panies. Where information on the type of construction work is available from the enquirer and with a digital reply process on the opera- tor’s side, the functional aim is to consolidate enquiry and Illustration 4: Handling of construction criticality by corridors Archiving: all data and documents are archived in line with the relevant legal provisions and kept for reference. Enquirers and operators may carry out research based on the data at a later time. Based on the collected data, statistical analyses in the form of monthly and annual reports can be generated in BIL. reply information in a digital workflow. This should help overcome any potential inhibitions with respect to mak- ing enquiries at any time and from anywhere. Preventing damages and operational faults adds economic value that may also contribute to increasing the much needed acceptance for necessary infrastructure projects. BIL ACTS AS COMMUNICATION PLAT- FORM FOR ENERGY CHANCE DEMANDS German high voltage transmission grid op- erators will increase their capacities along their routes to satisfy energy demands in southern Germany. By transmitting energy via overhead transmission lines electro- magnetic interferences may interfere with the pipe body of pipeline operators. The technical framework demands all operators to exchange data of their route locations to analyse technical feasibility. For this issue locations of pipeline operators in between mast location must be identified within the so called spanfields. Only BIL may give detailed information by a special report listing names of pipeline operators and informing them about on-going studies of the high voltage transmission grid opera- tors. Organised by German Amprion, as the largest of 4 high voltage transmission grid operators, leading pipeliners have con- firmed their cooperation in sharing detailed route data via the BIL portal for this specif- ic demand to accelerate the construction and optimization demands in Germanys “Energiewende”. BENEFITS Increasing safety in civil engineering works is the main motivation of all the founding members of BIL eG and at the same time, Illustration 5: Result of spanfield analysis showing coloured amount of identified operators within single spanfield
RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 43 New „digital“ business process Digital Business Modell: Comprehensive digital enquiry of digging request via internet Cost reduction in existing business tasks Digital Prozess Support: on-line responsibility-check to reduce communication n case of „non-responsibility“ Cost optimized service Digital Operating Model: Application Hosting, WMS- Integration, digital communication, external archive Illustration 6: Digital business process support for energy industry basis. Based on the experience of opera- tors of critical media, initial implementation was carried out which fully covers the re- quirements for web-based building enqui- ries. In addition to transmission system op- erators, BIL wants to reach the operators of local distribution system infrastructures, in particular municipal utilities and telecom- munication companies, but also operators of biogas pipelines or other media. The spanfield analysis between high volt- age transmission grid operators and the pipeline industry to optimize operations in the energy change debate demonstrates the benefits of a registered cooperative to solve economic demands. In the age of industrial digitisation, BIL can also help to boost the efficiency of processes that need to be opti- mised due to increasing construction activity, a decreas- ing headcount and standardised options for response. Individual operators developing their own planning information portals is a step in the right direction; it requires, however, that enquirers know which operators to address in the first place. BIL wants to solve this problem and pass on the enquiry information to the systems of the relevant operator(s). OBJECTIVE AND OUTLOOK It is BIL’s ambitious goal to become “the go-to portal” for pipeline/cable information from operators of all sectors. The main motivational factor is to simplify the mandato- ry enquiry process for the construction industry with the aim of providing “complete” information. The enquiries are free of charge for private individuals, building contractors or operating companies. Implemen- tation, maintenance and expansion of the system will be carried out by the BIL organisation in collaboration with third-party service providers and thus only requires a small set-up. Therefore, the foundation of a registered cooperative was identified as the most suitable organ- isational structure. This way, operators of all types of pipelines and media may participate on a not-for-profit Authors Jens Focke BIL - Federal German Construction Enquiry Portal Chief Executive Officer firstname.lastname@example.org Ingo Reiniger BIL - Federal German Construction Enquiry Portal CTO ingo.Reiniger@bil- leitungsauskunft.de “With 1 million construction sites in Germany each year and figures rising, the construction industry is in need of information on pipelines and cables and their routes both underground and aboveground. A simplified inquiry process an contribute to safety and effectiveness. Jens Focke Receive the most relevant global pipeline news directly to your inbox: www.newsletter.eitep.de
Prof. Dr. Jürgen Schmidt, Natalie Schmidt, Johannes Biernath > CSE Center of Safety Excellence PIPELINE SECURITY PUBLIC AWARENESS AND MITIGATION OF THIRD PARTY ACCIDENTS AS NEW LAYER OF PROTECTION FOR THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE GAS
RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 45 “Gas transmission pipelines belong to the critical infrastructure – they are essential for the energy supply. Statistics show a contin- uous decrease in the number of incidents per 1000 km pipeline length as a result of a per- manent increase in technical safety in the last thirty years. Especially in Germany population density increases while public acceptance of incidents decreases continuously. Prof. Dr. Jürgen Schmidt ABSTRACT Gas transmission pipelines belong to the critical infra- structure – they are essential for the energy supply of the industry and public households. International and national statistics1,2 show a continuous decrease in the number of events per 1000 km pipeline length as a re- sult of a permanent increase in Technical Safety during the last thirty years. Nevertheless, catastrophic incidents like gas explosions in Ghislenghien3, Gräveneck4 or Op- pau5 can’t be fully excluded. Third party activities, espe- cially through excavators and drilling machines, are the main the reason for these incidents. The most effective topic to further enhance the current safety standard of gas transmission pipelines is the protection of the critical gas infra- structure from external impacts. Especially in Germany population density locally increases while public acceptance of incidents decreases continuously. An innovative pipeline security concept is needed - it is time for a paradigm shift: pipelines shall additionally be protected by (1) a Third party anti-collision system (THANCS) based on latest Industry 4.0 opportunities and (2) an active role of the population to ensure pipeline security. As a consequence, the European Risk Com- munication Platform (EURIC) is founded at the CSE Center of Safety Excellence to deepen the research in this field. Figure 1: Event frequency per km in the German gas transmission network between 1981 and 2014 according to statistics of DVGW INTRODUCTION AND STATE OF THE ART The gas network extends to over 510,000 km6 within Germany and ensures the public and industrial energy supply. According to the German Energy Industry Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz)7, the secu- rity of the energy supply and the Technical Safety of these pipelines must be ensured. Technical Safety was significantly in- creased over the last decade in the areas of corrosion protection, pipeline construc- tion, monitoring and in-line inspection sys- tems. As a result, international and nation- al statistics show a continuous decrease in the event frequency per km8,9,see Figure 1. Figure 2: Frequency of incidents in registered pipelines due to EGIG13 Although Technical Safety is significantly enhanced, still major catastrophic incidents such as in Ghislen- ghien (2004)10, Gräveneck (2007)11 and Oppau (2014)12 occur. The risk for these incidents is very low, but they cannot be fully excluded. The main reasons for such events are external inter- ferences, in particular by excavators, drills, as well as agricultural and forestry equipment, according to the data of EGIG (European gas pipeline incident data group, a consortium of the 17 major European gas pipelines operators), Figure 2.
46 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY The probability of incidents to occur due to construction activities in distribution and house service connections is much higher than in long distance gas transmission pipelines. In contrast, impacts with damage to property and personal injury are usually low. An extract of various incidents during the last months is summarized in Table 1. Date Location Incident “Despite preventing measures, with about 1 million construction activities annually in Germany, accidental events on gas pipelines can only hardly be avoided. About 80 % of the damage on pipelines are human errors due to work with machinery. Prof. Dr. Jürgen Schmidt 08/05/2016 Alheim 30/05/2016 Cham 22/06/2016 Bad Wiessee Rupture of a gas transmission pipeline by an excavator14 Rupture of a gas transmission pipeline by an excavator15 Damage of a gas transmission pipeline by an excavator16 The German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water (DVGW) has defined a very high safety standard to ensure the Technical Safety of pipelines during plan- ning, construction and operation and, hence, to protect people and the environment against potential hazards of the pipeline. In addition, a protection of the pipeline from external interferences on the same safety level is needed. 14/07/2016 Eltville-Hat- tenheim Cut off of a gas transmission pipeline by an excavator17 11/08/2016 Wunsiedel 25/08/2016 Wiesbaden- Erbenheim Damage of a gas transmission pipeline by an excavator18 Construction worker gets se- riously injured by a jet flame caused by an accident at a gas transmission pipeline19 16/09/2016 Hetter- scheidt Rupture of a gas transmission pipeline by an excavator20 26/09/2016 Ahrensburg Damage of a gas transmis- sion pipeline on a construc- tion area21 Table 1: Non-representative list of open source publications of external interferenc- es on gas distribution lines by excavators in Germany within 5 month of 2016 If the pipeline is damaged, combustible and explosive gas is released. A small spark can cause an ignition and an explosion due to, for example, the contact between the pipeline metal and the excavator bucket. The damages can be particularly devastating, if the gas has been dis- tributed in the buildings before the explosion takes place, Figure 3, especially in areas with high population density. This is challenging, because Technical Safety mea- sures are lacking. Worldwide, organizational measures to prevent an incident due to third party activities are standard. In Germany, Technical Safety measures for construction and earthwork are regulated in many codes such as DVGW GW462-1, GW315 und GW381, TV A-StB 12 worksheets or also BGI 759 as organizational measures. Prior to any earthwork precise local maps of the pipeline network need to be requested, pipe network operators must be identified and in case the excavation work takes place in the vicinity of pipelines, workers often need to prevent a collision by means of carefully shoveling, before the roundup will continue. Despite these measures, with about 1 million construc- tion activities annually in Germany, accidental events on gas pipelines can only hardly be avoided. About 80% of the damage on pipelines are “human errors” due to work with machinery22. Training, strengthening of a safety culture, additional technical measures and public awareness are the main driver towards a higher level of security for gas pipelines. BALSIBAU for example is an initiative of the DVGW to increase the training standard of excavator drivers and drilling operator. Unfortunately, the training is not yet mandatory. Figure 3: major catastrophic event in Itzehoe (Germany) 2014 through an explosion of a gas distribution line caused by a third-party intervention Source: dpa
RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 47 Another major step to enhance the prevention of accidents is a central system for construction applications – an inter- face between construction industry and pipe network op- erator. In 2015 several pipe network operator have founded BIL as an information platform for critical infrastructure in Germany. BIL is an important prevention measure and may further be integrated into a pipeline security concept. Industry 4.0 opens the opportunity for a link between con- struction machines and gas network maps. Renewable Energy is very popular in Germany and seem to be available limitless and with less potential hazards compared to natural gas. For a major part of the Ger- man society the need for natural gas is not obligatory. Any incident and especially a catastrophic incident may strengthen the public demand to further increase the security of natural gas pipelines. Hence, a continuous improvement of the existing Technical Safety concept for gas pipelines by means of adaptation to the current State of Safety Technology is necessary. In addition, the quality of pipeline security measures to protect against an external interference need to be increased. PIPESECURE2020 – NEW LAYER OF PRO- TECTION FOR PIPELINE SECURITY The CSE Center of Safety Excellence initiated the “THANCS” program (Third party Anti-Collision System) with the intention to combine latest navigation and de- tection technologies for a development of a new excava- tor anti-collision system to avoid third party incidents. In addition, an innovative communication concept should encourage the motivation of the general public to secure actively the protection of pipelines. Based on the Nudg- ing-Principle, people’s behavior should be altered in a predictable way without prohibitions, instructions or sig- nificant changes in economic incentives23. Present types of communication are used mostly for an information transfer to strengthen the public perception of safety, but do not encourage the public awareness. The development of new layer of protection in a security concept for the gas infrastructure to protect pipelines from external interferences is the aim of the project “PipeSecure2020” at the CSE Center of Safety Excel- lence. The CSE-Institute is a non-profit competence center for research and education in the field of process and plant safety. The center is guided by an industrial advisory board in the areas of chemicals, petrochemicals, oil and gas and has special knowledge and decades of experience in handling and protecting risks of technical plants. The partner of the CSE Institute - the CSE-Society: Society for the Promotion of the Process and Plant Safety e.V. – includes about 40 renowned companies and institutions. Among others, BASF, Bayer, Linde, Siemens, Gasunie Germany, Thyssengas and Open Grid Europe as well as the German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water DVGW, but also many small and medium-sized enterprises, universities and worldwide partners. The CSE-Institute´s mission is to develop innovative safety concepts in order to increase the global and cross-industry safety of critical infrastructures. An indus- trial-scale testing installation to perform flow measure- ments and type testing of safety device with pressures up to 3400 bar (~ 50 000 psi) is under construction, Figure 4. The facility is built in co-operation with the Fraunhofer Institute for Chemical Technology in Pfinztal near Karlsruhe, Germany. Research is embedded in an interdisciplinary educa- tion of young academics in the field of process and plant safety at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, the Technical University of Kaiserslautern and the Univer- sity of Applied Science in Karlsruhe. Directors of the CSE-Institute are Prof. Dr. Jürgen Schmidt and Prof. Dr. Jens Denecke with more than 35 years of experience in protection of technical plant, especially chemical and petrochemical plants. To introduce a new awareness and mitiga- tion concept, latest findings of risk accep- tance and communication shall be applied to parties living within a zone of potential consequences of natural gas pipelines. Risk shall be understood, accepted as part of a life, but no fear shall be inspired. In many cases, engineering and objective argumentations, which are dominated by numbers, are insufficient to encourage the necessary trust in the communication. The situational circumstances of those communications have to be suited to the typical application procedure (heuristics) of nontechnical people. Figure 4: CSE High pressure loop for flow measurements and type testing at pressures up to 3400 bar (~50 000 psia)
48 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY THANCS PROGRAM The CSE-Institute aims to develop an innovative alarm system to automatically warn the operator of an exca- vating machine when approaching a gas pipeline and switches off the construction or agricultural machinery before an actual contact happens. On the one side, this Technical Security measures increase the protection of gas pipelines for the construction industry. On the other side, potentially affected persons in the vicinity of gas pipelines are also better protected. As a first easy and inexpensive preventive security mea- sure, a warning system embedded in a mobile device is planned. Machine operators of excavators and drilling machines will be warned of a potential damage to gas pipelines optically and acoustically from their mobile device. Gas network operators will be identified and informed about the actual risk situation evaluated on the basis of e.g. the population density in the surrounding of the pipeline. To enable the availability in rural areas (gaps in the mobile device network) or urban building situations, in a subsequent step this alarm system will be enhanced to a local autonomous system. An appropriate detection system for gas pipelines must be found in addition to the mobile device warning system. Measuring systems from other branches like the arche- ology and the measuring principle of the geomagnetism offer a good source base for that purpose. On the basis of the autonomous alarm system, a prototype of an au- tomatic anti-collision system in a construction machine that switches off the machine before a contact with a gas pipeline happens (Industry 4.0 Device) can be developed. For the conversion of these Technical Security measures precise geodata are necessary for the spatial position of all pipelines. Present offers for pipeline network informa- tion like the nationwide management system of pipeline net data information (BIL) are currently based on avail- able two-dimensional geographical data. These data are received from responsible gas net operators with a certain degree of incompleteness and exactness, for instance, of the depth of a pipeline. The European guideline INfrastructure for SPatial InfoR- mation in Europe (INSPIRE) may lead on a long term ba- sis to more precise electronically available data of critical infrastructures but may involve further potential security weak points. The digitization and the comparison of data from the information of gas net operators and public sources is a challenge within the project. Suitable mea- suring methods, for instance, GPS detection or ultrasonic measurements, must be further optimized to allow the integration of these data from inspection devices. EURIC: EUROPEAN RISK COMMUNICATION PLATFORM A comprehensive protection from external interferences on gas pipelines may be attained if in addition to the construction industry the society or at least potential- ly affected people are integrated. This new concept of protection does not yet exist in any European country, neither in Germany nor in another European land. The population will be involved actively into the protection of critical infrastructure and promote the awareness in public. Analogous to the behavioral employment protec- tion in companies that demand a personal responsibility of their employees for their own safety, the CSE Center of Safety Excellence aims to develop a suitable commu- nication concept and public education program. For this purpose, the risk perception of the population has to be examined regarding the hazards of the critical infra- structure. The risk perception and acceptance of the popu- lation shall be investigated for different risk-based and deterministic concepts of Technical Safety. On this basis, the behavioral pattern of the population in present public information events, can be directed. Risks have to be ap- pointed openly and target-audience-oriented, civil reliance has to be built and converted into a positive attention. To date, the public discussion on technical risks, for exam- ple, in project approval procedures, is mostly only based on a mediation of information that strengthens the secu- rity feeling of the citizens, indeed, but does not promote general attention in the public. Potential hazards are often not addressed but faded-out. The high level of Technical Safety may lead to an “emotion of zero-risk” in the society with the consequence of zero awareness even to obvi- ously risky situations. Instead of acting towards hazard mitigation or following an escape reflex a minority of the society tend to fully fade-out hazardous situations. Hence, an innovative communication draft should be compiled outgoing by current citizen’s information and integrated in new media and topical results of risk perception. For this, qualitative customer surveys will be carried out on the ba- sis of morphological effects and communication research. A major aspect is to develop a communication strategy. The aim of the new communication strategy is to train people’s awareness on risks and to motivate them to re- port potential hazards to a central information system. In this context, the term mindfulness of the public means to understand, detect and report potential hazards or ab- normalities in construction areas. This concept is based on the Nudging Principle and should influence the civil behavior without giving orders or imposing bans. For this, it is essential that a respectable trust base is creat- ed between the population and the gas net operator or a third party (e.g., the CSE Center of Safety Excellence).
RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 49 The strategy should motivate the population to an- nounce potential hazards to a central information system from their point of view, which initiates safety relevant measures according to a risk judgement and informs gas net operators and authorities if necessary. The situational circumstances of those communications must be suited to the typical application procedure (heu- ristics) of nontechnical people. At the same time, an assessment matrix for the classifica- tion of the hazard potential, which is based on simple, au- tomated risk assessment methods, should be developed. In this way, measures can be defined in a catalog, which may be activated depending on the respective hazard message. Thereby, a determination of the necessary infor- mation for the evaluation of potential hazards is essential. SUMMARY The CSE Center of Safety Excellence initiates the Pipe- Secure2020 program with the objective to improve the security of the critical infrastructure gas by protecting the pipeline from external interferences. This should be done (1) by an innovative alarm system for machine operators of excavators and drilling machines and by a further devel- opment to an automatic anti-collision system for such devices. For that, precise local geo-data of gas pipelines are needed. The development of (2) risk-based commu- nication measures has the aim of encouraging not only machine operators, but also the population according to the principle of Nudging, so that any impermissible ap- proach to a gas pipeline is preventively avoided. The new program aim to result in a comprehensive new protection approach to pipeline security for critical gas infrastructure. References 1. European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG): 8th EGIG-report 1970-2010, gas pipeline incidents, N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie, Groningen, 2011. 2. Frank Dietzsch (DVGW), Ronny Lange (inetz GmbH), Jonas Schmidinger (bnNETZE GmbH) & Dr. Michael Steiner (Open Grid Europe GmbH). Bestands- und Ereignisdatenerfassung Gas – Ergebnisse aus den Jahren 2011 bis 2014; Energie | wasser-praxis 1/2016 3. www.stern.de/panorama/weltgeschehen/belgien-15-tote-bei-gasexplosion-3072720.html 4. www.spiegel.de/panorama/gasexplosion-in-hessen-100-meter-flamme-schoss-auf-dorf-zu-a-502565.html 5. www.spiegel.de/panorama/ludwigshafen-gasexplosion-hinterlaesst-ein-truemmerfeld-a-999175.html 6. Bundeskartellamt, Bundesnetzagentrur für Elektrizität Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen: Monitoringbericht 2015, März 2016 7. Bundesministerium der Justid und für Verbraucherschutz: Gesete über die Elektrizitäts- und Gasversorgung (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz – EnWG), 2005, Teil 6, S. 86-89 8. Frank Dietzsch (DVGW), Ronny Lange (inetz GmbH), Jonas Schmidinger (bnNETZE GmbH) & Dr. Michael Steiner (Open Grid Europe GmbH). Bestands- und Ereignisdatenerfassung Gas – Ergebnisse aus den Jahren 2011 bis 2014; Energie | wasser-praxis 1/2016 9. European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG): Gas Pipeline Incidents – 9th EGIG Report; Februar 2015 10. www.stern.de/panorama/weltgeschehen/belgien-15-tote-bei-gasexplosion-3072720.html 11. www.spiegel.de/panorama/gasexplosion-in-hessen-100-meter-flamme-schoss-auf-dorf-zu-a-502565.html 12. www.spiegel.de/panorama/ludwigshafen-gasexplosion-hinterlaesst-ein-truemmerfeld-a-999175.html 13. European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG): Gas Pipeline Incidents – 9th EGIG Report; Februar 20 14. A. Meyer: Gasleitung zerstört: Großeinsatz der Alheimer Wehren; Mai 2016; HNA; URL: www.hna.de/ lokales/rotenburg-bebra/alheim-ort317754/gasleitung-zerstoert-grosseinsatz-alheimer-wehren- 6380747. html (Stand 30.09.2016) 15. F. Betthausen: Baggerfahrer reißt Gasleitung auf; Mai 2016; URL: www.mittelbayerische.de/region/cham/ gemeinden/cham/baggerfahrer-reisst-gasleitung-auf-22798- art1384632.html (Stand 30.09.2016) 16. Tegernseerstimme: Bagger reißt Gasleitung ab, Juni 2016,URL: www.tegernseerstimme.de/bagger-reisst- gasleitung-ab/214203.html (Stand 30.09.2016) 17. Wiesbadener Kurier: Gasleitung in Hattenheim beschädigt, Juli 2016; URL: www.wiesbadener- kurier.de/ lokales/rheingau/eltville/gasleitung-in-hattenheim-beschaedigt_17085954.htm (Stand 30.09.2016) 18. 18 Focus NWMI/Wunsiedel PI: Gasleitung angebaggert, August 2016; URL: www.focus.de/regional/bayern/ wunsiedel-polizei-gasleitung-angebaggert_id_5814681.html (Stand 30.09.2016) 19. Wiesbadener Kurier: Unfall an Gasleitung in Wiesbaden-Erbenheim: Bauarbeiter durch Stichflamme schwer verletzt, August 2016; URL: www.wiesbadener-kurier.de/lokales/wiesbaden/nachrichten-wiesbaden/ unfall- an-gasleitung-in-wiesbaden-erbenheim-bauarbeiter-durch-stichflamme-schwer-verletzt_17234701. htm (Stand 30.09.2016) 20. DPA-OTS/Feuerwehr Heiligenhaus: Gerissene Gasleitung nach Baggerarbeiten (Meldung 26/2016), September 2016; URL: www.focus.de/regional/nordrhein-westfalen/heiligenhaus-unfall-gerissene-gaslei- tung-nach-baggerarbeiten-meldung-26-2016_id_5950542.html (Stand 30.06.2016) 21. DOB: Leck an Gasleitung: Polizeit evakuiert Häuser, September 2016; URL: www.abendblatt.de/region/ stormarn/article208300213/Leck-in-Gasleitung-Polizei-evakuiert-Haeuser.html (Stand 30.09.2016) 22. BGI 759: Schutzmaßnahmen bei Erdarbeiten in der Nähe erdverlegter Kabel und Rohrleitungen; Berufsge- nossenschaft Energie Textil Elektro Medienerzeugniss; September 2010 23. Richard Thaler und Cass Sunstein: Improving decisions about health, wealth and happiness; 2008 Authors Prof. Dr. Jürgen Schmidt Johannes Biernath CSE Center of Safety Excellence CSE Center of Safety Excellence CEO of the CSE-Institute Research Associate email@example.com firstname.lastname@example.org Natalie Schmidt CSE Center of Safety Excellence Research Associate email@example.com
APPLICATION OF PROACTIVE RISK MANAGEMENT IN PIPELINE INTEGRITY Ricardo Almandoz, Debora Veitia > ROSEN Germany
RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 51 ABSTRACT Risk management is an essential element in the pipe- line integrity management process. Risk management involves not only the estimation of risk profiles and com- parison against tolerable criterion but also ensuring that measures to treat the risk are effectively assessed and implemented. Performing risk assessments can assist operators and engineers in understanding critical issues such as: • which threats are more likely to endanger the pipe- line’s integrity, “If risk is managed proactively rather than reactively, operators should be able to apply preventive and mitigate measures early enough to prevent pipeline failure from occurring. In addition, adopting a proactive / preventive strategy would allow resources to be effectively utilized for the optimization of maintenance plans. Ricardo Almandoz • which areas of the pipeline are more susceptible to • failure from the active threats, and if failure occurs, how is the released product likely to be dispersed and possibly affect critical receptors. cus on areas with elevated risk, and assess the benefits of preventative mitigation measures. Managing data and assessments in a suite provides the added benefits of consistency and traceability. If risk is managed proactively rather than reactively, oper- ators should be able to apply preventative and mitigative measures early enough to prevent pipeline failure from occurring. In addition, adopting a proactive/preventative strategy would allow resources to be effectively utilized for the optimization of maintenance plans. Enabling such assessments requires an effective risk model, hence efforts are focused on modelling and estimating the risk of pipeline failure in a quantitative manner. Such models can be highly complex, detailed, and require large amounts of data integration; in addition, they need to generate risk factors in a consistent and transparent manner to support effective decision making. ROSEN’s Quantitative Pipeline Risk Assessment Model (QPRAM) was developed to address the expectations and challenges inherent in identifying and assessing risk factors. QPRAM incorporates probability, consequence, and risk elements into a modular framework, and allows flexible construction of customized models to reflect specific applications such as pipeline location, fluid type, data availability and required level of complexity. This paper describes how the QPRAM methodology was developed and implemented in collaboration with a Eu- ropean gas pipeline operator. A customized risk model was constructed together with the operator to reflect bespoke conditions and challenges associated with the operating environment, known threats, and data avail- ability and quality. The model provides essential risk factors at high-resolution intervals along their lines, and was calibrated using real data to ensure that the result- ing risk profiles are reflective of the threats and operat- ing experience in their region. The integration of pipeline data and the implementa- tion of QPRAM is managed in ROSEN’s Asset Integrity Management Software (ROAIMS) suite. This enables the operator to identify and compare the risk of pipelines in their network, identify active threats to any pipeline, fo- Upon completion of risk assessments, proposed preven- tative and mitigative measures are analyzed together with other integrity assessments such as fitness-for-pur- pose assessments to provide an overall integrity man- agement plan that provides guidance to the operators on what should be done, where and when, to ensure the pipeline’s integrity is proactively managed. INTRODUCTION RISK MANAGEMENT DESCRIPTION Risk management is an essential element in the pipe- line integrity management process. Risk management involves estimation of risk profiles, comparison of the re- sults against tolerable criteria and ensuring measures to treat the risk are effectively assessed and implemented. Often, risk is evaluated up to the ‘assessment’ stage i.e. efforts are focused on defining models, processing data for executing analyses to generate probability, conse- quence and risk factors, and then comparing the results with acceptability thresholds, or simply generating risk metrics to visualize the results. Identifying areas of inter- est is clearly not enough to prevent assets from failing, therefore the ‘management’ aspect involves assessing and implementing effective preventative & mitigative (P&M) measures to treat and control the risk. Risk assessment is an essential step in the process of supporting operators with proactive decision making. Identifying points or areas of interest along the pipeline asset not only provides an awareness of the likelihood of failure or degradation due to credible drivers at spe- cific locations, as well as the potential elevated impacts to receptors in the case of failure, but more importantly assists in determining when and where to apply P&M measures. However, reaching this stage relies heavily on meaningful assessment results, which are often chal- lenging to achieve.
52 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY Various fundamental aspects must be properly ad- dressed in order to reach the milestone of being able to effectively manage risk. These include: Enabling an effective strategy: The risk approach should meet key principles (e.g. should be an integral element of the IM process, should assist with decision making, should be systematic and continuous, transparent and consistent), have a framework for implementation, be well communicated, and continuously executed and monitored. The ISO 31000 [Ref.1] standard provides generic guidelines on the principles, framework and pro- cess that could be applied for risk management. Other pipeline-specific guidelines such as ASME B31.8S [Ref. 2], IGEM TD/2 [Ref. 3] or DNV RP F116 [Ref. 4] provide recommendations for managing integrity and risk. Oper- ators often reference these guidelines while producing their individual corporate frameworks. An effective strat- egy should facilitate continual improvement and en- hancement of risk management within an organization. Defining an effective risk model: There are document- ed and known risk model classes, ranging from simple ‘qualitative’ models depending largely on subject matter, expert judgement, and producing risk results in relative terms, to more complex ‘quantitative’ models that re- quire large quantities of numeric input data, remove sub- jectivity, and yield results in absolute terms. To assess risk, an effective risk model and structure is required in order to estimate the risk factor results. The risk model is a set of structured rules (algorithms) that use available information and data relationships to estimate the per- formance of the system from a risk perspective. Although there are several guideline documents ad- dressing risk assessments of pipelines, such as ASME B31.8S [Ref. 2] for onshore gas transmission pipelines or DNV RP F116 [Ref. 4] for offshore pipelines, there is no industry standard for defining uniformity among risk models. As such, models developed and applied in the industry vary considerably in their complexity, structure, effectiveness and usability. There is an art and a skill to finding a balance between factors such data availability, complexity, integrating subjectivity and absolute infor- mation, tailoring models to meet bespoke conditions, and result transparency, consistency and interpretability when defining effective models. Gathering and integrating effective data: Having a model alone does not produce risk results; a risk model is basi- cally a placeholder, and only when data is introduced are profiles of the risk factors generated. Managing data can have several associated challenges, including but not limited to access and editing by multiple users, availabil- ity, quality and security, inconsistency with formats and database structures, processing, alignment and integra- tion into a centralized repository, onerous and increas- ing data volume, and resource availability. As expressed in the point above, data availability and accuracy is an important influencing factor for tailoring risk models; sometimes adopting a phased approach to updating and fine-tuning models relative to data availability is recom- mended. Data is usually reflective of a snapshot in time, therefore it is important to continuously gather, process and integrate data to assess risk throughout the asset’s lifecycle. Availability, accuracy and integration of data in a timely and consistent manner is also critical for yield- ing meaningful risk results. Generating meaningful, interpretable & consistent results: The pipeline industry is tending to more semi-quantitative and quantitative risk approaches that require objective measures of probability, consequence and risk factors. Results yielded from analyses should therefore be quan- tifiable, measurable and comparable. Analyses can return extensive results, however expressing metrics in a way that optimally supports decision making is important. Us- ing combined views of matrixes, charts, tables, and maps assists with visualizing, assessing, understanding, and communicating results, as well as planning treatment ac- tivities. Transparency and consistency of results, and the ability to assess different levels of detail, from overview profiles to root causes, are also necessary. Results pro- duced from an analysis are usually compared with tolera- ble criterion to identify and differentiate areas that exceed acceptable thresholds and therefore require treatment. Performing sensitivity analyses: Upon identifying areas of interest from the assessment stage, various feasi- ble P&M measures should be assessed to control and reduce the risk to within a tolerable level. This is often supported by a carrying out a combination of what-if sensitivity and cost-benefit analyses. These measures are barriers that if effectively applied could reduce the pipeline’s likelihood of degradation and even failure; these include a combination of treatment, maintenance, inspection, surveying, assessment, repair/rehabilitation and quality assurance activities. Obtaining a practica- ble balance between cost, gain, loss, and timing of P&M measures is required, although potentially challenging. QPRAM METHODOLOGY ROSEN’s Quantitative Pipeline Risk Assessment Model (QPRAM) was developed to address expectations and challenges with identifying and assessing risk factors. Although pipeline risk and integrity management is a global challenge, the issues faced can be very local and individual. Therefore, having the flexibility to tailor the risk model to address bespoke conditions and challeng- es associated with the operating environment, known threats, data availability, and quality is important.
RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 53 applied to the historic failure frequency to generate a modified failure frequency profile along the pipeline. When the mech- anistic, operational and environmental con- ditions and the preventative and mitigative measures vary along the pipeline, a new dynamic segmentation is produced. Inspection data (such as from an intel- ligent inline inspection) and associated assessments (such as fitness for service) provide relatively accurate information regarding presence, size, and criticality of anomalies in the pipeline, which in turn can be used to infer the presence and severity of the active threat in the line. This data (if available and relevant) is then compared with the modified failure frequency to generate a refined failure frequency profile along the pipeline. The result is a highly detailed profile of the modified (or refined) failure frequency val- ues showing the variation relative to historic frequency. Thus, areas of the pipeline are identified that are more or less likely to fail than average (baseline) and by how much. The QPRAM workflow contains modular elements which aid in estimating risk factors QPRAM incorporates probability, consequence and risk elements into a modular framework and allows flexibility in constructing customized models to reflect specific applications such as pipeline location, fluid type, data availability, subject matter expert input, and required level of complexity. THREAT ANALYSIS QPRAM provides a common framework for evaluat- ing the likelihood of failure due to credible threats by assessing the historic failure frequency of the pipeline system with a combination of mechanistic, operational and environmental conditions. The model assesses the severity of conditions that could affect the pipeline’s integrity degradation, and compares the severity against the quality and effectiveness of passive and active pre- ventative and mitigative measures. Historic failure frequency is a fundamental input to the model and should ideally reflect expected local condi- tions; however if this data is not available, regional or na- tional statistics could be used. The severity of the driving mechanistic, operational and environmental conditions, combined with the quality and effectiveness of preventa- tive and mitigative measures, produce a ratio that is then CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS The aim of the consequence analysis is to estimate the relative impact to receptors in close proximity to and along the pipeline should the pipeline fail. To this end, QPRAM utilizes a common 4-stage process: 1. Characterize the most likely failure scenarios: If a pipe- line fails due to a specific credible threat, the failure mode likelihood (leak vs full bore rupture) is assessed. Upon release of the product in the environment, vary- ing credible failure scenarios are evaluated, leading to the development of an event tree. Common simplified scenarios are rupture of the pipeline followed by im- mediate ignition of the product, resulting in jet fire, or leak of the pipeline followed by no ignition. 2. Calculate the hazard zone: Depending on the sce- nario being assessed, the impact could affect a zone relative to the failure point along the pipeline. For example, the scenario of a rupture of the pipeline followed by immediate ignition of the product result- ing in a jet fire produces thermal radiation, and the intensity of this radiation at varying distances from the fire could be determined using a point source method [Ref. 5]. By considering tolerable thermal ra- diation intensity thresholds, associated impact radii could be calculated to determine hazard zone areas.
54 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY 3. Identify receptors likely to be affected: Receptors such as people, environment and infrastructure that could be affected by the failure are identified. The pipeline and surrounding receptors are constructed within a Geographical Information Systems (GIS) en- vironment, and detailed spatial queries are executed at regular intervals along the pipeline to identify where receptors could be affected within the hazard zone of a potential failure scenario. 4. Estimate the potential damage to affected receptors: The severity of the impact to the receptors from the respective scenario is estimated both separately and holistically using a common metric. This could be measured for example in cost-specific terms, expect- ed fatality, or interruption of supply. Not only the impact to physical receptors within the hazard zone is estimated, but also economic impacts (including loss of product & production, and repair and recom- missioning costs), as well as less tangible impacts such as company image (including confidence, share price, etc.) are assessed. RISK ASSESSMENT Risk of failure is the product of probability of failure results (from the threat analysis) and the consequences of failure results (from the consequence analysis). Prob- ability, consequence, and risk values can be mapped to categorizations and compared on metrics such as corporate risk matrices. Additional risk metrics such as distance-based profiles of the risk value could be gener- ated, showing the total risk or comparing the risk among the credible threats; such profiles highlight points or ar- eas of interest. Risk factor profiles could also be visual- ized on a map view to associate segments with elevated probability, consequence or risk with spatial data sets such as populated areas, infrastructural density or envi- ronmental hotspots. IMP DESCRIPTION The Integrity Management Plan (IMP) is developed to set out the requirements for future inspection, monitoring and maintenance activities to control and mitigate credi- Section Length (km) Construction date (year) Diameter (inch) Wall thickness (mm) Pipe Material Design Pressure (MPa) MAOP (MPa) 1 2 45 80 1972–1973 1973–1974 28 28 6.5/7.92/10.31 6.5/7.92/10.31 X60 Х60С X60 Х60С 5.4 5.4 4.8 5.4 Table 1: Pipeline characteristics Figure 1: RA Results: Risk category profile
14TH PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE 18-21 MARCH 2019, ESTREL CONVENTION CENTER, BERLIN www.pipeline-conference.com Sponsors ble integrity threats and risk. The plan compares historical activities to the latest risk and integrity related assess- ments to determine the appropriateness and frequency of future activities. Examples of integrity-related assess- ments which could be integrated into an IMP include fitness-for-purpose assessments and risk assessments. The proposed activities and frequencies outlined in an IMP should support product transmission under safe and reliable conditions. Risk Assessment and IMP should be regularly reviewed to ensure that credible threats are being properly managed. Changes to the operation of a pipeline or surrounding environment should trigger a review or re-assessment. In addition to the generation of an action plan, key per- formance indicators should be set to measure the effec- tiveness of the plan and subsequent activities. Examples of these performance metrics include: • Say/do ratio (activities planned vs activities com- pleted during the measurement period) • Maintenance effectiveness (planned maintenance • hours vs unplanned maintenance hours) Risk reduction (difference between the risk from the start to the end of the measurement period) • Non-compliance tasks (number of reported vs • non-compliance tasks in the measurement period) Repair Reduction (number of planned repairs follow- ing the next inline inspection vs the current plan) CASE STUDY The QPRAM methodology was applied in a gas pipeline; characteristics are shown in Table 1. There have been four identified failures in this pipe- line, two of which were attributable to stress corrosion cracking. The primary impact was product loss. The data required for risk assessment includes inline inspection, above ground-surveys, gas composition, and operation- al parameters. The consequence model expresses the potential consequence of failure in terms of cost (BLV). These values are dependent upon local factors such as labor and material costs. The results of the threat and consequence analyses were combined to calculate the risk along the pipeline and highlight those areas where the risk is higher so that recommendations could be generated to reduce the risk to acceptable levels. The risk results are displayed in Figure 1. When the results are expressed in terms of probability and cost (per event), the risk value is an expression of the liability i.e. the average cost of failure per year. The stacked PoF, CoF and Risk Profiles are displayed in Figure 2.
56 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY Figure 2: RA Results: PoF, CoF & Risk profiles
RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 57 As can be noticed, the highest risk value (~142 BLV/year) occurs at ~121000 m, where the section is adjacent to one of the more populated areas, including roads, and also has a relatively high likelihood of failure. An alterna- tive way of viewing the risk results is cumulatively, as displayed in Figure 3. Figure 4 below provides a comparative distance-based view of the risk profiles of the threats. As can be seen, third-par- ty damage (TPD) is the most critical threat for this line; it clearly yields the higher PoF profiles. Thus it makes sense to prioritize resources to mitigate this threat. For the case in question, the focus will be on assessing the risk from TPD. The cumulative risk for the pipeline was 3,245 BLV/year. While the risk is fairly uniform along the length of the pipeline, with small peaks at populated locations, this chart shows that almost half the risk cumulates in the final 25 km (~1/5) of the pipeline. Any risk reduction measures deployed in this section would have a significant effect on the overall risk. In cumulative terms, it is the risk of third-party damage in the final 25 km that is of primary significance here. Once the main drivers for the primary threat are identi- fied, sensitivity analyses can be performed to define a maintenance plan to treat the elevated risk. It is important to mention that before applying corrective or preventive actions, a quality check of the data used for the assess- ment must be executed. Additional data collection or review could also be required to reduce any uncertainty that might exist regarding the analysis. The main aim of the operator is to focus efforts on reducing failure frequency and preventing failure, since there are lim- ited activities possible that could reduce the consequences. Operators therefore need to identify which threats increase the risk of failure, and define a strategy to mitigate them. The Driver Mitigation Ratio (DMR) charts provide a good indication of the root causes/leading factors that increase susceptibility, which is helpful in determining where to invest the resources. Figure 5 illustrates the profile of the DMR along the line for each driver of TPD. Figure 4: RA Results: Fixed Segmentation (Total PoF profile) Figure 3: RA Results: Risk Profile and Cumulative Risk
58 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY Figure 5 shows the drivers for TPD that vary the most along the line, which are pipe disposition, population near ROW, parallel pipelines in ROW (same operator) and areas susceptible to external interference in ROW. One recom- mendation to consider for reducing this effect is to in- crease patrolling of the last 25 km of the line to twice per year, especially because this is an influential area where considerable consequences would be likely to arise from third party damage. Another recommendation might be to inform the local population and landowners, perhaps with the support of the public education system and to ensure the effectiveness of the public education system. IMP As mentioned before, IMP compares historical activities to the latest risk- and integrity-related assessments to determine the maintenance plan. For the case in ques- tion, data from fitness-for-purpose assessments, records of inspection, and monitoring and maintenance frequen- cies were also taken into consideration. Considering TPD as the most critical threat in this case, some important findings from the overall review should be mentioned: • • The pipeline route is predominantly rural with a small proximity to villages (~15%). The nominal burial depth is 0.9 m and the line is buried for its length with the exception of 3 above- ground crossings. These locations are noted as having an increased wall thickness of 10.31 mm as mitigation against impact. • One dent was not reported by the ILI due to being outside the detection capacity of the inspection tool. The defect is considered top of line and was identi- fied as possible gouging, and may therefore be due to third-party damage. This defect was initially discov- ered in 2013, after which the section was recoated. • A procedure for regularly informing landowners of the presence of the pipeline and potential dangers of causing damage does not exist. There is a legis- lative requirement to maintain a 200 m right of way in respect to high pressure gas pipelines. Surveil- lance of this area is carried out at fixed intervals (annually) but the survey frequency does not take population density into account. Based on the analysis performed, some recommenda- tions could be considered to support the continued safe, reliable and environmentally responsible operation of the pipeline, such as: • A third-party damage prevention program should be • • developed, including landowner and public liaison. Following its implementation, the effectiveness of the program should be subject to regular review. Surveillance activities should be planned and executed using a risk-based approach that priori- tizes high-consequence areas. Generally speaking, these areas cover the final 25 km of the pipeline. Regarding the single top-of-line dent, previous rec- ommendations should be reviewed to ensure they were completed. If no recommendations or actions were completed, the following should be carried out: • • • Consult records (e.g. surveillance reports, land access records, etc.) to determine if the dent is located in an area at risk for third-party damage. If the dent is located in an area at high risk for third party damage, execute a local above- ground survey at the location of the dent to de- termine if there is associated coating damage. If the dent has associated coating damage, it should be excavated to determine its origin and significance, and repaired as appropriate based on the findings. Figure 5: RA Results: Driver Mitigation Ratio TPD
RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 59 Based on the recommendations from IMP, a sensitivity analysis was performed to evaluate the risk-reduction effectiveness of these actions before their implemen- tation. This resulted in a reduction in the PoF profile, as shown in Figure 6. As can be noticed, the implementation of some mitigation actions is able to significantly reduce the risk. Table 2 shows the comparison between total length in each risk category before and after the mitigations. The 78% reduc- tion of total length in the high-risk category is remarkable. Original After mitigations Risk Category Length (m) Very Low 108662.90 Low Medium High 12702.83 2668.36 1505.85 Length (m) 108662.90 12810.85 3727.69 338.51 Table 2: Length by risk category comparison Figure 6: RA Results: PoF profile comparison (before and after mitigations) Figure 7: RA Results: Risk for TPD (before and after mitigation)
60 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT / TECHNOLOGY Figure 8: RA Results : Cumulative risk (after mitigations on TPD) After implementing these simple actions, the highest risk value is 100 BLV/year at ~111000 m, corresponding with one populated area. At the previous location with highest risk at ~121000 m the risk value was reduced to 97 BLV/year. With these actions the cumulative risk was reduced by 6% (cumulative risk is now 3,058 BLV/year). CONCLUSION As was explained, ROSEN’s Quantitative Pipeline Risk Assessment Model (QPRAM) is a methodology that takes into account the particular conditions for each operator, which is a great advantage over other available methods. Particularly noteworthy is the ability to perform this kind of analysis after risk assessment, making this is a power- ful tool that allows operators to optimize resources. This is especially welcome when dealing with restrictions. Operators can also define a maintenance plan based on their possibilities and available resources through sensi- tivity analyses that help them assess the optimized risk treatment options. As a result, reactive maintenance will tend to decrease as proactive maintenance increases, leading to a reduc- tion of the maintenance budget and ultimately a more reliable system. References  ISO 31000, Risk Management, 2015  ASME B31.8S, Managing system integrity of gas pipelines, 2016  IGEM/TD/2 Edition 2, Transmission and Distribution (TD) – Assessing the risks from high pressure natural gas pipelines, 2015  DNV RP F116, Integrity Management of submarine pipeline systems, 2017  C-FER Report 99068, A Model for Sizing High Consequence Areas associated with Natural Gas Pipelines, 2000 Authors Ricardo Almandoz ROSEN Germany Risk and Integrity Engineer firstname.lastname@example.org Debora Veitia ROSEN Germany Risk and Integrity Engineer email@example.com
EUROPE’S LEADING PIPELINE CONFERENCE & EXHIBITION 14TH PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE 18-21 MARCH 2019, BERLIN, GERMANY Seminars organized within the framework of the Pipeline Technology Conference 2019 18 MARCH 2019 SEMINAR TOPICS Pipeline Life-cycle Extension Strategies Inspection Technologies forTraditional and Challenging Pipelines Risk Assessment and Management of Pipeline Project subjected to Geohazards Inspection of Offshore Pipelines and Risers ein Event Euro Institute for Information and Technology Transfer Mehr Informationen unter: www.pipeline-conference.com/seminars
62 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL INDUSTRY NEWS DENSO GROUP GERMANY – DENSOLEN® USED FOR FIELD-JOINT COATING ON HIGH-PRESSURE NATU- RAL GAS LINES IN UPPER BAVARIA, GERMANY DENSO Group Germany, manufacturer of corrosion prevention systems for welded seam coatings, rehabil- itation and complete pipe coatings, is supplying corro- sion prevention materials for approximately 3,000 steel pipe welded seams for the construction of the MONACO transport line in the east of Munich. The DENSOLEN® 2-tape system – proven over decades of use – will be installed on a 40-kilometre stretch of pipeline with nominal diameters of up to DN 1200, using highly developed application equipment. The DENSO- LEN®-N60/-S20 system is designed for use at consis- tently high operating temperatures, making it the ideal solution for this long-distance natural gas line, which can withstand pressures of up to 100 bar. The tape sys- tem has convinced in other major pipeline projects such as OPAL and NEL in Germany. Reliable and precise application of corrosion prevention tape using automatic machine technology For the customer, automation is a very important con- sideration. The petrol-fuelled or electric DENSOMAT®-11 wrapping devices guarantee a high level of application reliability, and automatically maintain a constant winding tension and overlap width. Three of these machines will be available for use on the pipeline. Mr. Bockstaele, Head of QSHE at the leading construction company DENYS, mentioned that due to the DENSOMAT®-11 the workload of the workers could be reduced as this wrapping device is “easily twice as fast” as manual application equipment. sites that are difficult to access, such as the steep slope that will present an installation challenge in this project. With the DENSOLEN® tape systems and the accompanying specially designed, reliable DENSO- MAT® wrapping devices, DENSO is providing a complete corrosion pre- vention solution for the field-joint coating of the steel pipes. The MONACO long-dis- tance natural gas line ensures that gas can be transported as required from and to the large nat- ural gas storage facilities in Bavaria and Austria. Completion of the work is scheduled for 2018; the new pipeline will be com- missioned later that year. More information is avail- able at www.denso.de. Steep slope at the installation site of the high-pressure gas line MONACO in Upper Bavaria The smaller winding device DENSOMAT®-KGR Junior is manually operated, light and exceptionally flexible. It is ideal for coating of short pipe bends or for use on Contact: Michael Schad Head of Sales International Email: firstname.lastname@example.org Fast and precise application of DENSOLEN®-N60/-S20 Reliable application with the DENSOMAT®-11
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 63 INDUSTRY NEWS TAL - Transalpine pipeline commissions world’s first crude oil “run-of-pipeline” power plant Crude oil flow becomes elec- tricity - at least in the Austrian Alps. The TAL - Transalpine Oil Pipeline - which delivers crude oil from Trieste, Italy, via the Alps to Germany and Austria, put the first crude oil “run-of-pipeline” power plant worldwide in operation on the 21st of September 2018. The plant is able to produce emission-free electricity, using the same principle as the hydro- electric power plants: the kinetic energy of the crude oil is used to drive a turbine that produces the electricity. Local geography makes this possible, because of one the major challenges the TAL has to face - the differences in altitude along the pipeline route, which add-up to 1,600 meters. TAL has now de- veloped an innovative method of generating electricity along the longest downfall along its route. The kinetic energy of the crude oil is built up by the downfall and drives a turbine in the valley below. It is noteworthy that this is a Francis-Turbine, the first ever to be installed in a crude oil pipeline. The turbine is a prod- uct of the Austrian company Global Hydro and TAL has installed it at the Taimeralm in the municipality of Mitter- sil at an altitude of 1,335 meters above sea level. Alessio Lilli, General Manager of the TAL Group, stressed that “with this globally unique project, the TAL will make a contribution to environmentally friendly energy supply in Austria and significantly increase its energy efficiency”. Project manager Markus Mühlmann describes the ca- pacity of the unique project at the ceremonial inaugura- 2.000 1.500 1.000 500 Höhe (m) 0 tion of the plant: “The annual working capacity is around 11.5 GWh. The maximum continuous output in normal operation is 2,500 kW.” The amount of energy generat- ed corresponds to around twelve percent of the current energy consumption of the local segment of the Tran- salpine pipeline and could supply 3,000 households. In 2017, a volume of 42.4 million tons of crude oil flowed through the TAL. Compared to the previous year, this is an increase of 2.4 percent. ILF Consulting Engineers Austria GmbH was responsible for planning the plant. The construction took three years and required an investment of 11 million €. Another char- acteristic of the Taimeralm facility is its location in the heart of a national park. To ensure that the plant fits in well with its surroundings, it was built with a green roof and a wooden facade. Hochpunkt Felbertauern (1.573m) Taimeralm (1.336m)
64 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL CONFERENCES / SEMINARS / EXHIBITIONS 14TH PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE Pipeline T Europe’s Leading Pipeline Conference and Exhibition 18-21 MARCH 2019, ESTREL CONVENTION CENTER, BERLIN, GERMANY Conference 2010 18 MARCH 2019 ptc Side conferences and Seminars EVENT PREVIEW 700+ DELEGATES 80+ EXHIBITORS 50+ DIFFERENT NATIONS From 18-21 March 2019 Europe’s leading conference and exhibition on pipeline systems, the Pipeline Technology Conference, will take place for the 14th time. The core ptc (19-21) will be supplemented with two side conferences and a number of seminars, taking place on 18th of march. ptc 2019 offers again opportunities for operators as well as technology and service providers to exchange latest onshore and offshore technologies and new developments supporting the energy strategies world-wide. More than 700 delegates and 80 exhibitors are expect- ed to participate in the 14th ptc in Berlin. The practical nature of ptc was always based on the cooperation with our technical and scientific supporters and on a top-class interna- tional advisory committee. The conference will feature lectures and presentations on all aspects surrounding oil, gas, water and product high, medium and low pressure pipeline systems. Please take a closer look into he “First Announcement and Call for Papers” and get involved now - send in your presentation suggestion and reserve your booth at the exhibition.
CONFERENCES / SEMINARS / EXHIBITIONS PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 65 Pipeline T Conference 2010 14TH PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE & EXHBITION EUROPE’S LEADING PIPELINE EVENT THE ANNUAL GATHERING OF THE INTERNATIONAL PIPELINE COMMUNITY IN THE HEART OF EUROPE After starting as a small side event of the huge HANNOVER MESSE trade show in 2006, the Pipe- line Technology Conference developed into Eu- rope’s largest pipeline conference and exhibition. Since 2012 the EITEP Institute organizes the ptc on its own and moved the event to Berlin in 2014. EXHIBITORS OF PTC 2018: 70+ Pipeline Operators 16 thematic focuses at ptc 2019 Construction Corrosion Protection Cyber Security Fiber Optic Sensing Inline Inspection Integrity Management Leak Detection Maintenance & Repair Materials Offshore Technologies Operational Improvements Planning & Design Pump & Compressor Stations Qualification & Recruitment Trenchless Technologies Valves & Fittings 2 ptc Side Conferences on • Qualification & Recruitment • Public Perception 4 ptc Seminars • Inspection Technologies for Traditional and Challenging Pipelines • Inspection of Offshore Pipe- lines and Risers • Pipeline Life-cycle Extension Strategies • Risk Assessment and Man- agement of Pipeline Projects subjected to Geohazards
66 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL CONFERENCES / SEMINARS / EXHIBITIONS Platinum Sponsors Golden Sponsors Silver Sponsors ptc Marketing Power Take advantage of the reach and power of ptc with a multi-faceted marketing program designed specifically to benefit the sponsors appearing at ptc 2019. Pre-Event Marketing • Adverts in Media Partner Journals • ptc Website • Pipeline Technology Journal (ptj) • ptc + ptj Newsletter • Press Releases • • Brochures • Direct Mailings • Promotion at Networking Events Social Media Activities During the Event Social Media Activities • Brochure in Conference Bag • • Networking Events • Conference Breaks within Exhibition Area Post-Event Marketing • Press Releases • ptc + ptj Newsletter • • • ptc Website • Pipeline Technology Journal (ptj) Final Report Social Media Activities 30K Verified Addresses 22 Media Partners >2K Followers on social networks Get in touch with us if you would like to get to know more about our sponsoring Opportunities. 42 Advisory Committee Members 16 Supporting Associations
CONFERENCES / SEMINARS / EXHIBITIONS PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 67 CONFIRMED EXHIBITORS AS OF 25.10.2018 REGISTER YOUR STAND AT www.pipeline-conference.com/stand-booking 50+ DIFFERENT NATIONS DELEGATIONS FROM 70+ DIFFERENT PIPELINE OPERATORS FROM ALL AROUND THE WORLD 700+ DELEGATES 80+ EXHIBITORS 100+ PRESENTATIONS 25 TECHNICAL SESSIONS ACCOMPANYING SCIENTIFIC POSTER SHOW THEMATIC FOCUSES: CONSTRUCTION CORROSION PROTECTION CYBER SECURITY FIBER OPTIC SENSING INLINE INSPECTION INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT LEAK DETECTION MAINTENANCE & REPAIR MATERIALS OFFSHORE TECHNOLOGIES OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS PLANNING & DESIGN PUMP & COMPRESSOR STATIONS QUALIFICATION & RECRUITMENT TRENCHLESS TECHNOLOGIES VALVES & FITTINGS
68 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL CONFERENCES / SEMINARS / EXHIBITIONS JOB & CAREER MARKET YOUR OPPORTUNITY TO ATTRACT PROFESSIONALS AND HIGH POTENTIALS The international pipeline community is in need of additional personnel. We need more experienced pro- fessionals, but we also need young graduates to join our ranks. Despite attractive working conditions, many companies encounter problems while they are reaching out to potential re- cruits. There are many competing in- dustry sectors who are also in need of high potentials. This results in many vacant jobs in the pipeline community, for operators, technology providers and service providers alike. This necessity has driven us to develop a new service for the global pipeline indus- try. For this reason, we organize the first ptc side conference on Qualification and Recruitment. ptc side conference on Qualification and Recruitment 18 March 2019 Estrel Convention Center Berlin, Germany In the frame of
CONFERENCES / SEMINARS / EXHIBITIONS PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 69 ONE SERVICE - MULTIPLE CHANNELS International Universities Offensive approach: We push forward and gen- erate attention to our career market directly at the universities. We also collect CVs from inter- national graduates and experts and forward it directly to you. Website Continuous promotion : Your vacancies are published on the Pipeline Technology Journal (ptj) website. In Addition, the ptj contains your vacancies too. Biweekly Newsletter Dead on target: We send your vacancies or your company profile to our database of 50,000 international pipeline professionals. International Events Physical appearance: The job & career market has an indi- vidual booth during all EITEP events. Questions? You get: Please contact Mr. Admir Celovic for further information and booking requests. email@example.com +49 / 511 / 90992-20 The most cost-effective support to your recruitment efforts available to the market
70 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL COMPANY DIRECTORY Association IAOT - International Association of Oil Transporters Czech Republic www.iaot.eu/ DVGW - German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water Germany www.dvgw.de Automation Siemens Germany www.siemens.com Yokogawa Japan www.yokogawa.com Certification Bureau Veritas Germany www.bureauveritas.de DNV GL Norway www.dnvgl.com TÜV SÜD Indutrie Service Germany www.tuev-sued.de/is Cleaning Reinhart Hydrocleaning Switzerland www.rhc-sa.ch/rhc/ Coating 1/2 Denso Germany www.denso.de Kebulin-gesellschaft Kettler Germany www.kebu.de Coating 2/2 Polyguard Products United States www.polyguard.com Premier Coatings United Kingdom www.premiercoatings.com/ RPR Technologies Norway www.rprtech.com/ Shawcor United States www.shawcor.com TDC International Switzerland www.tdc-int.com TIAL Russia www.tial.ru TIB Chemicals Germany www.tib-chemicals.com Construction 1/2 BIL Germany bil-leitungsauskunft.de Herrenknecht Germany www.herrenknecht.com IPLOCA - International Pipe Line & Offshore Contractors Association Switzerland www.iploca.com MAX STREICHER Germany www.streicher.de/en Petro IT Ireland www.petroit.com
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 71 COMPANY DIRECTORY Inline Inspection 2/2 LIN SCAN United Arab Emirates www.linscaninspection.com NDT Global Germany www.ndt-global.com Pipesurvey International Netherlands www.pipesurveyinternational.com PPSA - Pigging Products and Services Association United Kingdom www.ppsa-online.com Romstar Malaysia www.romstargroup.com Rosen Switzerland www.rosen-group.com Inspection Ametek – Division Creaform Germany www.creaform3d.com Applus RTD Germany www.applusrtd.com EMPIT Germany www.empit.com Integrity Management Metegrity Canada www.metegrity.com Pipeline Innovations United Kingdom www.pipeline-innovations.com Construction 2/2 VACUWORX Netherlands www.vacuworx.com Vlentec The Netherlands www.vlentec.com Construction Machinery Maats Netherlands www.maats.com Worldwide Group Germany www.worldwidemachinery.com VIETZ Germany www.vietz.de Engineering ILF Consulting Engineers Germany www.ilf.com KÖTTER Consulting Engineers Germany www.koetter-consulting.com Inline Inspection 1/2 3P Services Germany www.3p-services.com A.Hak Industrial Services Netherlands www.a-hak-is.com Intero Integrity Services Netherlands www.intero-integrity.com/ KTN AS Norway www.ktn.no
72 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL COMPANY DIRECTORY Leak Detection Asel-Tech Brazil www.asel-tech.com Atmos International United Kingdom www.atmosi.com Direct-C Canada www.direct-c.ca Entegra United States www.entegrasolutions.com GOTTSBERG Leak Detection Germany www.leak-detection.de MSA Germany www.MSAsafety.com/detection OptaSense United Kingdom www.optasense.com Pergam Suisse Switzerland www.pergam-suisse.ch PSI Software Germany www.psioilandgas.com sebaKMT Germany www.sebakmt.com SolAres (Solgeo / Aresys) Italy www.solaresweb.com Monitoring Krohne Messtechnik Germany www.krohne.com Operators TRAPIL France www.trapil.com/en/ Pump and Compressor Stations TNO The Netherlands www.pulsim.tno.nl Repair CITADEL TECHNOLOGIES United States www.cittech.com Clock Spring United States www.clockspring.com RAM-100 United States www.ram100intl.com T.D. Williamson United States www.tdwilliamson.com Research & Development Pipeline Transport Institute (PTI LLC) Russia www.en.niitn.transneft.ru Safety DEHN & SÖHNE Germany www.dehn-international.com/en HIMA Germany www.hima.de Signage Franken Plastik Germany www.frankenplastik.de/en
PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 73 COMPANY DIRECTORY Valves & Fittings AUMA Germany www.auma.com Zwick Armaturen Germany www.zwick-armaturen.de Further boost your brand awareness and list your company within the ptj - Company Directory www.pipeline-journal.net/advertise December 2018 Surface Preparation MONTI - Werkzeuge GmbH Germany www.monti.de Trenchless Technologies GSTT - German Society for Trenchless Technology Germany www.gstt.de Rädlinger Primus Line Germany www.primusline.com In the next Edition of ptj: Integrity Management The next issue of Pipeline Technology Journal (ptj) will address Integrity Management. This is a great opportunity for skilled authors to submit insightful papers and to contribute to the global pipeline industry’s constant professional exchange.
74 PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL CONFERENCES / SEMINARS / EXHIBITIONS GET TO KNOW Euro Institute for Information and Technology Transfer Dr. Klaus Ritter President Eitep Conferences & Exhibitions Marketing & Communication Dennis Fandrich Vice President Rana Alnasir-Boulos Vice President Marian Ritter Director Exhibitions Admir Celovic Director Publications Project Assistants As of 25.10.2018 The EITEP Institute is providing Know-How and Technology-Transfer through international Conferences, Semi- nars and Publications. Our primary objective is to foster the international exchange of state-of-the-art-technolo- gies, in order to provide the latest products and services where they are needed. EITEP is organized in two departments, guided an overseen by the company’s president, Dr. Klaus Ritter, who worked as general manager for professional, technical and scientific associations of the German energy and water supply sector before becoming the founder and president of EITEP. Conferences & Exhibitions The department Conferences & Exhibitions is responsible for the organization of EITEP events, which include the upcoming Pipeline Technology Conference. Also, all exhibitions associated with these events are planed and executed by this department. It is led by Mr. Dennis Fandrich, who is your contact for all matters regarding the Conferences. The exhibitions are organized by Mr. Marian Ritter, he will assist you with all questions regarding the fairs. Marketing & Communication The department Marketing & Communication planes and executes all activities related to the promotion of EI- TEP events and the communication with stakeholders. It is responsible for the publication of professional magazines like the Pipeline Technology Journal (ptj). The department is led by Mrs. Rana Alnasir-Boulos, she is your contact regarding marketing, sales, seminars and special projects. Responsible for our publications is Mr. Admir Celovic. He will assist you with questions regarding the journals edito- rial content and advertisement opportunities. EITEP is supported by the advisory committee AdCo, which consists of 44 senior pipeline professionals from all over the world. They bring in the necessary connection to the profession and valuable technical expertise. To fur- ther support our efforts. All presentations held during our conferences and all publications re- leased by EITEP are checked by the AdCo before cleared for publication. The Advisory Commit- tee is currently led by Heinz Watzka, former Managing Director Technical Services at Germany’s biggest pipeline operator, Open Grid Europe, and Dirk Strack, Technical Director at TAL Group. Additional senior consultants have been recruited as advisors for special issues. Heinz Watzka Dirk Strack
14TH PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE Europe’s Leading Pipeline Conference and Exhibition 18-21 MARCH 2019, ESTREL CONVENTION CENTER, BERLIN, GERMANY 18 MARCH 2019 ptc Side conferences and Seminars www.pipeline-conference.com Next Issue: November 2018 Pipeline Technology Journal In the next Edition of ptj: Planning & Construction www.pipeline-journal.net Event Calendar ADIPEC 12 - 15 November 2018 Abu Dhabi, UAE 14th Pipeline Technology Conference (ptc) 19 - 21 March 2019 Berlin, Germany ptc Side Conferences: on Qualification & Recruitment on Public Perception 18 March 2019 18 March 2019 Berlin, Germany Berlin, Germany
Pipeline Technology Journal You have interesting content to share with the global pipeline community? You want to enhance or maintain your international visibility as a company? Submit an Article! Book an Advertisement ! Use ptj as a platform to report about your news, projects, innovations and technologies. If you are interested in submit- ting insightful technical articles to be considered for the ptj, please send us an abstract for review. North America 37,8% Europe 33.4% Mena Region 6.8% Africa 2.5% South America 4.5% Asia 12.6% China special e-mail list of 20.000 recipients Oceania 2.5% The ptj-brand offers a multitude of advertisement opportunities to increase visibility and reputation to- ward pipeline professionals worldwide. Make use of the extensive ptj-portfolio and reach over 30,000 Experts. ptc ADVISORY COMMITTEE / ptj EDITORIAL BOARD ptj-brand-audiences CHAIRMEN Heinz Watzka, Senior Advisor, EITEP Institute Dirk Strack, Technical Director, TAL - Deutsche Transalpine Oelleitung MEMBERS Ulrich Adriany, Senior Technical Expert, ARCADIS Deutschland Arthur Braga, Country Manager, ITF Brazil Jens Focke, CEO, BIL Maximilian Hofmann, Managing Director, MAX STREICHER Dirk Jedziny, Vice President - Head of Cluster Ruhr North, Evonik Industries Dr. Andreas Liessem, Managing Director, Europipe Ralf Middelhauve, Head of Central Dept. Process Industrie / Plant Engineering and Operation, TÜV NORD Systems Dr. Prodromos Psarropoulos, Structural & Geotechnical Engineer, National Technical University of Athens Uwe Ringel, Managing Director, ONTRAS Gastransport Muhammad Sultan Al-Qahtani, General Manager, Pipelines, Saudi Aramco Filippo Cinelli, Senior Marketing Manager, Baker Hughes, a GE company Andreas Haskamp, Pipeline Joint Venture Management, BP Europa SE Dr. Thomas Hüwener, Managing Director Technical Services, Open Grid Europe Cliff Johnson, President, PRCI - Pipeline Research Council International Michael Lubberger, Senior Prod- uct Manager Pipeline, BU Utility Tunnelling, Herrenknecht Steffen Paeper, Offshore Engineering, South Stream Juan Arzuaga, Executive Secretary, IPLOCA Dr. Marion Erdelen-Peppler, Secretary General, EPRG - European Pipeline Research Group Jörg Himmerich, Managing Di- rector / Technical Expert, Dr.-Ing. Veenker Ing.-ges. Mark David Iden, Director, Gov- ernment Relations, Floating Leaf Mike Liepe, Head Business Solu- tion Line O&G Pipelines, Siemens Brigham McCown, Chairman and CEO, Nouveau Bruno Pomaré, Technical Director, Spiecapag Frank Rathlev, Manager of Network Operations, Thyssengas Dr. Joachim Rau, Managing Director, DVGW CERT Hermann Rosen, President, ROSEN Group Michael Schad, Head of Sales International, DENSO Audience Job Levels 11% CEO 20% Director 26% Manager 43% Executive Company types 23% Operators 61% Techn. / Service Providers 11% Researchers 4% Authorities Dr. Adrian Schaffranietz, Coordi- nator Government Relations, Nord Stream 2 Prof. Dr. Jürgen Schmidt, Manag- ing Director, CSE Center of Safety Excellence Ulrich Schneider, Business Development Manager Continental Europe, KTN Guntram Schnotz, Expert / Pipeline, TÜV SÜD Industrie Service Carlo Maria Spinelli, Technology Planner, eni gas & power Anand Kumar Tewari, Executive Director, Indian Oil Corporation A manifold database Asle Venas, Senior Pipeline Special- ist, DNV GL Paul Waanders, Int. Sales Manager, Maats Pipeline Equipment George Ziborov, Leading expert, Foreign Economic Relations Department, Transneft Bernd Vogel, Head of Network Department, GASCADE Gastransport Tobias Walk, Director of Projects – Pipeline Systems, ILF Consulting Engineers Roger Vogel, Sales Manager - EURA, Baker Hughes, a GE company Thomas Wolf, CEO, NDT Global We deliver content to local practicioners and global decision-makers alike, making the ptj- brand a suitable tool for global knowledge dis- tribution as well as developing and upholding overall visibility in the global pipeline industry.